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Problems of Communism

Book Reviews

Mark N. Katz

Harvey Fireside

JULY-AUGUST 1986

JAPAN CP

Peter A. Berton

Social Policy Under Gorbachëv

Walter D. Connor

Worker Roots of Solidarity

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Moscow and Nuclear War

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Problems of Communism

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JULY-AUGUST 1986 VOL XXXV

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Problems of Communism

Articles

Japanese Eurocommunists: Running in Place

Peter A. Berton

In the recent double election, the Japan Communist Party became the third largest opposition party in the Japanese Diet, moving ahead of the Democratic Socialists. But the JCP's position in the Japanese political arena has never been more precarious. It is isolated from the other parties on the left and no longer can count on its traditional bases of support, the intellectual elite and student and other activists. The JCP's biggest problem, however, is that the Japanese public by and large sees itself not as downtrodden and exploited but as middle class.

Social Policy under Gorbachëv

Walter D. Connor

Examination of Mikhail Gorbachëv's emergent policy in the social arena suggests that it may bring a new discipline to Soviet society; may create, under new conditions of work organization and reward, as many highly-motivated winners as disgruntled losers; may even, by design or by accident, impart a new dynamism in certain areas of Soviet life. However, it is a policy committed to conserving, indeed strengthening the grip of the Soviet state on the critical levers of the social process.

Worker Roots of Solidarity

Roman Laba

Although a general consensus maintains that Polish intellectuals provided the impetus for Solidarity, the demands advanced in 1970, 1971, and 1980 by the workers from the Baltic seacoast indicate that these workers initiated the program and organization of Solidarity. Long before the intellectuals founded the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR) and the Catholic Church became socially active, politically conscious coastal workers clearly set forth the demand for free trade unions which would be later championed by Solidarity. Their concerns extended beyond wage and working conditions within the factory to a systemic critique of the Leninist state--its power and privilege.

Notes

Soviets on Nuclear-War-fighting

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

By the early 1980's, the top Soviet political leadership had incorporated "mutual assured destruction" into Soviet military doctrine. But the Soviet high command, and notably Nikolay Ogarkov, were reluctant to accept this concept, which postulates that in a nuclear war neither the attacker nor the defender can emerge victorious. Marshal Ogarkov was relieved of his position as chief of the General Staff when he continued to insist that a defender could withstand a nuclear first strike and defeat an aggressor after retaliating with a second strike. It is by no means clear that Ogarkov's dismissal means an end to military opposition or that the military has now incorporated mutual assured destruction into Soviet war-fighting strategy.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Shifts in CPSU ID

Wallace Spaulding

The emergence of Anatoliy Dobrynin as Boris Ponomarëv's successor as chief of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party is the occasion for providing an updated listing of current knowledge about who mans the geographic sectors and desks of this important instrumentality of Soviet dealings with communist and other parties outside the Soviet bloc.

Essay-reviews

Soviet Third World Policy

Mark N. Katz

Expanded Soviet involvement in the volatile affairs of the Third World has turned this major portion of the globe into an arena of serious superpower competition and potential confrontation—with vital resources, strategic sea lanes, and political influence at stake. Yet, analysis of Soviet intentions and policies in this area is still underdeveloped. Do Soviet writings about the problems of establishing and maintaining friendly radical regimes in the Third World really evidence a willingness to settle for less, or does the frequent attention of Soviet military writers to cases of Western intervention in the Third World attest to a growing interest on the part of Moscow in like actions? Opportunities and crises will continue to arise in the Third World, lending studies of these issues growing importance.

Dissent and Soviet Society

Harvey Fireside

Recent literature reviewing the history of dissent in the Soviet Union suggests that the state has generally been effective in preventing dissident opinion from challenging party dominance of society. At the same time, it appears that a new cycle of officially sanctioned criticism and change is in full swing, which could generate new ferment among Soviet intellectuals directed at the serious obstacles to reform in the USSR.

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Japanese Eurocommunists: Running in Place

Peter A. Berton

Japan is situated in Asia, but it is an atypical Asian country. It was the first to modernize and industrialize, and the first non-Western country in the modern era to become an imperialist power. Today, Japan is mostly associated with the Western world. In the post–World War II period, Japan followed Germany's example in staging the world's second economic miracle, and in 1964 it became the first non-Western member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). A decade later, in the mid-1970's, Japan joined six of the world's most advanced industrialized democracies, all of which are in Western Europe and North America, to make up the economics-oriented "Big Seven." And in the early 1980's, it overtook the Soviet Union in GNP to become the second largest economy in the world.

It should therefore come as no surprise that by the late 1960's the Japan Communist Party (JCP), which earlier had favored Beijing over Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, openly associated itself with the independent, parliamentarian Eurocommunist parties of Western Europe. In fact, in July 1972, on the occasion of the party's 50th anniversary, the JCP staged an "International Conference on Theory" devoted to the problems encountered by communist parties in advanced capitalist countries. Delegates from the Japanese, Italian, French, Spanish, British, West German, and Australian parties shared parliamentary experiences, compared united front tactics, and discussed methods for making the transition from capitalism to socialism in a democratic setting. The JCP held similar symposia in 1979 and 1982.[1] Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, Japanese and West European Communist leaders exchanged visits, attended each other's party congresses, funerals, and other significant occasions, and constantly exchanged messages. So strong was this association that when I was asked to contribute a chapter on the JCP to a book on Eurocommunism between East and West, it seemed appropriate to entitle it "Euro-Nippo-Communism."[2]

But Eurocommunism has faded in recent years. French Communist cabinet ministers have come and gone, and the percentage of votes received by the Eurocommunist parties in national and local elections has gone down. In fact, the lead article in this journal a few months ago was entitled, "Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism."[3]

What about the Eurocommunist JCP? Has it fared

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[1]See, e.g., *World Peace, National Self-Determination and Social Progess: International Theoretical Symposium Marking the 60th Anniversary of the Japanese Communist Party,* Tokyo, Japan Press Service, 1982.

[2]Peter Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," in Vernon V. Aspaturian et al., Eds., *Eurocommunism Between East and West,* Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1980, pp. 326–62.

[3]Eusebio Mujal-Leon, "Decline and Fall of Spanish Communism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1986, pp. 1–27. See also Julius W. Friend, "After Eurocommunism," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Spring 1986, pp. 55–65.

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any better than its European counterparts, or has it too lost considerable electoral and political support? This essay examines the fortunes of the JCP and offers some thoughts on the JCP's prospects for the immediate and longer term future. Among the topics covered are the JCP's electoral record; its relations with other Japanese opposition parties and its parliamentary behavior; its structure, leadership, and bases of support; its publications empire; its role in communist international front organizations; its recent party congresses; and its relations with other communist parties. In looking at these various aspects of JCP activity, one cannot help but be struck by the persistence of the underlying theme of conflict—the conflict between the desire to instill party discipline and the need to retain and attract new party members by appearing to be "free and democratic," between the need to be "independent" and to distance itself from major ruling communist parties and the desire to be accepted by them. In the end, however, it is a story of stagnation, decline, and growing isolation at home but increasing activity within the international communist movement.

Electoral Record

The electoral record of the JCP reveals as much about electoral politics in Japan as it does about how the JCP is perceived by the Japanese electorate. Japan's National Diet is divided into two houses, the (lower) House of Representatives (*Shugiin*) and the (upper) House of Councillors (*Sangiin*). Elections to the 512-member lower house, by far the more powerful of the two, are held every four years unless dissolved sooner by the prime minister or by the representatives themselves. Elections to the 252-member upper house are fixed at three-year intervals, with half of the seats up for reelection. Councillors serve a six-year term, and represent either a national or a local (prefectural) constituency. There are also elections to local offices, and these are generally held every four years.[4]

House of Representatives. Ten years ago, in the 1976 House of Representatives election, the JCP suffered its first stunning electoral setback since the late 1950's: Communist representation in the lower house was cut in half from 40 to 19 (out of a total of 511), despite an increase in the total vote for Communist candidates from 5.7 million to 6 million (the percentage of the vote was marginally down from 10.88 percent to 10.66 percent). This poor showing reversed a momentum that had begun slowly in the 1950's and 1960's and then increased dramatically as JCP representation in the lower house rose from one member in 1958 to five in 1963 and 1967, to 14 in 1969, and to 40 in 1972 (see Table 1).

How have the Communists fared in the four lower house elections since 1976? The JCP's total vote declined from 6 million in 1976 to 5.8 million in 1979, rose a little to 5.9 million in 1980, then dropped substantially to 5.4 million in 1983 and 1986. Moreover, some rather dramatic fluctuations in JCP representation took place despite relatively small shifts in percentage of total vote. Indeed, although the number of Communist representatives jumped from 19 in 1976 to 41 in 1979, the JCP's percentage of the vote more or less remained at 10.7 percent (see Table 1). In the three subsequent elections, the size of the JCP contingent in the lower house shrank once again, falling to 29 in 1980 and to 27 in 1983 and 1986. The drop in percentage of total vote during the same period was from 10.7 to 9.0.

The erratic relationship between percentage of vote and number of representatives suggests the unique nature of the Japanese electoral system and of the political parties that operate in it. First, there are 130 electoral districts, each generally having three to five seats (only Okinawa prefecture is a single-seat constituency).[5] One peculiarity of the multi-seat electoral districts is that very often only a few thousand votes separate the bottom successful candidate and the top runner-up loser (*jiten*). Multi-seat districts also encourage coalition-building, especially among Japan's small opposition parties. Second, unlike the United States, Japan has no mandatory reapportionment of seats according to population after each decennial census. This means that 40 years of rural migration to the cities has resulted in serious underrepresentation of the urban population in the National Diet. Some electoral districts in the major cities have four times as many voters on their rolls as small towns and rural areas do. Furthermore, within the major megalopolises, there are big discrepancies between the older districts and the new high-rise bedroom communities.

There are six major political parties in Japan. Heading the list is the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the overwhelming victor in the recent double election (upper and lower houses). The LDP—which has benefited greatly from the overrepresenta-

[4]For the most up-to-date analysis of the Japanese political system, see Ronald J. Hrebenar, Ed., *The Japanese Party System: From One-Party Rule to Coalition Government*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986. For analyses of the JCP, see Hong N. Kim, "The JCP's Parliamentary Road," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1977, pp. 19–35; and Paul F. Langer, "The New Posture of the CPJ," *Problems of Communism*, January-April 1971, pp. 14–24.

[5]Following the May 1986 redistricting, one district in Hokkaido now has six seats, and four three-seat constituencies now have only two seats.

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Table 1: JCP and Elections to the House of Representatives, 1946-86[1]

Date of election	Seats won	Votes[2]	Percent of vote
April 1946	5	2,130,000	3.8
April 1947	4	1,000,000	3.7
January 1949	35	2,980,000	9.7
October 1952	0	890,000	2.6
April 1953	1	650,000	1.9
February 1955	2	730,000	2.0
May 1958	1	1,010,000	2.6
November 1960	3	1,150,000	2.9
November 1963	5	1,640,000	4.0
January 1967	5	2,190,000	4.8
December 1969	14	3,190,000	6.8
December 1972	40	5,700,000	10.9
December 1976	19	6,030,000	10.7
October 1979	41	5,760,000	10.7
June 1980	29	5,940,000	10.1
December 1983	27	5,380,000	9.4
July 1986	27	5,380,000	9.0

[1]Beginning with the 1972 election, all figures for seats, votes, and percentages include Communist candidates who ran as independents.
[2]Rounded to the nearest 10,000.

SOURCES: Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi Kyokai, Shin Sayoku—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, p. 258; *Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Dec. 20, 1983; and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 8, 1986.

tion of the rural population, its electoral base—has been in power ever since its formation in 1955. The Japanese Socialists, once unified in a single party, have since 1960 been split into two parties: the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The JSP, the largest opposition party in parliament, is a doctrinaire Marxist organization that maintains close contact with the Soviet Union and China and has until very recently advocated *unarmed* neutrality for Japan. The DSP, one-third the size of the JSP, is a moderate, socialist party not unlike its socialist or labor counterparts in Western Europe. Rounding out the list are the Komeito (or "clean government party,"), the political arm of the mass lay Buddhist organization *Soka Gakkai* (Value Creation Society); the New Liberal Club (NLC), an offshoot of the LDP and at the time of the recent election part of the coalition government headed by the LDP;[6] and the JCP.

At one time, all Japanese political parties except the LDP and the NLC were considered "progressive" parties of the left, but in recent years the Democratic Socialists and the Komeito have shifted toward the center and are today seen as centrist parties ready to participate in a coalition government with the LDP should the latter (together with the NLC) fail to get a working majority in the National Diet. That leaves only the JSP and the JCP as real parties of the left. While the JCP presents a monolithic facade, the JSP is split into left, center, and right wings, the leftist Socialists actually being to the left of the JCP on the political spectrum.

The intersection of party and electoral system has generally been unfavorable to the JCP. In the December 1983 lower house election, for example, 15 candidates won by getting only 40,000 to 50,000 votes, while 15 candidates lost with 100,000 to 130,000 votes. Interestingly, among the successful candidates with the small number of votes, 10 were from the LDP, 2 the JSP, 1 the Komeito, 1 independent, and 1 the JCP. By contrast, 7 JCP candidates lost with over 100,000 votes.[7] Moreover, JCP candidates received over 1 million votes in Hokkaido, Shizuoka, Kanagawa, and Saitama prefectures (the last two are a part of the Tokyo megalopolis), but did not win a single seat of the 70 allotted to these four prefectures.[8]

The JCP was also badly hurt by coalitions made at the local level by other opposition parties. In some districts, JCP candidates may well have won the fourth or fifth seat against candidates of the Komeito or the Democratic Socialists running separately and splitting each other's vote, but lost to a combined Komeito-DSP candidate. In fact, in the December 1983 election, 59 joint candidates were put up in 58 electoral districts and 46 of them won.

Of course, the Communists may pick up some seats in future elections should the DSP and the Komeito (or the JSP for that matter) fail to reach electoral agreements, but such fluctuations in representation associated with the small pluralities of multi-seat districting undermine the party's chances of establishing continuity in parliament. In those elections in which the JCP ended with a smaller number of seats in the lower house, it had a large number of *jiten* runners-up who made it in the next election, only to lose in the election after that. For example, two high-ranking JCP leaders, Kaneko Mitsuhiro,[9] director of the Secretariat, and Murakami Hiromu, a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium, were elected in 1972 in the Tokyo 8th District and Osaka 3rd District, respectively; they both lost in 1976, won in 1979 and 1980, again lost in 1983 (Kaneko by only 3,076 votes), and both won

[6]In early August 1986, following the reduction of its lower house contingent from eight to six members in the July double election, the NLC is in the process of disbanding, with most of its members rejoining the LDP.
[7]*Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Dec. 20, 1983, p. 9.
[8]Ibid., p. 8. In the July 1986 elections, one district each in Hokkaido, Saitama, and Kanagawa prefectures elected a Communist candidate: two of these districts had seats added in the LDP May 1986 redistricting, and further, two of the three newly elected Diet members were runners-up in 1983.
[9]In accordance with Japanese usage, the surname is given first.

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Japan Communist Party Presidium Chairman Fuwa Tetsuzo, left, and JCP Secretary Kaneko Mitsuhiro, right, tally party results in the July 7, 1986, Japanese national elections.

—Yomiuri Shimbun.

again in 1986 (Kaneko by 4,613).[10] In other words, whereas a number of JCP runners-up may well be in a position to win in the next election, by the same token there are a number of successful JCP parliamentarians whose margin of victory is precariously thin. This was perhaps best illustrated in the 1986 election as Senaga Kamejiro, one of the vice-chairmen of the Presidium, won in Okinawa by 102 votes, while a Communist candidate in Kyoto lost by a mere 61 votes.[11]

On a slightly more promising note for the JCP, a recent Supreme Court ruling has more or less forced the LDP to devise a plan to redress the great discrepancy between urban and rural representation in the National Diet. Numerous plans have been proposed to reapportion seats on a plus-minus (urban-rural) basis according to population. One such proposal would have 35 districts gain a total of 73 seats and 60 districts lose an equal number.[12] According to my calculations, had this arrangement been in effect in December 1983, the JCP would have gained 17 seats in the districts with more representation and would have lost only 3 seats in districts with reduced representation, yielding a net gain of 14 seats (or a hypothetical total of 41 seats). This figure constitutes 8 percent of the total number of seats, closer to the JCP's 9.4 percent of votes than to the 5.3 percent of the seats that the party now holds. Interestingly, in the July 1986 elections, the JCP won four of the eight extra

[10] *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 20, 1983, p. 9; and *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 8, 1986, p. 5.
[11] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 8, 1986, p. 5.
[12] See *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 20, 1983, p. 6.

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seats created by new LDP legislation—based on a "plus eight" (urban seats) and "minus seven" (rural seats) formula—which had been pushed through in May 1986. (The LDP won the other four seats.)[13] The JCP thus may expect a larger representation in the lower house as a result of more equitable apportionment of seats to urban areas (14 of its 27 seats are in Japan's two largest megalopolises, Tokyo and Osaka). It is not surprising, therefore, that most recent reapportionment plans introduced by the LDP have been quite modest, and that all have been rejected by the opposition parties, which obviously want a more thoroughgoing redistribution of seats according to population density.

House of Councillors and local offices. The JCP has witnessed similar electoral trends in the upper house. Support for Communist candidates peaked in the 1974 election when they received 11.8 million votes (6.8 million votes in the local and 4.9 million votes in the national constituencies). This constituted 12.8 percent of the votes in the local and 9.3 percent in the national constituencies, for a total of 20 seats in the upper house. In 1983, the voting for the national constituency was changed from voting for a *candidate* to voting for a political *party* (proportional representation). Following the pattern of the lower house, the JCP's strength in the upper house has also fluctuated since 1974 from 12 to 16, the present (1986) figure being 16 members.[14]

At the subnational level, the JCP vigorously participates in the elections of (1) prefectural and megapolis governors, and mayors of cities, towns, city wards, and villages; and (2) prefectural, municipal, city ward, and village assemblies. Two trends are worth noting in the contest between conservative and so-called progressive forces in the major Japanese urban centers. First, during the 1960's and most of the 1970's, the urban local governments slipped from conservative LDP control, as the opposition parties managed to elect governors or mayors of the six largest cities in Japan. This led the JCP to make the oft-repeated claim that 48 million Japanese lived under "progressive administrations." Then, in the late 1970's, the conservatives, often in coalition with the DSP and the Komeito, recaptured control of the major cities one after another. In the April 1983 gubernatorial and mayoral elections, only in Fukuoka did the JSP-JCP candidate win; in the other races, the winners were candidates backed by the LDP and the centrist parties. In the April 1986 gubernatorial election in Kyoto, the JCP candidate (actually the candidate of an umbrella organization called the "Conference for New Democratic Prefectural Administration Serving the Prefectural People," which included the JCP) lost to a candidate supported by all the other parties, including the LDP and for the first time the JSP.

While the number of JCP national legislators fluctuated during the past decade, the total number of JCP members or JCP-backed candidates in prefectural and local assemblies rose quite rapidly throughout the 1970's, from 1,700 to 3,600. In the 1980's, the number has stabilized around 3,650. In some instances, like in the case of national elections, the number of votes or the percentage of the vote does not correlate with the number of successful candidates. Thus, in the Tokyo Municipal Assembly elections in June 1985, the JCP increased its contingent from 16 to 19 (some years before they had had 24 assemblymen), even though both the number and the percentage of the total vote it received declined in comparison with the previous election.[15]

This brief analysis of the JCP's electoral record at all levels of government for the past decade indicates that the party may have reached a plateau in terms of electoral support at the 5–6 million mark in national elections, constituting 9 to 10 percent of the voting public (but 15 percent in Tokyo, 19 percent in Osaka, and over 22 percent in Kyoto, a Communist stronghold). Of course, given an average voter turnout of some 70 percent, the JCP's percentage of the total eligible vote may be much smaller. The combined number of Communist members in both houses of the National Diet is around 40, which is considerably less than the 59 it had reached in 1974 and 1979. The lower house contingent usually fluctuates between 20 and 40, depending upon a number of domestic and international factors. At the local level, the situation is more promising, as the party puts considerable effort into being of direct service to the public (see below).

Opposition Party and Public Servant

A major reason why the Liberal Democratic Party has remained in power so long is the fact that the opposition parties are so badly split. And part of the reason for the lack of cohesion among the opposition

[13]See *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), July 8, 1986, p. 3.

[14]Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi Kyokai, Shin Sayoku—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, pp. 218–23 (hereafter cited as *Nikkyo no Tebiki*); and *Sankei Shimbun*, July 8, 1986, p. 9.

[15]*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 8, 1985, evening ed., p. 1.

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parties is the role played by the JCP in the Japanese political system and the attitudes of other parties toward the Communists. As a party with a relatively small parliamentary delegation, the JCP has naturally championed the idea of a coalition government composed of all "progressive" parties. Thus, at its 11th Party Congress in 1970, the JCP made an appeal for the realization of a "democratic coalition government" by the end of the decade. Following impressive gains in the 1972 general election, the JCP announced more optimistically at its 12th congress in 1973 that the aim to establish a "democratic coalition government was being transformed into an attainable objective."[16]

But these were pipe dreams. Opposition party politics in Japan dictated a different reality. The DSP and the Komeito were both staunchly anti-communist, particularly the former, which had split off from the Socialist Party in 1960 in part because of an unwillingness to have anything to do with the Communists. By 1975, the two parties had moved sufficiently toward the center that they even began thinking about a possible coalition with the LDP instead of being a part of a "progressive" anti-LDP coalition. That left only the JSP as a possible coalition partner for the JCP. But the Socialists continued to be split into ideological factions, some of which would not cooperate with the Communists under any circumstances. This time, however, the JSP as a whole began to move toward the right, and in January 1980 it signed an accord with the Komeito by which it agreed to maintain the US-Japanese Security Treaty, approve the existence of the Self-Defense Forces, and, most important, exclude the JCP from any future coalition. This completed the isolation of the Communists in the Japanese political arena.

More recently, the JSP, under a new leader, Ishibashi Masashi,[17] has tried to shed its doctrinaire image. It has proclaimed itself the "New JSP" (*Nyu Shakai To*), sent a delegation to the United States, and distanced itself further from the Communists. Now, when the opposition parties make joint statements, they routinely exclude the JCP, as, for example, in May 1986, when they opposed the LDP decision to dissolve the lower house and hold double elections. The Communists retaliate by calling the present political system the "Imperial Rule Assistance Politics," a snide reference to the prewar and wartime merger of all political parties into a single political organization called the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

Parliamentary behavior. JCP legislators follow strict party discipline. They are in the forefront of opposition attacks on "money politics" and corruption of the ruling conservatives, and they can be relied upon to support the public against environmental hazards, consumers against taxation, and middle and small businessmen against any legislation that might favor big business, the mainstay of the LDP. They also support labor against business interests, especially the current drive to increase productivity by reducing the work force. The JCP also opposes the breakup and denationalization of the National Railways. In connection with the JCP's anti-nuclear policy (see below), the party is in the forefront of trying to obtain more relief for the victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings.[18]

The JCP is the most hostile of all Japanese political parties to the country's alliance with the United States. Communist Diet members persistently (and predictably) take a hard line on issues concerning Japanese relations with the United States, vehemently opposing the US-Japan Security Treaty, visits by US naval vessels to Japanese ports, especially of nuclear submarines, expanded cooperation between Japanese and US (and South Korean) armed forces, and a host of economic measures that are related to trade disputes with the United States. Curiously enough, however, the JCP is not the party most opposed to Japan's rearmament (it is the Socialists who until very recently had advocated the extreme position of unarmed neutrality). In fact, the JCP's foreign policy slogan is "independence, peace, neutrality, and self-defense."

Serving the public. Communist Diet members invariably speak out against legislation that might adversely affect the general public, consumers, small businessmen, and the like. Although the JCP lacks the electoral clout in the Diet to translate its rhetoric into national legislation, it has been able to provide numerous services to the public at the local level. Particularly impor-

[16]See, e.g., "Struggle for Life, Rights, Sovereignty and Peace for the Establishment of a Progressive United Front and Democratic Coalition Government" and "The Proposal of the Communist Party of Japan Concerning the Program of a Democratic Coalition Government," *Akahata* (Tokyo), Nov. 21, 1973; and the JCP Central Committee Publishing Bureau's *Bulletin: Information for Abroad* (Tokyo—hereafter *Bulletin*), Nos. 303 and 304, November 1973. See also "The JCP and Prospects for a Coalition Government," in Haruhiro Fukui, "The Japanese Communist Party: The Miyamoto Line and Its Problems," in M. Kaplan, Ed., *The Many Faces of Communism*, New York, Free Press, 1978, pp. 303–16.

[17]Ishibashi resigned after the JSP's July 1986 electoral debacle.

[18]In April 1986, the JCP offered an amendment demanding the enactment of a *Hibakusha* (atomic bomb victims) relief law, which if passed would have provided economic assistance, including an annuity for the *Hibakusha*, special benefits to bereaved families, medical allowances, nursing benefits, and "benefits for funerals and festivals." It was voted down by the Liberal Democrats. See *Japan Press Weekly* (Tokyo), No. 1494, Apr. 26, 1986, p. 8.

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tant are the "Livelihood Consultation Service Stations," which handle such things as citizens' and small businessmen's tax problems, complaints against indifferent and ineffective local bureaucrats, installment-sales fraud, housing loan swindles, as well as more personal matters such as divorce and "finding a wife."[19] At the 17th Party Congress in 1985, the party boasted of having over fifteen-and-a-half thousand such service stations, which handled 1.67 million cases in the past three years, saving the public billions of yen, and resolving a good many cases.[20] This is one area in which the JCP directly benefits the public, and itself, at least at the local assembly level.

The Party Organization

It is a sign of JCP stability (and stagnation) that the party structure and its leadership have changed little during the past decade. Miyamoto Kenji, the JCP's undisputed leader, has been in power since the mid-1950's. In 1982, at age 74, he took the title of chairman of the Central Committee, which paved the way for the promotion of the 52 year-old "crown prince," acting chairman and former director of the Secretariat Fuwa Tetsuzo (born Ueda Kenjiro), to the chairmanship of the Presidium. Although this has presumably freed Miyamoto from worrying about day-to-day party activities, he is still very much in charge. (In December 1984, for example, Miyamoto headed the JCP delegation that went to Moscow for a summit meeting with General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko.) Fuwa is assisted by five deputy chairmen, including his 59-year-old brother Ueda Koichiro, and by the party Secretariat, which is now directed by the 62-year-old Kaneko Mitsuhiro, a rising star and the number three man in the party hierarchy after Miyamoto and Fuwa.[21]

The nerve center of the JCP is the national Party Headquarters in the Yoyogi district near the juncture of the Central and the Yamate Loop lines of Tokyo's railroad network. From the elevated train one can see the *Nihon Kyosan To* (JCP) sign over a nondescript office building. Actually, the party occupies several buildings, including a small bookstore across from the main entrance to Party Headquarters.[22]

Headquarters of the Japan Communist Party in the Yoyogi district of Tokyo.

—Yomiuri Shimbun.

The central party organization consists of a 49-member Presidium (which includes a 20-member Standing Committee of the Presidium, or the Standing Presidium);[23] a Party Secretariat of 11 members; Control and Audit committees (19 and 3 members, respec-

[19]See Miyamoto's traditional New Year interview with the editor of *Akahata*, Jan. 8, 1977; and *Bulletin*, No. 367, April 1977, p. 15.

For a discussion of JCP policies and activities in the Kyoto area, see Ellis S. Krauss, "The Urban Strategy and Policy of the Japan Communist Party: Kyoto," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Winter 1979, pp. 322–50. For a description of party activities in both urban and rural settings, see George O. Totten, "The People's Parliamentary Path of the Japanese Communist Party," in *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver, BC), "Part I: Agrarian Policies," ibid., Summer 1973, pp. 193–217, and esp. "Part II: Local Level Tactics," ibid., Fall 1973, pp. 384–406.

[20]See "Resolution of the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1985; and *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986, p. 33.

[21]For biographical information on Communist leaders, see Peter Berton, "The Japan Communist Party: The 'Lovable' Party," in Hrebenar, op. cit. See also Mizushima Tsuyoshi, *Shokugyo Kakumeika—Nikkyo Kambu 160 Mei no Rirekisho* (Professional Revolutionaries—Biographies of 160 JCP Leaders), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, 1970.

[22]For a map of the party complex and the location of various party offices, see Mizushima Tsuyoshi, *Kore ga Kyosan To* (This is the Communist Party), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, 1977, pp. 13–16.

[23]For an analysis of the JCP leadership and the groupings of the Presidium members, see Fukui, loc. cit., pp. 287–98.

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tively); Editorial Committee for Central Party Publications; and numerous specialized agencies, consisting of a new Peace Problems Policy Conference (since April 1985), 19 committees,[24] 14 bureaus,[25] 15 departments,[26] the Central Party School, and the Social Science Research Institute. There are also two campaign committees on educational and electoral matters; eight functional committees;[27] and the JCP Diet members group guidance structure, which encompasses several groups and committees as well as a secretariat.[28]

It is not surprising, then, that more than 1,000 party apparatchiks work in the JCP headquarters. In addition, there are 10,000-plus apparatchiks in prefectural and district committees, and some 70,000 chiefs and members of branch leadership committees.[29] Regular contact with the provincial apparat is maintained through periodic conferences of prefectural and district chairmen, and through meetings of chiefs of provincial functional departments, such as those dealing with publications and elections.

The JCP is run dictatorially by Miyamoto and his protégés. In true "democratic centralist" fashion, they co-opt and appoint all levels of party apparatchiks, prefectural and district committee members, staff at the Tokyo headquarters, the Central Committee with its Presidium and Standing Committee, and all delegates to the party congresses. One measure of this control is the number of Miyamoto's personal secretaries or assistants who now sit on the party Presidium (by one account, some 14 out of 50 in 1982), as well as the disproportionately high number of Tokyo Headquarters apparatchiks who get promoted to senior positions in the party.[30]

Women make up 40 percent of the JCP's membership but play only a small role in Miyamoto's party. To be sure, the JCP takes particular pride in the number of female members officially endorsed and elected under party auspices. Indeed, in the lower house elections in December 1983, the JCP elected seven female parliamentarians compared to two for all the other parties combined.[31] But women are seriously underrepresented in the party hierarchy. Only 30 of the 206-member Central Committee elected at the 17th Party Congress in 1985 were women.[32] Moreover, there is but one woman on the Standing Committee of the Presidium, two in the Presidium, and none on either the Secretariat or Control and Audit committees. In total, of almost 200 top posts in the party 15 are filled by women. Actually, the 15 turn out to be only 9 individuals, since one of them (Yamanaka Asako) wears no less than five hats, and two other women have two posts each.[33]

Membership. The JCP has fallen far short of its ambitious membership goals, announced at the 8th Party Congress in 1961 when membership totaled some 80,000, of having 300,000 members by 1963 and 1 million by 1970.[34] Party membership did reach 300,000, but not until 1970; and the 1 million goal seems unattainable even by the year 2000.[35] In 1977, the party began to talk about a goal of half a million members, but this figure also seems difficult to reach. In July 1982, at the 16th congress, the party an-

[24]The committees are concerned with such issues as international affairs, economic policy, security and diplomatic affairs, JCP policy in the National Diet, policy on ad hoc administrative reforms, promotion of united front, social security, liaison with mass movements, old and disabled citizens, youth and students, peace problems, military bases, audio-visual propaganda, environmental problems and natural disasters, religion, sports, intellectuals, petitions, and journals.

[25]Among the concerns of the bureaus are labor, farmers and fishermen, urban activities and small and medium enterprises, elections and local government, ideology, propaganda, publications, as well as party organization, personnel, and finance and business.

[26]The departments deal with such issues as women, children, Burakumin outcasts, culture, education, science and technology, public relations, legal affairs, and welfare.

[27]These committees bring together personnel to deal with such matters as international problems, national and local policy, united front, mass movements, educational affairs, party organization and discipline, propaganda, and elections.

[28]The guidance structure consists of the General Assembly of JCP Diet Members Groups, House of Representatives and House of Councillors Party Diet Members groups, House of Representatives and House of Councillors Policy committees, and the Party Diet Members Group Secretariat. See *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 218–23. For brief descriptions of the functions of party agencies, see *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai* (An Introduction to the Japan Communist Party), Tokyo, JCP Central Committee Pubiishing Bureau, 1976, pp. 71–75, 159–62, and 206–13.

[29]Introductory speech by Miyamoto at the 1st National Conference, *Akahata*, Apr. 14, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 522, May 1984, p. 24.

[30]See "Two More Miyamoto Secretaries Became Members of the Presidium," *Zembo Tokubetsu Tsushin* (Tokyo), No. 778, Aug. 11, 1982, pp. 7–9.

[31]See, e.g., *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 20, 1983, p. 8. In the 1979 elections, 14 out of 22 female candidates and 8 out of 11 elected representatives were Communists.

[32]See *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1985, p. 2. This was actually twice as many women as had been elected to the 15th Central Committee in 1980.

[33]Women are only slightly better represented on less prestigious party bodies: there are two women among 14 members of the Editorial Committee for Central Party Publications; and six among the more than 50 heads of committees, bureaus, and departments. One woman is on two 25-member campaign committees, and the same woman serves among the eight heads of functional committees. Three women serve in leading positions in the parliamentary groups (out of 19). See *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 218–23.

[34]"First Unified Two-Year Plan for the Expansion of Party Influence," cited in Kyosuke Hirotsu, "The New Line of the Japan Communist Party for the 1970s: Special Features and Problems of the Eleventh Party Congress," *Review: A Quarterly Journal for the Study of Communism and Communist Countries* (Tokyo), No. 26, September 1970, pp. 34–35.

[35]Other ambitious, but not very realistic, goals have included: *Akahata* readership of 8 million; over 100 representatives in the National Diet; 3 million supporters each among students and labor unionists; and 20 million votes.

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nounced the figure of 480,000 members, but three years later, at the 17th congress, the figure was down to 466,000 (see Table 2).

These membership figures are party claims, however, and Japanese government analysts dispute them. They point out that during periods just before party congresses the JCP announces membership goals and carries on its membership rolls quite a number of "sleepers" (i.e., those whose membership has technically lapsed but against whom no action has been taken).[36] By government estimates these "sleepers" account for some 20 percent of the membership (or about 100,000 people).[37]

One measure of the party's rather desperate attempts to hang on to these "sleepers," and thus camouflage its declining membership, is the revision of one of the party rules. It used to be that either nonpayment of party dues or nonattendance at party meetings for six months constituted grounds for expulsion, and the lower organizations routinely terminated inactive members. In January 1981, however, Miyamoto warned against the "easygoing cancellation of the [party] registration." First, the rule was changed requiring a year's inactivity instead of six months. Then at the 16th Party Congress the pertinent Article XII was amended to make expulsion of inactive members even more difficult. The new rule provides that before a member can be expelled, the lower organization must bring the matter up to the district committee, which in turn must receive approval from the prefectural organization, and in some cases must even consult with the Central Committee.[38]

Given party leaders' open concern and government analysts' projections, it seems not unreasonable to speculate that out of the JCP's 400,000-plus membership, there are probably only some 100,000 dedicated party members and another 200,000 who are somewhat less committed. Nonetheless, even if this is the case, JCP membership figures are quite impressive when one realizes that it has more actual members than all the other Japanese opposition parties combined. Internationally, the JCP is the third largest non-

Table 2: Membership in the Japan Communist Party, 1945-85

Date	Event	Members
December 1945	4th Congress	1,000
February 1946	5th Congress	7,000
February 1947	6th Congress	7,000
February 1951	4th Conference	84,000
July 1955	6th Conference	45,000
July 1958	7th Congress	40,000
July 1961	8th Congress	80,000
November 1964	9th Congress	150,000
October 1966	10th Congress	270,000
July 1970	11th Congress	300,000
November 1973	12th Congress	347,000
July 1976	13th Congress	379,000
October 1977	14th Congress	393,000
February 1980	15th Congress	438,000
March 1981	National Conference of Prefectural and District Chairmen	442,000
July 1982	16th Congress	479,000
July 1983	Fifth CC Plenum	478,000
November 1983	Sixth CC Plenum	471,000
January 1984	Seventh CC Plenum	469,000
April 1984	First National Conference	432,000
November 1984	14th Conference of Prefectural Chairmen	453,000
November 1985	17th Congress	466,000

SOURCES: Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi, Kyokai, Shin Sayoku—Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, p. 248; *Akahata* (Tokyo), Nov. 25, 1985; and *Zembo* (Tokyo), February 1986, p. 12.

ruling communist party in the world, after the Italian and French.

Publications and finances. These two topics are inevitably intertwined in any discussion of the Japan Communist Party. In fact, the party has been jokingly called "The Yoyogi Newspaper Publishing Company, Limited." Of course, all communist parties recognize the power of propaganda, but probably only the JCP is able to finance practically all of its operations from the sale of its publications. The party publishes a daily and Sunday party organ, *Akahata* (Red Flag)—its financial lifeline, as well as one of its primary measures of success (along with party membership goals, the JCP constantly sets *Akahata* subscription goals). It also publishes a whole array of weeklies, monthlies, quarterlies, and semiannuals covering such issues as ideology and theory, international affairs, parliamentary matters, agriculture, labor economics, culture, science and technology, as well as numerous publications aimed at specialized audiences, including, among

[36]According to a secret document prepared by the Party Central Committee in November 1980, the number of JCP members who came under Article XII of the Party Constitution (nonpayment of dues for six months, etc.) increased from 55,100 in January 1975 to 84,700 in November 1980. Mizushima Tsuyoshi, *Watakushi no Yoyogi Tokuhain: Nihon Kyosan To no Shindan* (My Yoyogi Correspondent: A Diagnosis of the JCP), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, November 1981, p. 131.

[37]According to a confidential party report circulated at the 7th Plenum in January 1984. Cited in *K.D.K. Information* (Tokyo), No. 5/84 (May 1, 1984), p. 5.

[38]*The 16th Congress of the Japanese Communist Party: Atami, July 27–31, 1982*, Tokyo, Japan Press Service, 1982, pp. 194–95 and 258.

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Publications of the Japan Communist Party

Name, subject, periodicity	Approximate circulation
Akahata (Red Flag) — party daily, mass circulation political newspaper, postwar edition since October 1945	600,000
Akahata — Sunday edition, weekly, since March 1959	2,700,000
Akahata — study and party activities edition, weekly	170,000
Akahata — weekly commentary on policy and theoretical problems	200,000
Akahata — in braille, monthly, since January 1975	1,000
Akahata Shashin Nyusu (Akahata Illustrated News) — wall newspaper for propaganda and advertising purposes, three times a month, since August 1965	80,000
Akahata — reduced-size, bound edition for libraries, monthly (of both daily and Sunday editions), since 1961	6,000
Gakusei Shimbun (Student Newspaper) — weekly, since February 1961	35,000
Zen'ei (Vanguard) — theoretical monthly, since February 1946	60,000
Riron Seisaku (Theory and Policy) — monthly collection of resolutions, decisions, policies, and other important documents, since October 1967	17,000
Sekai Seiji (World Politics) — semi-monthly journal on international affairs, since July 1956; originally entitled *Sekai Seiji Shirjo* (Materials on World Politics)	16,000
Kurashi to Seiji (Life and Politics) — monthly reports on parliamentary affairs (national, prefectural, and local), since October 1959; originally entitled *Gikai to Kyosan To* (The Diet and the JCP)	17,000
Asu no Noson (The Village of Tomorrow) — monthly journal on the agricultural movement, since May 1966; originally entitled *Rodo, Nomin Undo* (The Labor-Farmer Movement)	13,000
Gekkan Gakushu (Student Monthly) — for new party members, since April 1961	80,000
Josei no Hiroba (Women's Forum) — monthly journal for female party members, since March 1979	160,000
Konnichi wa, Kyosan To desu (Hello, This Is the JCP) — illustrated monthly, since September 1983	Unknown[1]
Bulletin: Information for Abroad — irregular publication (in English, French, and Spanish) for foreign communist parties, since 1961	2,000
OTHER PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTED OR PROMOTED BY THE JCP	
Bunka Hyoron (Cultural Review) — monthly, since December 1961	40,000
Keizai (Economics) — monthly, since June 1962	30,000
Rodo Undo (Labor Movement) — monthly, since May 1966; originally entitled *Rodo, Nomin Undo* (The Labor-Farmer Movement)	32,000
Kikan Kagaku to Shiso (Science and Thought Quarterly) — since July 1971	7,000
Minshu Bungaku (People's Literature) — monthly organ of the Nihon Minshushugi Bungaku Domei (Japan Democratic Literature League), since December 1965	4,000
Shin Fujin Shimbun (New Japan Women's Association Newspaper) — weekly	280,000
Minshu Seinen Shimbun (Japan Democratic Youth League Newspaper) — weekly (also appears semiannually in reduced-size bound edition for libraries, 3,000 copies)	145,000
Domei Katsudo (Activities of the Japan Democratic Youth League) — weekly for League cadres	35,000
Warera Kokosei (Our High School Students) — weekly of Japan Democratic Youth League	40,000
Seinen Undo (Youth Movement) — theoretical monthly of Japan Democratic Youth League	40,000
Gakushu no Tomo (Study Companion) — monthly for working youth	100,000
Shonen Shojo Shimbun (Newspaper for Boys and Girls) — weekly, since March 1969	100,000

[1]During elections "delivered to almost every home in the country." See "Fuwa's Central Committee Report to the 17th Congress," *Akahata*, Nov. 20, 1985.

SOURCES: Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Japan Institute for Political and Economic Affairs), *Nikkyo, Minsei, Shakaishugi Kyokai, Shin Sayoku —Kenkyu, Chosa, Taisaku no Tebiki* (The Japan Communist Party, Japan Democratic Youth League, Socialist Association, and the New Left—Research, Surveys, and Policy Handbook), Tokyo, November 1983, p. 255; *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai* (An Introduction to the Japanese Communist Party), Tokyo, JCP Central Committee Publishing Bureau, 1983 edition, pp. 242-46; and JCP publications.

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others, women, youth, students, and children (see box on p. 10). Circulation of these publications (excluding *Akahata*) ranges from 4,000 to 28,000, totaling over 1.5 million copies. In addition, the Central Committee Publishing Bureau puts out millions of pamphlets, especially during elections, and a whole range of books.[39]

Akahata has become a publication of some magnitude and substance. It maintains permanent correspondents in such communist centers as Hanoi, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Bucharest, Belgrade, as well as in Paris, London, Rome, Mexico City, and Washington. In the past, *Akahata* also had permanent correspondents in Beijing (expelled in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution) and Pyongyang (a position currently vacant). The paper also dispatches special correspondents to many other centers on all continents and has at its service some 13,000 correspondents or stringers in Japan, as well as more than 50,000 unpaid delivery workers.

Since *Akahata* subscription figures are used by the party as a measure of the success of JCP activities, a brief look at its publishing history seems in order. The period of greatest growth occurred in the 1960's (the Sunday edition of *Akahata* was started in 1959), when circulation went from 300,000 to 1.8 million. Another million was added by 1973; 3.25 million was reached by the time of the 14th Party Congress in 1977; and subscriptions peaked in 1980 at some 3.55 million. Over the next six years, *Akahata* subscription totals dropped to 3.4 million in July 1982 and to just "over 3 million" in November 1985.

While these setbacks may signify that JCP organs had reached their limits of expansion, the magnitude of the party's publishing deserves recognition. Indeed, *Akahata* easily surpasses the circulation of the party newspaper of any other nonruling communist party. In fact, Miyamoto bragged that his colleagues in the French and the Italian communist parties were astounded when they learned about *Akahata*'s 3 million-plus readership.[40]

But if party publications are valuable as conveyor belts of JCP ideology and policy, they are at least as valuable as sources of income. Fully 90 percent of the JCP's total income comes from sales of these publications, which continuously show a healthy profit. By contrast, membership dues account for only about 5 percent of party income.[41]

Amazingly, insofar as official reporting is concerned, the JCP is the richest political party in Japan, even though, of course, the LDP enjoys the generous support of big business, and political donations are more easily concealable than the JCP income from its publishing empire.[42] In 1980 (an election year), the JCP's reported income was US$93.3 million compared to $88.8 million for the LDP. In 1981, the JCP income was $95.0 million, followed by $58.6 million for the LDP, $42.4 million for the Komeito, $23.2 million for the JSP, and $6.0 million for the DSP.[43] This is even more remarkable when one considers that the other opposition parties enjoy the financial support of large labor union federations and of a religious organization in the case of the Komeito. This also means that the JCP is not indebted to outside interest groups, which gives it an advantage over the other parties since they sometimes get bad publicity because of "money politics" and charges of conflict of interest.

Affiliate Organizations

In Japan, as in most other countries, the communist movement comprises much more than just the Japan Communist Party. Other integral components of the movement are the party's youth and women's affiliate organizations.

Japan Democratic Youth League. The Japan Democratic Youth League (*Nihon Minshu Seinen Domei*, or *Minseido*) was established in April 1923 as the Japan Communist Youth League and became the Japan branch of the International Communist Youth League.[44] It shared the vicissitudes of the JCP

[39]For circulation figures, see *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, p. 255; *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai*, 1983 ed., pp. 234–52; and Mizushima, *Kore ga Kyosan To*, pp. 94–105. In addition to election campaigns, special pamphlets are issued on many occasions. For example, over 4 million pamphlets were distributed in the wake of the purge of Presidium Vice-Chairman Hakamada Satomi and his subsequent exposés of the party and Miyamoto's dictatorial control (see p. 15 of text). Many books and journals are published under the imprint of Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha (New Japan Publishing Company), a party affiliate organization.

[40]*Shukan Asahi* (Tokyo), May 30, 1975, cited in Richard F. Staar, Ed., *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs: 1976*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1976, p. 304. The circulation of the daily edition of *L'Unità* is roughly a half a million and *l'Humanité* considerably less.

[41]The JCP claims that 75 percent of the LDP, 40 percent of the DSP, and 28 percent of the NLC budgets come from corporate contributions, whereas 34 percent of the JSP and 15 percent each of the DSP and the Komeito budgets come from party dues. See *Nihon Kyosan To Shokai*, 1983 ed., p. 264. The section on party finances is entitled "People-Supported Clean Party Finances," pp. 256–66.

[42]The LDP is of course structured in such a way that finances of the various factions and support groups need not be reported by central party headquarters.

[43]*Nikkyo no Tebiki*, p. 289. Because of the recent revaluation of Japanese currency, the JCP's income is now around US$150 million.

[44]See ibid., Part 5, pp. 293–360.

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throughout the prewar period, and its members suffered persecution, arrests, and assassinations. After the war, in February 1946, two months after the reappearance of the JCP, the youth organization was reestablished as the Japan Youth Communist League. Its initial membership was about 3,000.

In June 1946, it joined with other youth organizations on the left to form the Japan Youth Council (*Seinen Kyogikai*). In 1951, League members were part of the Japanese youth delegation to the Third World Youth and Students Peace and Friendship Festival in East Berlin. During the turbulent 1960's, however, many of Japan's youthful revolutionaries (much like their counterparts in Western Europe) deserted the communist party, which they felt had become too rigid, bureaucratic, and conservative, and most student organizations on the left split into pro-JCP and anti-JCP groups.

Today, there are literally dozens of "New Left" youth and student groups in Japan, but their combined membership is a fraction of the JCP Youth League's.[45] However, while JCP membership grew in the 1970's and early 1980's (albeit at a greatly reduced rate), the membership of the League reached its peak of 234,000 in 1966; today, its membership stands at 210,000.[46] Circulation of the organization's weekly *Minsei Shimbun* (Japan Democratic Youth League Newspaper) also reached its peak of 310,000 in 1966, and now stands at half that mark. The number of JCP members in the League too is down somewhat from a high of 70,000 in the 1969–76 period.

The motto of the League is "Study, Play, Struggle," and besides the organization's congresses, which are held every two or three years, the highlight of its activity since 1973 has been the annual "Yangu Jampu" (Young Jump) assemblies (attracting 2,000 to 4,000 young people).[47] These assemblies combine excellent entertainment with pep talks and long-winded lectures by Miyamoto and other top party leaders.

The stagnation in the JCP youth affiliate, of course, has a direct bearing on the future of the party itself, as a healthy youth organization normally guarantees the growth of the parent organization. Therefore, it was very discouraging for party leaders to discover that whereas 55 percent of the party membership in 1970 was under 30, the figure was down to 43 percent (some 160,000 members) in 1976, 25 percent (120,000) in 1982, and only 15 percent (70,000) in January 1985.[48]

New Japan Women's Association. The New Japan Women's Association (*Shin Nihon Fujin no Kai,* or *Shinfujin*) was organized as the JCP's "women vanguard corps" in October 1962 following a decision at the 8th Party Congress held in July 1961.[49] The organization was designed to deal with a wide range of problems (rising prices, education, medical problems of infants and children, environmental issues, cultural affairs, sports), wherever possible in conjunction with other groups; it was also charged with many tasks, among them to organize women's auxiliaries in labor unions, women in rural areas, and renters groups in apartment complexes.

Like its youth league counterpart, the *Shinfujin* has seen its membership rise sharply in its formative years only to level off in later years. At its founding meeting, for example, the *Shinfujin* claimed a membership of 34,000. Between its 3rd and 4th congresses (from February 1965 to May 1967), *Shinfujin* membership almost doubled, from 53,000 to 100,000. Membership growth slowed considerably in the 1970's and the early 1980's, and at the organization's latest congress (the 12th, held in June 1984), membership was given at 182,000, roughly the size of the JCP youth affiliate. The resolutions adopted at the latest congress included the usual good things about children's education, health and cultural living for the elderly, and the "three equalities" for women (equality in society, equality at work, and equality at home). In addition, there was one very topical resolution against Tomahawk missiles and "for a complete prohibition of nuclear weapons!"[50]

Thus, while the triad of the party and its youth and women's affiliates can claim a combined membership of over three-quarters of a million, it is clear that all three organizations are no longer growing at the same rate as during the periods of rapid expansion, and may in fact be in a period of continuing stagnation.

The Party's Larger Network

Beyond the party's youth and women's affiliate organizations, JCP influence is felt in certain labor unions and in numerous front organizations which focus on a wide range of issues such as peace, international

[45]Ibid., Part 9, on the New Left, pp. 703–98.

[46]These are figures announced at the 18th Congress held in July 1984. "What Was Noteworthy at the 18th National Congress of the Democratic Youth League," *Koan Joho* (Tokyo), No. 371, August 1984, pp. 79–94.

[47]The Japanese seem to love to use foreign phrases like "Young Jump" whether or not it makes any sense in the original language.

[48]Hirotsu Kyosuke, "The 17th [Communist] Party Congress and the Miyamoto Organization," *Koan Joho,* No. 393, June 1986, p. 11.

[49]*Nikkyo no Tebiki,* pp. 515–24; and Shiso Undo Kenkyujo (Research Institute on Ideological Movements), Comp. *1981-nemban Nihon Kyosan Tokei Dantai Yoran* (1981 Handbook of JCP Lineage Organizations), Tokyo, Zembo Sha, 1981, pp. 625–47 (hereafter cited as *1981 Yoran*).

[50]"Circumstances Surrounding the 12th National Congress of the New Japan Women's Association," *Koan Joho,* No. 370, July 1984, pp. 64–83.

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friendship, nuclear disarmament, welfare, and livelihood protection. Several of these organizations are constituent members of international communist front organizations, even though their membership is by no means exclusively Communist. Many of the organizations are also part of larger Japanese federations of organizations on the left, some of which, especially those originally co-sponsored by the Communists and Socialists, have split into JCP and JSP groups. Most notable among these was the anti-nuclear movement of the early 1960's.

Some analysts have singled out the youth, women's, and small businessmen's organizations as the party's "Three Great Families" (*Gosanke*, an ironic reference to the three main branches of the ruling Tokugawa family during the 17th to 19th centuries). More recently, three other organizations have been jokingly designated as the JCP's "New Three Great Families"—the associations of doctors, lawyers, and tax accountants—in recognition not only of the importance the party attaches to these professions but also of the significant role these organizations have played in projecting an image of the JCP as a party that is helping people in their daily lives.[51]

Front organizations. Government law enforcement agencies keep careful track of the numerous leftwing (and some rightwing) organizations, and several anti-communist research organizations put out handbooks and other reference works identifying leftwing front organizations and their members, as well as JCP activities in public and private enterprises and labor unions.[52] It is the ties of these organizations to international communist fronts and the JCP's organization, manipulation, or infiltration of these bodies that has concerned the authorities over the years, especially after the anti-government forces' spectacular show of strength and influence during the anti–Security Treaty riots and demonstrations in 1960.

Since it would take a separate study to describe and analyze the organizational framework and principal objectives of these overlapping and related organizations and groups, I shall here focus only on several of the more prominent ones.[53] Perhaps most notable is the All-Japan Federation of Commercial and Industrial Organizations (*Zenkoku Shōko Dantai Rengokai*, or *Zenshoren*), the third organization in the original "Three Great Families" of the party (along with the JCP's youth and women's affiliates). This federation grew out of the party's attempts back in 1947 to organize the 2.5 million small and medium businessmen to oppose high taxation. It was formally launched in August 1951, when some 300 representatives from 37 different businessmen and citizen groups gathered in Kyoto. The organization grew rapidly, gaining 170,000 members by 1961 and over 350,000 in the early 1980's. *Zenshoren* too has its own official publication, and the readership of this semimonthly is reportedly over half a million.[54]

Other well-known organizations include the Japan Peace Committee, the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, the JCP faction of the General Federation of All-Japan Student Governments, the Japan Conference of Journalists, and the Japan Scientists Association.

A close comparison of the leadership lists of JCP front organizations and communist international fronts clearly reveals a connection between the two. For example, Hirone Tokutaro, professor of Physics at Yamagata University and one of six directors of the Japan Scientists Association, is also a vice-president of the World Federation of Scientific Workers; Suzuki Shiro, president of the Japan Conference of Journalists, is a vice-president of the International Organization of Journalists; Ozaki Susumu, one of two standing directors of the Japan Liaison Society of International Lawyers, is a vice-president of the International Association of Democratic Lawyers; Kasai Akira, a Central Committee member of the Japan Democratic Youth League, is one of the secretaries of the World Federation of Democratic Youth; and Kushida Fuki, a member of the Standing Committee of the New Japan Women's Association and chairman of the Federation of

[51] *1981 Yoran*, Preface, pp. 2–3.

[52] Thirty-nine of the most important organizations are described in some detail in *1981 Yoran*; 699 professors are listed in Shiso Undo Kenkyujo, Comp., *Zenkoku 244 Daigaku, Gakububetsu Sotenken: Daigaku Kyoju Shinshiroku, Sayoku Hen* (General Examination of 244 Universities in Japan by Department: Who's Who of University Professors, Leftwing), Tokyo, February 1984; and "Outside Organizations of the JCP," Part 7 in *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 441–630.

[53] A recent handbook lists some 11 organizations in the peace movement, 12 international friendship associations, 8 legal assistance societies (including lawyers' groups), 15 welfare and livelihood protection organizations (including doctors' groups), 9 women and 6 youth and student groups, 11 academic and publishing organizations, 56 leftwing publishers and over 100 "democratic" bookstores, 31 organizations belonging to the Liaison Conference of Cultural Organizations, over 150 groups belonging to the National Conference of Choral Groups, some 300 music lovers clubs, almost 100 theatrical performance groups, about 300 children's theatrical troupes, some 10,000 members of movie fan groups, the New Japan Physical Education Federation consisting of 40 prefectural federations, 12 different sports societies, 2,000 circles of almost 50,000 members, and 32 workingmen's fishing groups. See "Outside Organizations of the JCP," loc. cit.

[54] Ibid., pp. 489–96 and *1981 Yoran*, pp. 98–128. For a description of the activities of the most important of these organizations, see Totten, "Part I: Agrarian Policies," pp. 193–217, and "Part II: Local Level Tactics," pp. 384–406.

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Women's Organizations, is a vice-president of the Women's International Democratic Federation.[55]

Most of the Japanese front organizations are very active, and a schedule for the month of June 1984 lists 45 national congresses, meetings, and conferences. These include the 12th National Congress of the New Japan Women's Association, the 34th National Congress of the Japan Peace Committee, the 21st General Meeting of the Japan-Cuba Friendship Society, the 154th Meeting of the Standing Board of Directors of the Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, and the 25th National Congress Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the All-Japan Federation of Organizations Protecting Livelihood and Health.[56]

Umbrella organizations. To some extent, the scope and activities of these JCP front organizations make up for the inability of the party to gain control over the nation's major labor union federations, which provide support to the Socialist Party and the Democratic Socialists. In an effort to expand JCP influence throughout the labor union movement (the party has successfully penetrated a number of individual labor unions),[57] in December 1974 the JCP launched the Conference of Trade Unions to Promote a United Front, which now encompasses more than 1.8 million workers through 400 locals and which has spawned its own youth and women's affiliates.[58] At the "1985 Special General Meeting" held in December, the Conference leadership made plans for the spring 1986 labor offensive, one of the organization's four "joint actions," the others being opposition to rightwing tendencies in the labor movement, efforts to expand the capabilities of the unity of progressive forces, and the struggle to prevent nuclear war and completely eliminate nuclear weapons (the last point added in December 1983).[59]

Another umbrella organization was launched in the wake of the 1980 anti-JCP agreement between the JSP and the Komeito. This was grandly labeled the National Forum for Peace, Democracy and Progressive Unity. The Forum claimed a membership of 4.35 million (comprising 2,700 constituent organizations, 33,000 distinguished individuals who support or take part in the Forum, and 320 provincial and local forums).[60]

Shifting JCP Fortunes, 1977–85

The past decade has witnessed a sharp decline in electoral support for JCP candidates. The JCP's disastrous showing in the election to the lower house in December 1976 was followed by a dismal performance in the July 1977 upper house election. The JCP has been hurt by bad publicity—some of it its own doing, some not. Domestically, the party has suffered because of the resurfacing of the Miyamoto "lynching case," a reference to the prewar charge that back in the 1930's during a party interrogation, Miyamoto killed another JCP member suspected of being a police informant. Not only did the JCP lose seats in the House of Councillors, but Miyamoto himself, a leader of a major party, came in as number 41 in the national constituency out of 50 successful candidates. Abroad, the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four one month later revealed the seamy side of Chinese politics, and the defection of a Soviet MiG–25 pilot to an airfield in Hokkaido highlighted both the Soviet military threat to Japan and the closed nature of the Soviet system.

At the 14th Party Congress, held in October 1977 shortly after the elections to the upper house, the JCP leadership blamed the party's poor showing on an anti-communist "second postwar reactionary offensive" that they say had begun in the mid-1970's. As a result, the congress seriously concerned itself with this "anti-communist counteroffensive," discussed ways of combatting it, and proposed the "consolidation of the party through education," emphasizing the necessity for qualitative improvements in party activity.[61]

One measure undertaken was the revamping of study texts for all levels of membership. For several years, the party had deemphasized Marx, Engels, and other foreign communist classics and stressed indigenous JCP documents. The 14th Congress went one step further. Henceforth, the reading list for new members would be limited to JCP documents, with only the highest level containing a substantial number (about one-third) of non-Japanese materials.[62] Conspicuous

[55] *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, passim, and Wallace Spaulding, "Communist International Fronts," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1984, pp. 52–61.

[56] See *Shiso Undo Joho* (Tokyo—formerly *Zembo Tokubetsu Tsushin*), No. 843, June 13, 1984, pp. 19–20.

[57] For Communist penetration in key industrial districts and in broadcasting, banking, law, and other areas, see Mizushima, *Kore ga Kyosan To*.

[58] *Nikkyo no Tebiki*, pp. 417–37, and *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1508, Aug. 2, 1986, pp. 23–25. In 1986, the Conference announced an immediate goal of 2 million members and united action by 3 million workers, with a longer range goal of 10 million workers, involving the underemployed and the unorganized.

[59] "Circumstances Surrounding the '1985 Special General Meeting' of the Conference of Trade Unions to Promote a United Front," *Koan Joho*, No. 389, February 1986, pp. 37–48.

[60] *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1487, Mar. 8, 1986, p. 13.

[61] "Report of the Central Committee to the 14th Party Congress by Fuwa Tetsuzo, Director of the Secretariat, October 17, 1977," *Akahata*, Oct. 18, 1977; and *Bulletin*, No. 390, January 1978, p. 11.

[62] Of these, nine are by Marx and Engels, eight are by Lenin, and two are Comintern documents. See *Akahata*, Jan. 1, 1978; and *Bulletin*, No. 399, June 1978.

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by their absence were the writings of Mao Zedong, Stalin, Tito, Castro, and even Togliatti.

The 14th Congress also caused quite a stir among party members and the public at large by dropping several Presidium vice-chairmen, and particularly by stripping Vice-Chairman Hakamada Satomi of all party posts. This set the stage for another purge, which further damaged the party's image among the Japanese public. One of the oldest party leaders, Hakamada, aside from holding the post of vice-chairman of the Presidium, had epitomized JCP tenacity and virtue: he was one of the very few true proletarians among the JCP leadership (he was a metal worker) and one of the very few prewar Communists who upon arrest and interrogation did not perform the act of *tenko* (recantation or conversion) and who as a result remained in prison until liberation by the order of General Douglas MacArthur in October 1945. Moreover, shortly after his release from prison, he was one of only six selected for membership on the Politburo at the 5th Party Congress held in February 1946. Hakamada was also a comrade-in-arms of Miyamoto from the 1930's (he was present at the infamous interrogation, or "lynching"), and later worked closely with him in the postwar period.

Unable to present his case to the party membership—the JCP under Miyamoto tolerates neither dissent nor open criticism of its policies from within the ranks—Hakamada had the choice of either remaining silent and tolerating his demotion or going public in the "bourgeois press" and courting expulsion. A few months after the congress, he chose the latter, and was immediately expelled from the party.

Hakamada's revelations had an extremely negative impact on the JCP's public image and on Miyamoto personally. He characterized Miyamoto's rule in the party as "despotic," and he directly linked Miyamoto to the "lynching," to which he was, after all, a witness.[63] The charge of despotism was very damaging. Some newspaper commentators even took to referring to the JCP, which only the year before had published a "Manifesto of Freedom and Democracy," as "Mr. Miyaken's One-Man Show" (abbreviation for *Miya*moto *Ken*ji). Furthermore, Hakamada's corroboration of the "lynching" charge revived interest in challenging both Miyamoto's legal status and his suitability as a Councillor.[64] Hakamada's purge backfired, and the JCP was dealt a big blow in the press and in the Diet.

The 1978 local elections reversed the trend toward solid "progressive" control of the major Japanese metropolises: Kyoto and Yokohama reverted to conservative rule (albeit in coalition with the "centrist" parties), and in 1979 the two largest cities, Tokyo and Osaka, followed suit. On the positive side, Miyamoto led a JCP delegation to Yugoslavia and Romania, which resulted in a joint statement with Tito and a joint declaration with Ceauşescu, putting Miyamoto on the same level as these world statesmen. The following year, the JCP recouped its losses in the House of Representatives election in October 1979, and two months later a Brezhnev-Miyamoto summit normalized JCP-CPSU relations after 15 years of estrangement.

The atmosphere at the 15th congress held in February 1980 was upbeat because of the lower house election results; and, because of peace with the Soviets, it was well attended by foreign communist party delegations from 30 countries, including all East European satellites and many West European countries. In addition, some 50 congratulatory messages were received.[65]

Ironically, as the JCP was breaking out of isolation in the international communist movement, it was becoming more and more isolated at home. In January 1980, the Socialists signed an anti-JCP pact with the Komeito, and the Communists lost their last potential coalition partner. In the meantime, Soviet troops began their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, a move that made a mockery of the freshly signed JCP-CPSU joint communiqué with its pious references to noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. The JCP almost immediately criticized the Soviet action, but suffered humiliation and frustration nonetheless. Just how much this contributed to the JCP's defeat in the double elections in the summer of 1980 is difficult to tell. There were other complicating factors, such as the very high voter turnout and the sympathy vote for the LDP because of Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi's recent death.

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[63]See Hakamada's articles in the weekly *Shukan Shincho* (Tokyo), Jan. 12 and Feb. 2, 1978. See also Hakamada, *Kinoo no Doshi Miyamoto Kenji e* (To Miyamoto Kenji, My Comrade of Yesterday), Tokyo, Shincho Sha, November 1978. For official and unofficial JCP statements on the expulsion of Hakamada, and Miyamoto's interview with a *Yomiuri Shimbun* reporter, see *Akahata*, Jan. 4 and 6, 1978, and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Jan. 13, 1978. See also *Bulletin*, No. 391, January 1978, and No. 397, May 1978.

[64]The charge was resurrected by DSP Chairman Kasuga Ikko in the National Diet on January 27, 1976. If Miyamoto were guilty of murder, Kasuga argued, that would mean that he had actually been an ordinary criminal and not a political prisoner during his incarceration before and during World War II. Thus, he would have been ineligible for release by order of the American occupation. See the January 1976 issue of the popular mass circulation magazine *Bungei Shunju* (Tokyo). For JCP refutations, see Fuwa's statement and other documents in *Akahata*, Jan. 28–30, 1976; and *Bulletin*, No. 345, February 1976. On March 14, 1979, Councillor Tamaki Kazuo of the LDP reopened the case by lodging an official complaint to President Yasui Ken of the House of Councillors that Miyamoto was not qualified to serve as Councillor. See *K.D.K. Information*, No. 4/79 (Apr. 1, 1979), pp. 6–7.

[65]For documentation of the 15th Party Congress, see *Akahata*, Feb. 27 to Mar. 9, 1980; and *Bulletin*, Nos. 431–34, April 1980. For analysis, see Akiyama Jun'ichi, "Problems Surrounding the 15th Party Congress of the JCP," *Koan Joho*, No. 318, March 1980, pp. 1–44.

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The 16th Party Congress was held in July 1982 to coincide with the celebration of the party's 60th anniversary. Despite strained relations with the CPSU because of the events in Afghanistan and Poland (the JCP held the Soviet Union responsible for the actions of the Polish authorities) and the worsening domestic isolation of the JCP, the party staged elaborate celebrations,[66] including an International Symposium on Theory attended by representatives from eight West European countries, Australia, and Mexico. The party tried to make the best of a bad situation by declaring, "Let us study history to create history," and by declaring itself "a glorious minority today and majority tomorrow." The congress also stressed the value of study and education, as well as of establishing a "proper party style"[67]—a phrase that denoted slack party discipline and low morale.

Matters did not get any better during the next year. The party suffered losses in the elections to both houses in June and December 1983, respectively, and the JCP leadership chose to postpone its 17th Party Congress, which had been scheduled for 1984. Instead, party leaders decided to tackle some of the problems at a National Conference that would bring together the Central Committee, chairmen of prefectural and district committees, the party's Diet members, prefectural and local assemblymen, and assorted central and provincial party apparatchiks and activists.[68] The 1st National Conference was held in April 1984, essentially to implement the decisions of the 7th Plenum of the 16th congress, to decentralize some party activity to lower-level organizations, and to engage in "mass struggles centering on the defeat of the [LDP] plot [to enact] a political party law" that was designed to establish "Japanese-style fascism."[69]

The 17th Congress and Its Aftermath

The 17th Party Congress was held, as rescheduled, in November 1985. It followed a specialized JCP-CPSU summit in Moscow in December 1984 devoted exclusively to nuclear problems, an international symposium for preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons held in Tokyo in July 1985, and elections to the Tokyo Municipal Assembly (in which the JCP could at least boast of increasing its contingent, if not the total vote or percentage of the vote).

As is customary, drafts of the 17th congress resolution and proposed amendments to the Party Program and the Party Constitution (party rules) were published well in advance of the congress to allow for an all-party discussion. Changes in the program included eliminating "inappropriate definition of the 'general crisis' of capitalism," and a note about the revival and *strengthening* of imperialism. Curiously, the original 1961 statement that "although it is a highly-developed capitalist country, Japan is virtually a dependent state, semi-occupied by US imperialism" was not amended. More significant, a statement was added that "the hegemonist deviations committed by some socialist countries have become important international factors that help the anti-communist reactionary offensive," an unambiguous statement that the JCP wanted to dissociate itself from past and present domestic and international policies and behavior of most ruling communist parties. The proposed amendments to the party rules were cosmetic, but they were introduced because in "facing the second postwar reactionary offensive" the party must "overcome . . . weaknesses and shortcomings in party life" and build a party "filled with vitality in comradeship and solidarity arising from intellectual awareness" (whatever that means).[70]

The festive beginning of the Congress was marred by a demonstration outside the Central Party School in the resort city of Atami near Tokyo, where the congress was being held. Several party members from the Tokyo University Graduate School's second party cell attempted to distribute a proposed draft resolution calling upon the entire party to reconsider party policies and advising Miyamoto to retire voluntarily. The leader of this group, known by the pseudonym Iriichi (for Vladimir "Ilyich" Lenin), managed to get himself elected as a delegate to the congress, but his unsuccessful attempts to place a reconsideration of party policies and its leadership on the agenda led to a six-month suspension of his party membership and, hence, the revocation of his delegate credentials. (Following the fracas, duly reported in the national press, Iriichi was expelled from the party for "anti-party sectarian actvities.")[71]

[66]In May 1982, at the annual *Akahata* Festival, Miyamoto cleverly linked the party's 60th anniversary with the 35th anniversary of the postwar constitution. *Akahata,* May 5, 1982; and *Bulletin,* No. 483, May 1982.

[67]*Akahata,* June 11 and Jul. 28–Aug. 5, 1982; *Bulletin,* Nos. 488–92, June-September 1982; Nishida Shin'ichiro, "Problems Surrounding the 16th Party Congress of the JCP," *Koan Joho,* No. 347, August 1982, pp. 1–47; and *Kenkyu Tsushin* (Tokyo—publication of Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo), No. 11, June 30, 1982.

[68]See *Akahata* coverage for mid-April 1984; and *Bulletin,* No. 522, May 1984.

[69]Introductory speech by Miyamoto at the 1st National Conference, *Akahata,* Apr. 14, 1984; and *Bulletin,* No. 522, May 1984, pp. 2, 11.

[70]"Draft Resolution of the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata,* Sept. 9, 1985; *Bulletin,* No. 552, October 1985; "Report on Amendments to Party Program," *Akahata,* Nov. 22, 1985; and *Bulletin,* No. 560, March 1986.

[71]Iriichi published his diary and his theses in the "bourgeois press" and

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Miyamoto Kenji addresses the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party in November 1985.

—Kyodo News.

The week-long Congress itself went off rather smoothly. Over a thousand official delegates attended, plus 64 nonvoting councillors (party center apparatchiks). Although foreign communist and other representation was unimpressive—only 27 of approximately 100 parties worldwide sent delegations—it was an interesting collection, to say the least. Among those attending were the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the "Sahara Arab Democratic Republic" (the Polisario Front), Algeria's ruling Socialist Vanguard Party, and El Salvador's Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, hardly bona fide members of the communist movement. More than one-third of the delegations came from Western Europe, about evenly divided between Eurocommunist and pro-Soviet parties. The Romanians and Yugoslavs were also there, as were delegations from the Soviet Union,[72] East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Vietnam, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Conspicuously absent among ruling parties were China, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Albania, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. On the final day, it was announced that, in all, 354 congratulatory messages had been received from "progressive local governments," labor unions, and "democratic organizations."

Programmatically, the congress was notable for its uneventfulness.[73] The resolutions passed by the congress contained no significant innovative policies. Pre-

eventually in book form by the publishing house of Nitchu Shuppan (Sino-Japanese Publishing House), operated by a group of former Communists who were themselves purged for publishing details about a split in the JCP front organization, the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. The JCP launched a campaign criticizing Iriichi and his ideas. See *Akahata*, Jan. 18 and 19, 1986; and Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the 'Rebellion' of the Tokyo University Graduate School [Party] Branch," *Koan Joho*, No. 390, March 1986, pp. 1–12.

[72]Unlike the Soviet delegation that attended the 15th Party Congress, numbering six people and headed by a member of the Secretariat, the delegation to the 17th congress was composed of only three persons and was headed by an ordinary member of the CPSU Central Committee.

[73]See coverage in *Akahata*, Nov. 20–25, 1985; *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986; *Japan Press Weekly*, Nos. 1473–74, Nov. 23 and 30, 1985; Nihon Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo, *Shiryo Tsushin—Research Bulletin* (Tokyo), No. 22-23, Dec. 15, 1985; Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the JCP's 17th Congress," *Koan Joho*, No. 387, December 1985, pp. 1–18.

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dictably, the party pushed the anti-nuclear campaign (see below for details) for all it was worth. A lot of noise was being made about the establishment of a "non-nuclear government" instead of the "pro-nuclear government" of the LDP and Prime Minister Nakasone in particular. Local governments were encouraged to declare themselves "non-nuclear areas," and the anti-nuclear campaign was given "five non-nuclear goals," which combined both international and domestic action:

1. Initiatives for the prevention of nuclear war and elimination of nuclear weapons as an urgent task;
2. Strict observance of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles;[74]
3. Opposition to any measure that could turn Japan into a nuclear battlefield;
4. Relief for atom-bomb victims, with state compensation; and
5. International solidarity to keep alive the positive tradition of the World Conference Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.[75]

Although Miyamoto maintained his firm grip over the party, and hardly any changes in leadership took place at the congress, all was not well. According to knowledgeable Japanese observers, the noisy demonstration outside the congregation was a portent of dissatisfaction with Miyamoto's dictatorial methods and bureaucratic style. And there were rumors of a serious rift between Miyamoto and Fuwa's elder brother, Presidium Vice-Chairman Ueda Koichiro.[76]

International Relations

JCP leaders used the occasion of the 17th Party Congress to try to impress foreign delegates, honoring them throughout the country at elaborate welcoming public meetings "full of fevered atmosphere of solidarity." What can be said of JCP ties to other communist parties? Has the JCP managed to emerge from its isolation within the international communist movement (begun 20-odd years ago when it lost its ties to the Soviet and Chinese communist parties)?

It is important to note that the JCP considers itself an integral part of the "independent current in the world communist movement," dedicated to the proposition that recognized norms of relations between communist parties include independence, equality, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, and solidarity in solving common tasks. According to the JCP, this means not only that "each party has the right to decide independently its own policy, without outside interference on such questions as the ways of transition to socialism and the building of socialism and communism,"[77] but also that there can be no "vanguard" or "center" of the international communist movement or any "leading party."

China. Relations between the JCP and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have been strained ever since Mao Zedong severed ties with the JCP in 1966 after it had refused to join his anti-Soviet coalition. Hostility between the two parties continued unabated for the next decade and a half, as both sides exchanged insults and diplomatic snubs. JCP leaders apparently were hopeful that relations might improve amid the atmosphere of self-criticism surrounding the June 1981 Chinese reappraisal of CCP history,[78] but they did not. The Japanese were further disappointed when the Chinese made no mention of JCP-CCP relations in an authoritative article on CCP errors in dealings with other communist parties during the Cultural Revolution.[79]

JCP leaders are also displeased with China's new policy of accommodation with Washington and Tokyo. In a drastic switch in policy, China now supports a US military presence in Asia and, more disastrous for the JCP, advocates maintaining the US-Japan Security Treaty and even strengthening Japan's military potential. These policies, of course, directly contradict long-held JCP positions stressing the need to fight "US imperialism" and to work toward the dismantling of both the Security Treaty and the Japanese defense establishment.[80]

[74]The Three Non-Nuclear Principles are: "not to manufacture, not to acquire, and not to allow nuclear weapons on Japan's soil." LDP Prime Minister Sato Eisaku received the Nobel Peace Prize for championing these non-nuclear principles.

[75]"Resolution of the 17th Congress of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Nov. 25, 1985; and *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986, p. 20.

[76]"JCP Congress: Secret Session Intelligence," *Zembo* (Tokyo), No. 8172, Jan. 10, 1986, pp. 8–11. Reportedly, out of 1,033 valid votes, Ueda came in third with 1,027 (Miyamoto was tenth with 1,012), ahead of both Kaneko and Fuwa.

[77]"The Japan Communist Party and the Brezhnev Era of the Soviet Union," *Akahata*, Jan. 7, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 497, January 1983, p. 10.

[78]"Review of Interventionism Called for—On the 'Resolution' of the 6th CC Plenum of the Communist Party of China," *Akahata*, Aug. 22, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 469, September 1981.

[79]See the article by Li Ji and Guo Pingshi in the second issue of 1983 of the CCP's theoretical journal *Hongqi* (Beijing), "Principles Governing Relations with Foreign Communist Parties." Also published in the *Beijing Review*, Apr. 25, 1983, pp. 15–19.

[80]See, e.g., the JCP criticism of China's appraisal of the latest Japanese government White Paper on defense as encouraging the rebirth of Japanese militarism, in *Akahata*, Aug. 17, 1978, and "Bar the Road to Military Fascism," *Akahata*, Sept. 9, 1978 (the latter also in *Bulletin*, No. 406,

(cont. p. 19)

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The major stumbling block to the normalization of relations between the two parties as far as the JCP is concerned, however, is the CCP's unwillingness to cut its ties to "old friends," a reference to pro-Chinese members who were purged from the JCP following the party's break with the Chinese party, and who subsequently organized several pro-CCP splinter groups.[81] The JCP is adamant in its stand that there can only be one legitimate communist party in any given country, quoting Marx and especially Lenin on "one country, one vanguard party." So when the two "big socialist powers" (as the JCP calls them) support more than one communist party in a country, as they both have consistently done, the Japanese Communists accuse them of big power chauvinism and interference in the internal affairs of fraternal parties. They vehemently criticize the "parallel parties" argument.[82]

These problems notwithstanding, rumors have persisted that high-ranking members of the Chinese embassy in Tokyo have approached the JCP in an effort to reach some kind of accommodation. A good omen for the JCP was the Chinese permission for the JCP-led Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (one of six Japanese organizations) to participate in the "Beijing Forum on Safeguarding World Peace," which was convened in June 1985. Finally, at the 17th Party Congress in November 1985, Miyamoto announced that "at the request of the Chinese party" negotiations were taking place.[83] It should perhaps come as no surprise if a formula is found to enable the JCP and the CCP to "normalize" their relations, although it will be interesting to see how the "parallel parties" problem is handled.

North Korea and Vietnam. During the 1960's, both North Korea and North Vietnam had close relations with the JCP. All three leaned toward Beijing (and away from the Soviet Union), and all three supported the establishment of a broad united front against "US imperialism" in Indochina. But JCP relations with both, especially with Pyongyang, have since cooled. The JCP does not support North Korea's plan for the reunification of the Korean peninsula, and it tries to distance itself from Kim Il-song, his Korean Workers Party (KWP), and his cult of personality. When study groups of Kim Il-song Thought and Chuche (self-reliance) ideology were formed in Japan in 1978, Fuwa personally criticized them in the party theoretical journal *Zen'ei* (Vanguard).[84] The JCP especially disapproves of "the cult of personality" and the "attitude of blindly following foreign leaders."[85] The JCP also condemned the October 1983 bombing incident in Rangoon, in which a number of high-ranking South Korean officials were assassinated by North Korean agents.[86]

Tensions rose in late July 1984 when a North Korean naval vessel fired on a Japanese fishing boat. The JCP characterized the incident as "an inhuman and outrageous act." North Korean authorities, in return, denounced the JCP reaction as an attempt "to drive a wedge between the [North] Korean and the Japanese peoples."[87] The KWP did not send a delegation to the 17th Party Congress held in November 1985, and it came in for some criticism in the resolution passed at the congress:

Hegemonism is not a deviation limited to big socialist countries. The attitude of the Workers' Party of Korea which disregards the theory of scientific socialism and international law in respect to the "military demarcation line," and the shooting at a Japanese fishing boat and the launching of an unjustifiable campaign against our party for not keeping in step with them, is a barbaric form of hegemonism. Our party also resolutely rejects hegemonist attitudes such as the claim that the "thought" of a state leader is lauded as the leading thought of the world, with "ism" added to his name, with this or that followers' group fostered and imposed on our country.[88]

With this, and subsequent mutual denunciations, relations between the JCP and KWP hit a new low.[89]

November 1978). A recent controversy centered on the *Nihon Rodo To* (Japan Labor Party), a miniscule pro-Chinese group that enjoys Beijing's support and receives invitations to attend important celebrations in China. See the "Anti-JCP Foreign Power Followers" series in *Akahata*, April and May, 1986, and *Bulletin*, Nos. 565–67, June 1986.

[81]"What Hinders Restoration of Relations Between the Japan Communist Party and the Communist Party of China?" *Akahata*, Apr. 17, 1985; and *Bulletin*, No. 543, May 1985.

[82]See "One Country, One Vanguard Party—Fundamental to Scientific Socialism: Criticism of 'Parallel Parties' Argument," *Akahata*, Jul. 25, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 525, July 1984, p. 33.

[83]See Miyamoto's opening speech at the 17th Party Congress, Nov. 19, 1985, in *Akahata*, Nov. 20, 1985; and *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1473, Nov. 23, 1985, pp. M11–M13.

[84]*Zen'ei* (Tokyo), September 1979 issue. The JCP's relations with the North Korean party are complicated by a third actor: the Chosen Soren, a fiercely pro-Pyongyang association of several hundred thousand Korean residents in Japan.

[85]See "Anti-Communist and Anti-Progressive Maneuvers by Followers of Kim Il-Songism," *Akahata*, Dec. 9, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 513, December 1983.

[86]See Miyamoto's 1984 New Year interview with the editor, *Akahata*, Jan. 1, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 515, January 1984, p. 8.

[87]*Rodong Shinmun* (Pyongyang), Aug. 6, 1984. Cited in *North Korea News* (Seoul), No. 233, Aug. 20, 1984, p. 3.

[88]"Resolution of the 17th Congress," *Bulletin*, No. 556, January 1986, p. 9.

[89]In March 1986, a North Korean journal of international affairs attacked the JCP, which in turn responded with an article entitled "Further Typical Proof of Barbaric Hegemonism." See *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1504, July 5, 1986, p. 15.

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The JCP's relations with Vietnam continued to be close throughout the 1960's and 1970's, and all three top JCP leaders—Chairman Emeritus Nosaka Sanzo, Miyamoto, and Fuwa—have made several trips to Vietnam and have attended all important state and party functions. A Vietnamese vice-premier attended the 15th JCP Congress, and high-ranking Vietnamese diplomats have stopped by the JCP headquarters on their official visits to Japan. The party took a distinctly pro-Vietnam position in assessing the events that led to China's January 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Yet, although the JCP condemned the Chinese invasion, in time it also criticized the continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.[90] This, along with JCP attacks on the CPSU, and particularly on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which the Vietnamese have supported, has soured JCP-Vietnamese relations to the point where the Vietnamese have rescinded the diplomatic status of the Japanese Communist representatives in Hanoi. The Vietnamese also apparently did not invite the Japanese party to attend their 5th Party Congress in March 1982.[91] Nonetheless, a Vietnamese Communist delegation did attend the JCP's 17th congress last year.

Romania and Yugoslavia. JCP ties with so-called independent communist states in the Balkans are much better than those with neighboring ruling communist parties. The JCP openly lauds Romania's "independent road to socialism" and makes every effort to associate itself with the maverick communist state. In addition to routinely attending each other's party congresses, the two parties have taken special care to maintain warm relations: Miyamoto visited Romania in 1971 and 1978; Fuwa stopped off in 1984; and Nicolae Ceauşescu met with Miyamoto while on a state visit to Japan in 1975.

Although the JCP had denounced Yugoslav "revisionism" in the 1960's, relations between the two communist parties warmed considerably after the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, an action both parties condemned. In recent years, high-level contact between the two has been fairly frequent: Miyamoto visited Tito in 1978; delegations of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) have addressed JCP congresses; Fuwa attended the 12th LCY Congress in June 1982; and a JCP-LCY summit took place in Tokyo in May 1984 when an LCY delegation headed by Chairman Dragoslav Markovic held talks at JCP headquarters. While relations with Romania and Yugoslavia, as well as with other challengers to Moscow, are designed to enhance the image of JCP independence, one wonders if such a close association with Ceauşescu, a ruthless dictator and blatant nepotist, is going to help the JCP in the Japanese political arena.

Western Europe. The JCP's relations with the communist parties of Western Europe are made to order. For one thing, as noted at the outset of this article, economically Japan is part of the Western world; for another, politically it is a parliamentary democracy not unlike those in Western Europe. As soon as the Japanese party began to stress its commitment to parliamentary democracy, it gave priority to developing ties with the Eurocommunist parties, which had a similar task of convincing their own electorates of the sincerity of their commitment. In the 1970's and 1980's, delegations of Eurocommunist parties attended all JCP congresses, as well as the three International Conferences on Theory noted earlier. In recent years, the JCP has held talks and exchanged visits with the Italian, French, Spanish, British, Swiss, Swedish, Danish, Norwegian, Belgian, Dutch, and West German parties. French party chief Georges Marchais traveled to Japan in 1976, and Spanish party head Santiago Carrillo visited Japan in 1976 and again in 1983. These visits were reciprocated by Japanese leaders at the Presidium level, and have included visits to Europe by Miyamoto and Fuwa. A couple of years ago, in June 1984, Fuwa flew to Rome to attend the funeral of Italian party chief Enrico Berlinguer, whose death was doubly unfortunate from the JCP perspective, since he was scheduled to visit Japan in July. Aside from the obvious public relations value of being photographed with a leading European politician, Berlinguer's visit would have given JCP leaders an opportunity to get his insights on the JCP-CPSU summit scheduled for November. On his return home, Fuwa, in an interview with an *Asahi Shimbun* correspondent, took the opportunity to discuss Eurocommunism and the Japanese party:

The primary aim of Eurocommunism is to achieve a revolution by the majority and through democratic means, not taking established revolutions in the Soviet Union and other countries as a model. . . . It is a kind of law for the revolutionary movement in developed countries like Western Europe and Japan. . . . The most outstanding character of Eurocommunism is its independent and autonomous line, and it clearly emerges in the relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . There must be twists and turns and trials and errors in

[90] *Akahata*, Oct. 31, 1982.

[91] "The Japanese and Vietnamese Communist Parties Have Entered a Confrontation Stage," *Zembo Tokubetsu Tsushin* (Tokyo—now *Shiso Undo Joho*), No. 766, Apr. 9, 1982, special issue.

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the future of Eurocommunism, but the current of history will not be changed. . . . Both Eurocommunism and the JCP are identical in the revolutionary direction.

He ended his interview on a positive note, pointing out that in Europe "staunch anti-communism is gone" and that a communist party like that of Italy can enjoy the support of 30 percent of the population. Although on the surface the JCP looks isolated, he added, "brighter and broader perspectives lie ahead."[92]

JCP-Soviet Ties

In 1964, in response to the Soviets having signed the essentially anti-Chinese Limited Test Ban Treaty the year before, the Japan Communist Party severed its ties with the CPSU. Since then, relations between the two parties have gone through two stages. During the first stage, from 1964 to 1979, relations vacillated between none at all and mutual attempts at reconciliation, culminating in the Miyamoto-Brezhnev-Suslov summit in December 1979, at which the two parties normalized relations. During the second stage, from 1980 to the present,[93] the Japanese party has consistently criticized Soviet actions, first in the wake of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, later in connection with the repression in Poland, and more recently for the shooting down of the Korean airliner.[94] There was also an acrimonious exchange, outlined below, over Soviet domination of the editorial policies of the communist journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (known better in the West as the *World Marxist Review*).

How did the two parties manage to restore relations after a hiatus of some 15 years? And what impact did it have on future JCP relations with the Soviet Union? Since I have extensively written elsewhere about this relationship, and particularly on the 1979 rapprochement between the two parties,[95] I will not dwell on this in any great detail here. Essentially, between 1968 and 1977, the Soviets made three unsuccessful attempts at reconciliation with their stubborn Japanese comrades. The major stumbling block was the CPSU's continuous support for a miniscule pro-Soviet splinter group, the so-called Japanese Communist Party—The Voice of Japan, and hence its concomitant refusal to recognize the JCP as the sole party representing the communist movement in Japan. But with the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, which the JCP had opposed on the grounds that it would damage Japan's relations with the Soviet Union, the CPSU decided to abandon its loyal dissident group and normalize relations with the JCP, hoping thereby to offset Chinese influence in Japan by strengthening the JCP's position on the Japanese political scene.[96]

Perhaps no issue has been more contentious, however, than the dispute over the "northern territories," which were first occupied by the Soviet Union during the closing days of World War II.[97] While all Japanese political parties, including the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, demand that the Soviet Union return the two southernmost Kurile islands and a few small islands off the coast of Hokkaido, only the JCP demands the eventual return of the entire Kurile chain, all the way to the Kamchatka peninsula. This ultra-nationalist stand is obvious grandstanding, as there is not the slightest chance that the Soviet Union will relinquish the entire Kurile archipelago. But such an appeal is necessary, in party leaders' eyes, if the JCP is ever to erase its prewar image as an alien group organized and manipulated by the Communist International in Moscow.

In 1981, after its 26th congress, the CPSU Central Committee asked the Japanese party to support the Soviet "Peace Program for the 1980's." Rather than use discreet party channels to reject the offer, the JCP

[92] *Asahi Shimbun*, June 23, 1984, as cited in *K.D.K. Information*, No. 7/84 (July 1, 1984), pp. 5–6.

[93] See *Nisso ryo Kyosan To no Ofuku Shokan, 1980–1984* (Letters Exchanged Between the Two Communist Parties of Japan and the Soviet Union, 1980–1984), Tokyo, JCP Central Committee Publishing Bureau, May 1985.

[94] The day after the incident, Sept. 2, 1983, the JCP asked the CPSU and the Soviet government "to disclose the full facts and without delay take a fully responsible attitude." The Soviets responded 10 days later, and on September 21, the chief of the JCP International Affairs Department, Tachiki Hiroshi, visited the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo and handed Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Pavlov a letter from the Central Committee of the JCP to the Central Committee of the CPSU. "JCP Letter to CPSU on the Downing of the KAL Plane," *Akahata*, Sept. 22, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 508, September 1983.

A good summary of JCP-CPSU relations since 1964 from the JCP point of view can be found in "The Japan Communist Party and the Brezhnev Era of the Soviet Union," loc. cit.

[95] Berton, "The Japanese Communists," and idem, "Soviet and Japanese Communist Parties: Policies, Tactics, Negotiating Behavior," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Autumn 1982, pp. 266–87.

[96] *Pravda*, Dec. 27, 1978.

[97] For the JCP position on the territorial issue, see Berton, "Japan: Euro-Nippo-Communism," p. 343; *Chishima Mondai to Nihon Kyosan To* (The Kuriles Problem and the JCP), published by the JCP Central Committee in May 1974; and Nishiguchi Hikaru et al., *Nisso Ryodo Mondai no Shinjitsu* (The Truth About the Japanese-Soviet Territorial Problem), Tokyo, Shin Nihon Shuppan Sha, 1981. Some of the JCP statements on the territorial issue are translated in *Bulletin*, No. 321, September 1974, and Nos. 371, 372, and 374, June and July 1977. For the benefit of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who was scheduled to make an official visit to Japan in mid-January 1986, *Akahata* printed "Territorial Problems and Points of Agreement Reached Between the JCP and the CPSU." *Akahata*, Dec. 27, 1985; see also *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1479, Jan. 11, 1986, pp. 37–42.

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Central Committee published a rather critical reply in *Akahata*.[98] The Soviet party responded, which led to another JCP letter that too was made public in *Akahata*.[99] The section headings of this pamphlet-size letter give a good indication of its content: "The Sequence of Polemics and Increasing International Tension"; "The Truth About 'The Afghanistan Incident' "; "Evading the Fundamental Tasks for World Peace"; "Problems Relating to Poland"; "The Territorial Issues Between Japan and the USSR"; and "The Question of Big-Powerism and Hegemonism."[100] The question of "Big-Powerism" was taken up at great length by Fuwa in a series of articles in *Akahata* in January and February 1982, entitled "Stalin and Big-Powerism." The articles have since been issued in book form (and even in an English-language edition entitled *Stalin and Great-Power Chauvinism* for the benefit of "foreign Communist parties," not to mention Western analysts of the JCP).[101]

If the JCP's differences with the CPSU over such issues as the Kurile Islands, Afghanistan, and Poland concern the Soviet Union's foreign policy, its attempts to restrain the Soviet-dominated editorial board of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* stress the JCP's commitment to "independence" within the communist movement. Indeed, the JCP's primary complaint is that the journal, "which had been founded [in 1958] as a common forum for exchanges of information, experiences, and opinions between communist parties," has been "made into a propaganda organ for absolutizing Soviet foreign policies."[102] The Japanese party particularly objected to the journal carrying in its April 1980 issue an interview with Babrak Karmal, "head of the puppet regime in Afghanistan, who could only speak in praise of the military intervention by the Soviet Union."[103]

The first signs that the dispute was serious surfaced in 1981, when the journal's 1981 publication plan was adopted. The JCP, in a letter dated December 27, 1980, protested the proposed inclusion of a series of articles criticizing the CCP, arguing that the journal was created to contribute to the development of the international communist movement, "on the basis of the publicly recognized principle that all parties are independent and equal." The JCP repeated its opinion, expressed at a conference of party representatives affiliated with the journal, that "special treatment accorded to one specific party in praise of its leadership and activities should be ended, as well as the campaign organized against a specific party."[104] The JCP also objected to the way the journal was being run, particularly the "undemocratic" way in which members of the Editorial Board were selected,[105] and the fact that the office of editor-in-chief had been always held by a high-ranking CPSU apparatchik.[106]

The Editorial Board did not address the points raised in the JCP letter, and the dispute between the board and the JCP intensified throughout 1981 and the first half of 1982. In May 1981, the JCP sent a delegation, headed by a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium, to an International Theoretical Conference cosponsored by the Central Committee of the Hungarian Party and the Editorial Board of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*. The Japanese agreed to participate only after being given assurances that "equal rights of participants and full freedom of speech would be guaranteed in the conference, and that no keynote report would be delivered by any particular party, nor a specific conclusion or resolution be adopted."[107] The chief Japanese delegate spoke three times. He condemned the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and of Afghanistan, and he reaffirmed the JCP's stance that "there is no such thing as a 'leading party'."[108] Apparently the sponsors' assurances did not extend to accurate reporting, however, as the August, September, and October issues of the journal carried summaries of the Hungarian conference that made no mention of the debate on Afghanistan and distorted Japanese statements through creative editing.[109]

[98] *Akahata*, June 16–18, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 461, June 1981.

[99] JCP reply to the CPSU letter of July 30 in *Akahata*, Sept. 5, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 468, September 1981.

[100] In the meantime, *Akahata* also published in its commentary edition a lengthy document pointedly entitled "For a True Peace Program." See *Akahata*, Commentary Edition, July 6, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 464.

[101] *Akahata*, Jan. 12–Feb. 18, 1982; and *Bulletin*, No. 486, June 1982. Fuwa's thesis was reported in Yugoslav, Romanian, and Italian Communist party organs and in a limited-circulation information bulletin for CCP cadres.

[102] "The Japan Communist Party and the Brezhnev Era of the Soviet Union," loc. cit.

[103] Ibid.

[104] "Letter to the Editorial Board of 'Problems of Peace and Socialism' Sent by the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Jan. 12, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 452, January 1981, p. 3.

[105] The JCP wanted the Editorial Board to be appointed in a democratic way, "taking geographic equity into consideration" and making sure that "existing differences of opinion . . . should also be equitably reflected" (*Bulletin*, No. 452, January 1981, p. 4).

[106] For organizational structure and very useful lists of participating parties and of Soviet officials, see Wallace Spaulding, "New Head, Old 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1982, pp. 57–62.

[107] "International Theoretical Conference, Hungary, May 5–7, 1981—JCP Delegation Speeches and Discussions," *Akahata*, Commentary Edition, May 25, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 459, June 1981, p. 1.

[108] *Bulletin*, No. 459, June 1981, pp. 10–14.

[109] Okamoto Hiroyuki, "On Materials of the International Theoretical Conference Held in Hungary, as Published in 'Problems of Peace and Socialism'—Arbitrary Editing, Inconsistent with the Proceedings of the Conference," *Akahata*, Nov. 22 and 23, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 476, November 1981.

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Such snubs, surprisingly, did not deter the JCP, as it continued to send high-ranking delegations to similar conferences held every three or four years. The JCP again made proposals concerning the journal's editorial work and the composition of the Editorial Board and the Secretariat. As usual, all proposals were rejected or disregarded by the Soviet editor-in-chief.[110] Stymied at every turn, the JCP made a formal proposal that the journal be dissolved. The proposal was repeated at the 1984 conference in Prague.[111] As happened with all previous Japanese suggestions and proposals, however, this one too was ignored.

Relations between the CPSU and the JCP took a turn for the better in April 1984, when a Soviet delegation headed by Pëtr Fedoseyev, Central Committee member and vice-president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, began preliminary talks at JCP Headquarters with a Japanese delegation headed by the late Russian-speaking Nishizawa Tomio.[112] The Soviet delegation also included the CPSU Central Committee Japanese expert Ivan Kovalenko, who perfected his Japanese when dealing with Japanese prisoners-of-war after World War II. These talks were followed by further negotiations in Moscow, and again in Tokyo, eventually leading to a Miyamoto-Chernenko summit in Moscow in December 1984, which, however, was restricted by the Soviets to a single issue—nuclear weapons (see below).

Fuwa and Kaneko attended Chernenko's funeral in March 1985 and met with the new General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv. (Fuwa recalled that he and Gorbachëv had met nine months before in Rome at Berlinguer's funeral.)[113] Kaneko attended and addressed the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, and Miyamoto and Fuwa paid a courtesy call on the Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, when he paid an official state visit to Japan in January 1986. In early August 1986, a JCP delegation headed by Fuwa traveled to Moscow for a meeting with Gorbachëv, a regular consultation stipulated in the December 1984 summit joint statement on the nuclear issue.

Fuwa Tetsuzo, chairman of the JCP Presidium, meets with CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv during an August 1986 visit to Moscow.

—Kyodo News.

The Nuclear Issue Campaign

The most recent focus of the JCP's international policy is "the struggle for preventing nuclear war and eliminating nuclear weapons" (see the party's 1986 May Day slogans on p. 24). This was, in fact, the topic of an international symposium organized by the party in July 1985.[114] In contrast to the three previous international symposia in 1972, 1979, and 1982, which had been devoted to theoretical problems of communist

[110] *Akahata*, Nov. 28, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 475, November 1981, p. 22. For Soviet attacks on the JCP, see Boris Vesnin, "The Communists and Peace, Detente, Disarmament," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 49, December 1981, p. 10; and A. Kozlov and B. Likhachev, "The Prague Meeting of Communists," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 2, 1982, pp. 81-93, esp. pp. 85-86.

[111] See, e.g., Pavel Auersperg, executive secretary of *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, in *Zivot Strany* (Prague), No. 4, 1982, cited and responded to in " 'Fact and Logic' of Executive Assistant of Hegemonism—Reply to Auersperg's Criticism of the Japan Communist Party," *Akahata*, Apr. 30, 1982; and *Bulletin*, No. 485, May 1982; N.K. Krishnan in *Party Life*, organ of the pro-Soviet Communist Party of India, No. 3, 1982, and Bruno Furch in *Weg und Ziel*, organ of the Austrian Communist Party—both reprinted in *Information Bulletin* (Prague), No. 7, 1982, cited and responded to in "Ineffective Apologetics for Soviet-Centrism—JCP Answers Two Articles Reprinted in the Information Bulletin of *Peace and Socialism*," *Akahata*, May 25, 1982; *Bulletin*, No. 487, June 1982, and the statement of Murakami Hiromu, vice-chairman of the Presidium, in Prague on Dec. 5, 1984, *Akahata*, Dec. 7, 1984.

[112] "Preparatory Talks Between the Two Communist Parties of Japan and the Soviet Union," *Shiso Undo Joho*, No. 840, May 12, 1984, pp. 1–8; Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On Developments Surrounding the JCP-CPSU Summit Meeting," *Koan Joho*, No. 369, June 1984, pp. 1–15.

[113] *Akahata*, Mar. 16, 1985.

[114] *Zen'ei*, the entire September 1985 issue; and the 555-page *Struggle for Preventing Nuclear War and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons—International Symposium 1985 Sponsored by [the] Japanese Communist Party*, Tokyo, Japan Press Service, November 1985.

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JCP 1986 May Day Slogans

Listed below are the JCP's 1986 May Day slogans as reproduced in the May 10 issue of *Japan Press Weekly*. They signal the party's priorities, concerns, and action agenda. Whereas in previous years, the slogans included criticisms of the USSR (for holding on to the northern territories, the invasion of Afghanistan, the quashing of Solidarity in Poland), or of China ("immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal from Vietnam"), the 1986 slogans are mainly directed against the United States and the LDP. To be sure, the JCP is an opposition party, but fully 12 of the 15 slogans oppose something, while only three are positive.

1. Liberate humankind from the danger of nuclear war. For conclusion of an international agreement for urgent elimination of nuclear weapons. "No" to SDI plan of the Reagan administration which turns its back on the elimination of nuclear weapons and extends the nuclear arms race into outer space. By world public opinion and actions let us isolate the forces clinging to nuclear weapons.

2. Let us achieve the goal of collection of signatures of the majority of the Japanese population for the Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For consensus and cooperation of the people based on the five nonnuclear points. For realization of a nonnuclear government.[1]

3. "No" to US aggression against Libya and military interference in Nicaragua. Defend the right to national self-determination against all imperialism and hegemonism.

4. Do not allow any kind of terrorism that goes against social progress. Opposition to export of terrorism. "No" to the policy of Liberal Democratic Party government and the policy authorities leaving at large terrorist and wild acts of pseudo-left violent groups and using them for anti-communist propaganda.

5. Do not make the Tokyo Summit a place for justifying US hegemonism.

6. Do not allow construction of US military bases or housing at Miyakejima Island and Zushi City; oppose long-term seizure of land in Okinawa for US military use. Abrogate Japan-US Security Treaty and recover true independence and sovereignty of Japan.

7. Thorough investigation by the Diet into the "Marcos corruption" and "corruption of the National Federation of Thread-Plying Industry Cooperative Associations." Stop service to interests of big business and US world strategy in the name of foreign "aid."

8. Against division and privatization of the Japanese National Railways, and integration and abolition of national hospitals and sanatoriums. Against local "administrative reform" [involving] cutting down welfare and mal-revision of the Elders Health Insurance Law. Against introduction of a big indirect tax. For defense of living and improvement in welfare and education.

9. For substantial wage-hikes and establishment of national uniform minimum guaranteed wage system. For substantial reduction of working hours. Opposition to "rationalization" for reduction of workforce. Do not shift sacrifices from yen upsurge onto small and medium enterprises and agriculture. Improvement of self-supply rate of foodstuffs and stabilization of agricultural management. Expansion of true domestic demand, not for interest of big business but for boosting people's energy.

10. Opposition to support for the war of aggression and the dark politics of the pre- and mid-war era and beautification of the Tenno [Emperor] and the Tenno system, as well as the campaign for celebration of the Tenno's 60-year reign [as] incompatible with people's sovereignty in the post-war age. Opposition to the planned visit of the crown prince to the Republic of Korea, in violation of the constitutional provision forbidding the Tenno's involvement in government. Opposition to turning the Tenno into the head of state and mal-revision of the Constitution. For true people's sovereignty. For immediate correction of the unbalanced allocation of Diet seats to constituencies, and materialization of the "equality under the law" with differences in vote value not more than 1 to 2 (based on population in each constituency). Prevention of maneuvers to establish Japanese style fascism by enactment of the state secrets protection law and establishment of a Security Council, and for development of freedom and democracy.

11. Against the Ad Hoc Commission for education aiming at revival and strengthening of militarism and the building of character to suit financial circles. For educational reform based on national consensus for elimination of "bullying" and "dropouts" of pupils.

12. Opposition to rightist reorganization of the labor front, which is a modern version of the prewar "Association for Service to the State through Industry." For advance in the movement of a United Front of the CTUPUF (Conference of Trade Unions for Promotion of a United Front) and development of united action for true unification of the labor front. For establishment of a class-based national center of trade unions.

13. Down with the Nakasone LDP government which defends US nuclear strategy, leading Japan to become a nuclear battlefield. Do not allow simultaneous elections of the Upper and Lower Houses aiming at arrangement of conditions for Nakasone's third term as LDP president.

14. For outstanding advance of the JCP, the party struggling against war and for peace, for establishing people's sovereignty and fundamental human rights; defender of the people's living both in prewar and postwar days, the party tested in its history of over sixty years.

15. Long live the May Day of 100 years, the 57th May Day. Working men of all countries and the oppressed nations, UNITE!

[1]See p. 6, fn. 18 on JCP efforts to enact a relief law for atomic bomb victims; p. 18 on the five nonnuclear points.

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parties in advanced industrial democracies and which had been attended by less than a dozen, largely Eurocommunist parties, the 1985 symposium attracted 26 parties, including the CPSU and several pro-Soviet ruling parties in Eastern Europe, Asia (Vietnam), and Latin America (Cuba and Nicaragua).

In calling for a total prohibition of nuclear weapons, the JCP draws a distinction between its position and that of the Soviet Union, which, according to the Japanese, changed after the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 and of late has included a variety of half-measures, such as the nuclear freeze.[115] The JCP also criticizes Soviet foreign policy as having adopted the doctrine of "equilibrium of military strength" and as having moved away from advocating a simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization.[116] This enables the JCP to advocate a maximum anti-nuclear program—politically astute in nuclear-allergic Japan—and at the same time to oppose "any manifestation of imperialism, hegemonism or interventionism," which allows the party to distance itself from the Soviet position and stress its own independence.

The party also tries to portray itself as a participant on the world scene. Thus, in June 1983, the Central Committee issued a statement entitled "We Denounce Nakasone's Remarks Fanning 'Globalization' of the Nuclear Arms Buildup, and Urgently Demand that the United States and the Soviet Union Should Achieve a True Nuclear Weapons Zero." Letters were then sent to US President Ronald Reagan and CPSU General Secretary Yuriy Andropov.[117] In January 1984, party leader Miyamoto announced that he had sent personal letters to the two leaders calling for a total abolition of nuclear weapons.[118]

The disastrous national election in December 1983, resulting from a near isolation of the JCP in the political arena, was probably responsible for the decision to step up the nuclear issue and on that basis try to build a broader coalition from below. One of the first actions was to manipulate the anti-nuclear movement into adopting, in August 1984, the so-called Tokyo Declaration, which called for the mobilization of public opinion. This declaration was used to start national and international campaigns to collect signatures, and was later formalized as "An Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to Abolish Nuclear Weapons." The "Appeal" set goals of 60 million signatures in Japan (half of the population) and an equal number of signatures outside Japan.[119] (In 1983, the JCP had engaged in a signature-collection campaign to have "Japan declared nuclear free.")[120] Another stratagem was to label the Nakasone government a pro–nuclear weapons government and argue that Japan desperately needed an "anti–nuclear weapons government."[121]

In the meantime, after three rounds of negotiations, the JCP and the CPSU agreed to a Miyamoto-Chernenko summit meeting to be devoted exclusively to the anti-nuclear issue. (The Soviets, surely, wanted to be spared Miyamoto's long speeches on Afghanistan, Poland, Japanese territorial claims, and various other complaints.) The meeting took place, as planned, in mid-December 1984, but it was not so much a Miyamoto-Chernenko summit as a series of meetings between lower-ranking officials on both sides trying to hammer out a joint communiqué, with the principals involved only in the first and last sessions, the latter apparently a 15-minute signing ceremony.[122] The joint statement mentioned "the need and possibility of the immediate prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons," declared 1985 to be the year of anti-nuclear and peace struggle, and appealed to the communist parties and peoples of the world in general to organize a kind of anti-nuclear international united front.[123]

A couple of months later, however, the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council continued to push the Soviet line about opposition to President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") and the great role the Soviet Union had played in the victory in World War II, all but ignoring Japanese proposals about the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki" signature campaign.[124] There was also disagreement between the

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[115]See, e.g., the Oct. 3, 1983, letter from the JCP to the CPSU in *Akahata*, Oct. 4, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 509, October 1983.

[116]See " 'Military Equilibrium' Doctrine Incompatible with World Peace" and " 'Simultaneous Dissolution of Military Alliances' Disappears from Soviet Policy" in the letter from the JCP to the CPSU, *Akahata*, June 16–18, 1981; and *Bulletin*, No. 461, June 1981, pp. 12–14.

[117]For the statement and the two letters to the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union, see *Akahata*, June 19, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 504, June 1981.

[118]*Akahata*, Jan. 20, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 516, January 1984. Andropov replied to Miyamoto a day before he died. Miyamoto Kenji, "Our Aspiration: Advance for a Total Ban on Nuclear Weapons—On Publication of Letter from General Secretary Andropov," *Akahata*, Feb. 14, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 519, February 1984.

[119]"International Signature Campaign Demanding the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: Recent Developments," *Koan Joho*, No. 377, February 1985, pp. 62–74.

[120]"On the Signature Collection Campaign for a 'Nuclear Free Japan Declaration'," speech by Miyamoto Kenji, May 7, 1983, *Akahata*, May 9, 1983; and *Bulletin*, No. 503, June 1983, pp. 18–20.

[121]Miyamoto Kenji, "Make the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons the Task of International Solidarity for Survival—Defeat the Pro–Nuclear Weapons Japanese Government, Set Up an Anti–Nuclear Weapons Government," *Akahata*, Oct. 18, 1984; and *Bulletin*, No. 530, November 1984, pp. 5–24.

[122]Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the JCP-CPSU Summit Conference," *Koan Joho*, No. 376, January 1985, pp. 16–36.

[123]*Akahata*, Dec. 18, 1984.

[124]Nishida Shin'ichiro, "On the JCP 'International Symposium'," *Koan Joho*, No. 383, August 1985, p. 21.

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Japanese and Soviet delegates (and their allies) at the international symposium mentioned above.[125]

A member of the JCP Standing Presidium participated in the International Scientific Conference sponsored by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Academy of Sciences, which was held in July 1985 on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress, at which the famous prewar international anti-fascist united front was initiated. The Japanese delegate's speech was significantly entitled, "Lessons of the 7th Comintern Congress and Anti-Nuclear International United Front."[126] This clearly underscored the JCP's desire to organize an international movement similar in scope to the prewar united front.

The JCP Tally Sheet

The JCP's current obsessive focus on the anti-nuclear campaign stems from three sources. The first is isolation at home; the second is isolation in the communist movement. In both cases the prescription is the same: find a cause that can galvanize the party faithful and attract potential supporters. The nuclear issue is tailor-made for Japan—the only atom-bombed country in the world—where anti-nuclear feelings run high. And it was particularly appropriate to stress the anti-nuclear issue in 1985, the 40th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Raising the issue of the atomic bombing of these two cities also could not help but remind the Japanese public that it was American pilots who dropped the bombs—an obvious fact for the anti-American JCP to emphasize. Third, there is also a personal factor. Party leader Miyamoto is nearing 80, and he no doubt would like to crown his political career with international recognition as an "anti-nuclear statesman."[127] (Former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku had received the Nobel Peace Prize for his advocacy of non-nuclear principles for Japan.)

The JCP has cleverly played up the hawkish aspects of Prime Minister Nakasone's defense policies, branding his administration a "pro–nuclear weapons government." (During the 1986 election campaign, Fuwa called Nakasone a "fascist politician," and an *Akahata* editorial referred to him as a "Japanese Hitler.")[128] Communist assemblymen, for their part, have extended the campaign to the local level by encouraging local governments to adopt "non-nuclear peace declarations," and indeed the JCP claims that over half of the Japanese population now lives in such areas.[129] Also, over half of the heads of local governments (1,674 out of 3,324) have signed the "Appeal from Hiroshima and Nagasaki."[130] And Prime Minister Nakasone was personally embarrassed when his constituency, Takasaki City in Gumma Prefecture, unanimously adopted the "Declaration for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons for a Peace City."[131]

But if the anti-nuclear campaign strikes a sympathetic chord among the Japanese public, some of the JCP's policy stances do not. The party stridently opposes the Japanese-American security treaty, which a majority of the Japanese people support (increasingly so after China gave the alliance and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces its seal of approval). More difficult to understand is the party's vehement opposition to the celebrations marking Emperor Hirohito's 85th birthday and the diamond jubilee of his reign, unless it is Miyamoto's personal animus against the Emperor in whose prisons he was incarcerated for over a decade before and during World War II. (Actually, the 1947 constitution relegated the Emperor to being only the "symbol of the state and of the unity of the people.") Since over 70 percent of the Japanese public approve of the celebrations, and only about 5 percent disapprove, the JCP's campaign against the "beautification of the Emperor" is not likely to win friends and influence people.

Despite its recent electoral and political setbacks, the JCP remains a formidable organization. If the party is unable to grow in membership (including its youth and women's affiliates) or increase its share of the vote and the number of seats in the National Diet,[132] it has other assets that are quite important. These include the multitude of front organizations originally sponsored by the party or later infiltrated by party activists. (When the party cannot successfully manipulate these organizations, it tries to set up competing ones.) Especially influential are consumer and other grass-roots

[125]Ibid., and documents cited in n. 110.

[126]*Akahata*, Jul. 22, 1985; and "Theoretical Conference in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern," *Bulletin*, No. 550, August 1985.

[127]Miyamoto may also be thinking of the career of Georgi Dmitrov, an obscure Bulgarian Communist who became world-famous in the 1930's for his activities in the Communist International.

[128]*Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1502, June 21, 1986, p. 13; and *Akahata*, June 25, 1986.

[129]As of July 1986, 1,040 local governments representing 64.3 million people, that is, 53.1 percent of the total Japanese population, have so declared themselves. See Miyamoto's address at the 64th anniversary of the founding of the JCP, July 15, 1986, in *Japan Press Weekly*, No. 1506, July 19, 1986, p. M6.

[130]Ibid., No. 1488, Mar. 15, 1986, p. 3.

[131]Ibid., pp. 3–4.

[132]Just holding its own in the face of the LDP landslide victory in the July 1986 double elections was an achievement. In the House of Representatives, the LDP increased its contingent from 250 to 304, largely at the expense of the JSP (which dropped from 111 to 86 seats) and the DSP (37 to 26). The DSP, thus, dropped below the JCP (in both houses), making the Communists the third largest opposition party in Japan.

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organizations in urban areas, which is the main reason why JCP candidates have a greater chance of success at the local rather than at the national level.

But beyond the visible legal party, there is the potential for secret infiltration of labor unions (particularly those composed of government employees, who are more radical than their counterparts in the private sector), industry, the educational network, and even Japanese security forces. Japanese government analysts are particularly concerned about the long-range effect of Communist teachers in the classrooms, of Communist bureaucrats in critical financial agencies, and of Communist lawyers who may one day sit on the Supreme Court.

Since violence, wherever it comes from, is counterproductive in contemporary Japanese society, and especially hurts the party because of its violent past, the JCP has sought to diffuse the violence of the extreme left and the anarchist fringe through party-led youth and student organizations. To this day, Lenin's pamphlet decrying excessive violence as "leftwing infantilism" is mandatory reading for JCP members. Party leaders immediately and forthrightly denounce what they call "pseudo-left" terrorist acts, such as the recent bombing of railroad stations, poisoning of chocolate bars, and the firing of home-made rockets. The JCP even accuses the government, the LDP, and the police of duplicity by nonaction—that is, the conscious decision of not acting preventively and promptly enough in the hope that leftwing violence will enable the government to strengthen police powers and push through repressive legislation.

Although the JCP's constant demands for the return of the northern territories from the Soviet Union have not been successful, the mere fact that the Japanese Communists have persisted in this matter must have shown Soviet leaders the depth of Japanese feeling on this thorny issue in Soviet-Japanese relations. The party has been more effective in pressing other Japanese grievances against the Soviets, such as Soviet obstacles to visits of gravesites in the occupied islands, and the detention of fishermen and various problems over fishing rights. In fact, whenever there is a stalemate in Soviet-Japanese fishery negotiations, JCP visitors to the Soviet capital call upon the Soviet minister of fisheries and draw his attention to the difficult situation of the Japanese working fishermen.

Succeeding Miyamoto? How will the JCP fare in the post-Miyamoto period? Since Miyamoto is almost 78 years old, and since he was instrumental in retiring or purging most leaders of his generation, the Japan Communist Party is bound to have both a leadership change and a generational change in the not too distant future. Miyamoto has not been well, although the nature and extent of his illnesses have been either suppressed or minimized. For many years, he had a nurse near him at all times (some Japanese journalists have intimated that this was not solely for medical reasons), and he took a physician along when he traveled to Moscow two years ago. Miyamoto's protégés are much younger, to be sure, but they have worked in his shadow for at least 20 years. What kind of policies can we expect from them?

In the rumored dispute between Miyamoto and Ueda, the former is portrayed as a hard-line ideologue who has been forced to adopt Eurocommunist tactics in pluralist Japan. Ueda, on the other hand, is seen more as a parliamentarian, anxious to open up the party and model it on the Italian party. But Ueda might not inherit the mantle, as the present top positions are held by his younger brother Fuwa and by Kaneko, who are more trusted by Miyamoto. Of course, adopting a Eurocommunist stance poses the danger that the communist party could become indistinguishable from the established democratic socialist parties. This could undermine the JCP's very raison d'être as a Leninist vanguard party, which, in turn, would likely alienate some of the party's hard-core Leninists, without a compensating growth on the right.

One thing is certain about the post-Miyamoto JCP: his passing will surely benefit the party's image. With his prewar "lynching" case, with his ruthless, dictatorial grip on the party, Miyamoto daily reminds the Japanese public of the prewar JCP: a violent group on orders from an alien power bent upon overthrowing the government. This image dies hard, despite all of the JCP's "Eurocommunist" efforts to present itself as a legal political party working within the Japanese political system and all the party's manifestoes on freedom and democracy. Miyamoto's "cult of personality" has contributed to the disillusionment among better-educated voters, and some party members lay the blame for the decade-long stagnation of the party on him personally and on the central bureaucratic party machine he has created. The distribution of anti-Miyamoto leaflets at the 17th congress certainly underscores this fact.

Future prospects. What are the reasons for the rather dismal record of the Japan Communist Party during the past decade and what are its prospects for the future? The first question can be answered with some certainty, although analysts, of course, differ on what factors should be given more weight. Answering the second question is much more difficult. This is not

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because of the complexities of the Japanese communist movement per se, but because Japan as a society and an economic system is in the process of fundamental change.

The reasons for the JCP's stagnation during the past decade must be analyzed from three perspectives: the party's actions, the impact of international developments, and the domestic environment. There is, of course, overlapping in many instances. Starting with party policy first, the main barrier to growth in my opinion is Miyamoto's dictatorial grip upon the party and bureaucratization of the party apparatus. To this must be added the residual negative image of the party (outlined above), which brings me to the second perspective.

Japanese public opinion links the Japan *Communist* Party to communism in general and to the actions of ruling communist parties in particular. As an overall proposition, communism and Marxism-Leninism have lost steadily in popularity among the more critical circles of the Japanese intelligentsia. This is not to say that Marxist-Leninist ideology has lost all of its attractiveness. But officially sanctioned revelations about the horrors of the so-called Cultural Revolution in China have had a devastating effect. So has the suppression of humanist socialism in Czechoslovakia and of the Solidarity movement in Poland, clearly a grass-roots working class phenomenon. And the failures of the economies of the Eastern bloc countries—especially when compared with the economic miracle of Japan and given the practical admission of failure implicit in the Chinese economic reforms—have given pause to many Japanese, quite a few of whom have seen for themselves when traveling abroad. Add to this list the gruesome stories of genocide in Communist Cambodia, North Korea's bombing of a South Korean presidential delegation in Burma, the shooting down of the Korean airliner by a Soviet fighter plane (many of the victims were Japanese), and so on.

Closer to home, the 180-degree turn in China's policies, especially with regard to the usefulness of the Japanese-American alliance and the desirability of building up Japanese defense forces, has undercut the major arguments of the so-called progressive camp in Japan. Then there is the Soviet occupation of the northern islands, considered by *all* Japanese to be an integral part of Japan (and not territories occupied by Japan through conquest) and deeply resented. And while a good many opinion leaders on the left have denied the existence of a northern threat from the Soviet Union, they can hardly deny Chinese accusations of Soviet aggressive behavior. The final confirmation came with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, significant increases in the size and composition of the Soviet naval forces facing Japan, not to mention missiles and long-range bombers, and the militarization of the northern islands. All this has contributed to strong anti-Soviet feelings in Japan, best illustrated in frequently taken public opinion polls, which inevitably depict the Soviet Union as the least liked country in the world by a large margin.[133]

On the domestic front, the very success of the JCP at the polls in the early 1970's gave second thoughts to the floating and protest voters, as well as, more important, to the other opposition parties. The latter began pooling their resources in electoral districts, with the result that the JCP candidates began to lose to coalitions, notably joint DSP-Komeito electoral slates. Economic prosperity and political stability have been taken for granted in Japan, so that leftwing violence (the long struggle to prevent the construction of the second international airport facility at Narita and the most recent attempts to sabotage the Tokyo summit, to name just two) strengthened the hand of the government and contributed to the negative image of the Communists, in spite of the JCP's public denunciation of violence.

A word about the floating and protest vote. Generally speaking, on the national average, the party pulls in twice as many votes as the number of *Akahata* readers. In the past, however, in certain middle-class districts in Tokyo the JCP attracted three or even four times as many voters as readers of *Akahata*. But in more recent elections, the ratio in many of these districts is coming down to 3:1 and even 2:1. One conclusion is that the JCP is gradually losing the "progressive" floating and protest vote—a development that ironically may be in part due to the party's unexpected strong showing in the early 1970's. Some voters, however, may resume their protest voting for the Communists now that the JCP appears to be stagnating and isolated.

Internally, this stagnation and isolation have produced frantic attempts to strengthen the indoctrination of members and build up morale. All congresses and Central Committee plenums have been stressing education, self-study, compulsory reading of party organs,

[133]The only exception was during the Cultural Revolution when "Communist China" was even more unpopular than the Soviet Union. See Peter Berton, Paul F. Langer, and George O. Totten, Trans. and Eds., *The Russian Impact on Japan: Literature and Social Thought—Two Essays by Nobori Shomu and Akamatsu Katsumaro*, Los Angeles, University of Southern California Press, 1981, pp. 125–29. Calculated from the *Jiji Seron Chosa Tokuho* (Jiji Public Opinion Survey: A Special Report), Tokyo, Jiji Tsushin Sha, 1960–1981. In the first half of the 1980's, especially after the Korean airliner incident in September 1983, the unpopularity of the Soviet Union increased.

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A demonstration in Tokyo's Yoyogi park in July 1983 proclaims: "We are Against the 'Arms Race'" and "Down with the Japanese-American Security Treaty."

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and especially party decisions and resolutions. Party leaders also seem somewhat alarmed about the JCP's prospects in the next election (whether national, prefectural, or local), and they hope to improve party performance by increasing sales of *Akahata*, by distributing literally millions of pamphlets, and by attracting new members in the belief that greater membership translates into higher readership of party organs, which in turn pulls in more voters.

Future bases of support? What are the immediate prospects for the JCP? Not terribly promising. The party can expect a gradual erosion of its primary bases of support: the intellectual elite, student and other young activists, and workers (white-collar more than blue-collar).

In the past, the party has depended to a great extent on the intellectual elite (Miyamoto, Fuwa, and Ueda are all products of the prestigious Tokyo University, and the JCP contingent in the Diet is, along with that of the LDP, the best educated group).[134] Moreover, China's defection from the radical camp has been a very painful experience for Japanese intellectuals, and not only for the dedicated Maoist apologists for the Cultural Revolution.

A second group comprises students and young men and women in general. Former student activists like Fuwa and his brother Ueda, in particular, have been influential in the party hierarchy, outnumbering labor unionists seven to three. The party's future development obviously depends to a large extent on the recruitment of young men and women. And this, in turn, depends on the perceptions, ideology, and general outlook of the new generation.[135]

That outlook is not so favorable for the JCP, if the results of a recent survey of 277 freshmen entering Tokyo University is any indication. According to this April 1983 poll conducted by an assistant professor at this prestigious institution, 28.5 percent of these freshman supported the LDP, 10.5 percent the JSP, and 6.9 percent the JCP.[136] Although this survey is not as damning as was a 1978 poll conducted by the editorial board of the Tokyo University newspaper (entering freshman favored the LDP over the JCP 45 percent to 3.5 percent),[137] support for the JCP in the student population from 1981 to 1984 dropped from 4.3 percent to 3.1 percent.[138]

Even more ominous for the JCP is the coincidence of a lessening of the appeal of socialism and a growing satisfaction with the present system among many young people. An annual survey of some 9,000 trainees at a national youth center for new company employees and those who were employed for three to five years, sponsored by the Japanese Productivity Center from 1970 to 1981, indicates a diminishing number of respondents who favor a socialist system for Japan (rising from 7 percent in 1970 to 10 percent in 1973 and gradually falling to 3 percent in 1981). Those in the

[134]Among the JCP contingent in the Diet, there are many graduates from the elite Tokyo and Kyoto universities and the best private universities like Waseda, including a number of lawyers, two physicians, and two university professors.

[135]Government analysts estimate that among students' self-governing bodies, the JCP controls about 20 percent, extreme leftists about 10 percent, and the neutrals and others the remaining 70 percent. See "Significant Points of the 36th National Congress of the JCP-Led All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Governing Bodies," *Koan Joho*, No. 378, March 1985, pp. 52–69.

[136]Ibid., p. 56.

[137]Ibid.

[138]Ibid., p. 57.

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survey favoring the "present system" figured 24 percent in 1970, dropped to 17 percent in 1974, and then rose to 43 percent in 1981.[139] Perhaps the most devastating statistical trend for the JCP is the gradual aging of the party due to a significant drop in the percentage of young men and women. As noted above, between 1970 and 1985, the percentage of members under age 30 dropped from 55 to 15.[140] It has also been calculated that during the same period the percentage of JCP members among all Japanese students dropped from 1 percent to 0.6 percent.[141]

All these polls seem to indicate that Japanese youth are getting more conservative and more supportive of the present political system. The complacent mood in the mid-1980's is a far cry from the defiant mood of the mid-1960's and the early 1970's. This does not bode well for a reformist (if not an openly revolutionary) political party, such as the JCP.

The third component of party support is white- and blue-collar workers, many of whom are members of trade unions. Space limitations preclude a discussion of the important distinctions between workers in government and private industry, between large-scale (big-business) firms and medium- and small-scale companies, and between blue- and white-collar workers. As mentioned earlier, unlike the French and Italian communist parties, the JCP does not enjoy the support of huge labor federations. Big labor in the Japanese context supports the JSP and the DSP. The JCP, despite being a party allegedly of and for the "proletarian" class, is not the first choice of the union rank-and-file. In fact, some polls indicate rather shallow working-class support for the JCP.[142]

The biggest problem for the JCP is that the Japanese public by and large considers itself "middle class." Poll after poll indicates that upwards of 90 percent of all Japanese opt for the "middle class" label. This shows that whatever inequalities may exist in the Japanese society, the perception of the vast majority is that it is neither downtrodden nor exploited. Of course, the party cannot accept this fact, and goes to great lengths to portray Japanese society quite differently. Supposedly using 1980 figures from the Bureau of Statistics of the Prime Minister's Office, the JCP in its introductory booklet for new members claims that the *working class* (*rodosha kaikyu*) constitutes 67.1 percent (including 2.5 percent unemployed) of the Japanese working population. The other 33 percent is composed of petty businessmen in commerce and industry, and other "working townsmen" (*kinro shiminso*), 17.4 percent; farmers and fishermen, 9.8 percent; capitalist class, 4.8 percent; and the Self-Defense Forces and the police ("armed guards of the ruling class"), 0.8 percent.[143]

However the JCP chooses to classify the Japanese population, a far more important development is taking place that will radically alter the present occupational and social patterns and have a profound impact on the mid-range future of the party. In the wake of the first oil shock of 1973–74, the Japanese government has made some long-range plans for restructuring the Japanese economy, away from the resource-dependent and environment polluting industries and toward high technology, knowledge-based industries, research and development, computer-based information and communications, genetic engineering, new materials, and the like. Japan also has more industrial robots than the rest of the major industrial powers combined.

Japan has already experienced a radical shrinkage in the rural, agricultural sector. The same will gradually happen with the blue-collar industrial labor force, partly because of the utilization of robots. Until now, the tertiary (service) sector has been growing largely at the expense of the primary (agricultural and mining) sector. In the future, the tertiary sector will grow at the expense of the secondary (manufacturing) sector, with profound consequences for the Japanese political parties, especially the so-called progressive parties, including the JCP.

Some of the same phenomena are taking place in Western Europe, but around the turn of the century Japan might be leading the way in economic and social transformation. Students of Eurocommunism might well profit from following the fortunes of the Japan Communist Party.

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[139]Ibid.

[140]Hirotsu, "The 17th Party Congress," p. 11.

[141]Ibid.

[142]A poll, conducted in May 1977 among 15,000 labor union members in the Kansai area, shows a lack of JCP support even among Japan's proletariat: JSP was favored by 28 percent, DSP by 11, LDP by 5.5, and the JCP by only 2.5 (a whopping 45 percent did not support any political party). See Tomita Nobuo et al., "Japanese Politics at a Crossroads: The 11th House of Councillors Election," *Bulletin of the Institute of Social Sciences, Meiji University* (Tokyo), Vol. 1, No. 3, 1978, p. 17. However, because many Japanese are reluctant to identify themselves publicly with the JCP, the validity of such polls is weakened.

[143]*Nihon Kyosan To Shokai*, 1983 ed., p. 97.

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Social Policy under Gorbachëv

Walter D. Connor

In little more than a year since taking office as general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachëv has added a vigorous, comparatively youthful "face" to the Soviet leadership, reshaped the composition of the party Politburo and Secretariat, met Ronald Reagan in a summit that Gorbachëv's two short-term predecessors had avoided, and managed (rather well) the 27th CPSU Congress and (less well) the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster. Although journalistic and expert commentary has, understandably, tended to concentrate on the "high politics" of this period of transition to a post-Stalin leadership generation, the conclusion of the Congress and the adoption of the first new party program since Nikita Khrushchev's visionary document of 1961 raises a broader issue—the emergent policy of the Gorbachëv leadership in the *social* arena.

Social policy is a broad and vague term, definable only at the risk of drawing limits too narrow or, at the other extreme, of including everything that a strong state may do that has any impact at the grass-roots level. Focusing somewhere in the middle of these extremes, this article will first explore some aspects of economic policy as they affect the consumption aspirations and possibilities of the Soviet "man in the street," then examine some themes and policies in the areas of social discipline, educational reform, and work tenure and organization, and finally, touch on the issue of equity and "social justice" in Gorbachëv's USSR. It is surely too early to assume that rhetoric and enunciated policy are a clear guide to future Soviet developments, but not too early to explore some possible contingencies arising from the confrontation of new policies and a Soviet population that has become unaccustomed—through a long Brezhnev era and an extended transition to the age of Gorbachëv—to bold departures.

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Consumerism and Constraint

Soviet consumers will find little of great encouragement in the public communications emanating from the Kremlin since the autumn of 1985, and—if they read improbably closely—there are some clearly discouraging indications. The lengthy "Consumer Goods and Services Program" published on October 9, 1985, set goals for the period to 1990—that of the 12th Five-Year Plan—and to the year 2000, the current end-point of so many Gorbachëv projections.[1] Near-term goals, if not revolutionary in their promise, seem beyond the reach of the modest-to-minimal growth record of recent years. The program promised to increase production of nonfood commodities by 30 percent above 1985 levels by the year 1990, and 80 to 90 percent by 2000, to achieve better siting of retail outlets, and to arrange for more convenient store hours. Beyond predictable references to clothing and footwear, furniture, and refrigerators, the document revealed the continu-

[1] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Oct. 9, 1985, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter *CDSP*), Nov. 6, 1985, pp. 13–30.

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ing "overload" on a central planning apparatus that apparently found it necessary to refer to the production of new types of automatic potato peelers, to promise a 100 percent increase in the production of quartz wristwatches by 1990, and to raise production of videocassette recorders to 60,000 a year by 1990 and 120,000 by 2000.

The program predicted that "payments and benefits provided to the population from public consumption funds will receive further development," but it also set the goal of creating "an extensive and efficiently operating system" of *paid* services, the volume of which is to rise 30–40 percent by 1990 and 110–130 percent by 2000. The commitment to an expansion of paid services was accompanied by comments on improving the quality of services to urban and rural populations and on making services available to all population groups and to people "with different income levels."[2] Whether this bespeaks an aim to impose charges on services currently "free" to all, or to offer a better variety of paid services than is now available to those with the money to pay for them, seems unclear. But if, as seems likely, wage policies will aim at increasing the role of personal income (as opposed to public consumption provisions) in satisfying needs beyond the minimal/normal,[3] the commitment to increasing the proportion of paid services seems likely to benefit mainly higher-income strata.

Moreover, the economy may fall short of fulfilling these promises. There is a perplexing lack of correspondence between targeted 1986–90 investment in the "nonproductive" sector and the promised "delivery" from this sector, suggesting that consumption is likely to be an "orphan" in the second half of the present decade. Investment bulks large in the targets of the 12th Five-Year plan, including investment in the energy and agriculture sectors—indeed, Gorbachëv has apparently had to compromise on his public position of mid-1985, which foresaw no significant rises in investment for these sectors.[4] Total investment is targeted to increase by 18–21 percent over the 1986–90 period, but productive investment is to grow by fully 25 percent.[5] The adverse implication of this for investment in "nonproductive" sectors (health, education, housing, culture), which normally only accounts for about one-quarter of all investment anyway, is clear. This is not a "social budget."

Nor do resources seem to be moving toward the production of mass consumer goods in sufficient numbers to reduce the bottlenecks and pressures that have produced a spectacularly bribe-ridden Soviet economy. Both the Gorbachëv rhetoric emphasizing technological investment in leading sectors of the economy (notably machine-building) and the discrepancy between the overall investment growth target of some 20 percent and promises of growth in nonfood commodity production of 30 percent by 1990 would seem to tip the scales against any emerging abundance of consumer durables.

That "objective circumstances" do not favor the Soviet consumer over the next 5–10 years, then, seems obvious. This raises for Gorbachëv the necessity to mobilize energies, while disciplining expectations—to deliver the "stick," or its functional equivalent, in the absence of a credible and motivating promise of carrots in the near term. The prospective belt-tightening (on the basis, let it be noted, of the anything but dramatic growth of consumer welfare in the first half of the 1980's)[6] is not simply a matter of policy choice in a slow-growth Soviet economy. For various reasons, neither Eastern Europe nor the West is a likely source of the goods whose import might improve the consumer picture.

Eastern Europe is itself economically strapped, and so long as the Soviets understand that social peace there is maintained partially at the price of guaranteeing a living standard that, however threadbare, exceeds the Soviet norm, they will not be tempted to treat the region as an interim source of goods to buttress Soviet living standards. Beyond social peace, a modicum of consumerism is necessary to keep East European citizens motivated as producers, at a time when Soviet policies on integration within the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) lean harder on East European economies than hitherto. In a paper prepared for the UN Economic Commission on Eu-

[2]Ibid.

[3]As the Soviet economist Oleg Bogomolov puts it in an interesting United Nations paper, "while the social guarantees of the receipt of benefits and services from the social consumption funds are also being reinforced, the role of wages in satisfying demands for 'goods' (e.g., housing) that exceed the sociallly guaranteed standards is increasing in most of the countries [member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] under consideration." See UN Economic and Social Council, Economic Commission for Europe "Perspectives on the ECE Regions: Centrally-Planned Economies in the Period up to the Year 2000," Nov. 19, 1985 (for presentation at the Feb. 17-21, 1986, meeting of Senior Economic Advisors to ECE Governments), mimeo, p. 14.

[4]See, e.g., Gorbachëv's speech to a June 11, 1985, Central Committee meeting on accelerating scientific and technological progress, reported in *Pravda*, June 12, 1985.

[5]See the discussion in Keith Bush, "Ryzhkov's Speech to the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress: A Tone of Sobriety", Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 109/86 Mar. 3, 1986, p. 2.

[6]As Prime Minister Ryzhkov noted in his speech at the 27th Party Congress, in 1982 (the second year of the 11th Five-Year Plan) "the increase in the population's real income virtually stopped." *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Mar. 1, 1986, p. 2, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 23, 1986, pp. 2-3.

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The director of a Soviet consumer service center discusses a product with two of his customers outside his complex in early 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

rope, Soviet economist Oleg Bogomolov predicted that the CEMA market as a whole

will continue to suffer (at least for the next 5–10 years) from an excess of demand (principally from the USSR) for food and consumer goods. There is, however, relatively little potential for expanding exports of such products. . . .[7]

Western sources will doubtless continue to supply an important component of Soviet consumption, making good shortfalls in grain production. But even in this area relating directly to diet (at the base of "living standards"), developments look anything but promising. Falling Soviet oil-export revenues reduce available hard currency, intensifying the dilemmas of what to import from the West: technology and capital, grain, or other consumer goods?

On the agricultural front, it is not clear that the USSR is "due" some good luck with weather; without it, grain shortfalls will be all the worse, and the claims on diminishing energy-export revenues all the greater. The yet-to-be clarified agricultural consequences of the Chernobyl' nuclear reactor disaster raise further questions about the quantity and utility of output from farming in the generally marginal producing areas near the plant and, more important, in the Ukrainian bread-basket lands to the south and southeast.

At the 27th Party Congress, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov spoke of pay raises amounting to 25–30 percent *for those in material production, plus allocations for* raises for many in nonproduction branches, to be financed by "increased production and efficiency" of

[7]Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 26.

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labor collectives. These, plus increases in public consumption funds, he predicted, would "lead to really appreciable changes in the living conditions and living standards of very broad strata of society" over the period 1986–90.[8] It is difficult to square this with Bogomolov's commentary on prospects for near-term rises in consumption in the CEMA states:

It is not impossible that until the end of the 1980's resources will be insufficient for the achievement of ***socially perceptible*** *growth in consumption. . . . In these circumstances, there is likely to be development and satisfaction of aspects of demand that do not relate to increase in the supply of material goods but are important for the promotion of social contentment, namely, the improvement of working conditions and the multiplication of training and leisure options. That will help to augment workers' capacity for highly productive labour and promote their more active involvement in production and management.*[9]

The inference is clear: while officials of the Central Statistical Administration will doubtless report some quantitative growth in consumption over the 12th Five-Year Plan period, the dimensions of this growth will not be evident to the public. With stagnation in material conditions, Bogomolov's training and leisure options are unlikely to suffice as incentives for sharply improved work effort.

This brief review of the economic background to social policy in the Gorbachëv era reveals a predominance of constraints over opportunities, of tight spots rather than room for maneuver. The regime seems ready to live—or make its subjects live—within those constraints. Along the way, the social policy lines that are emerging, while not altogether clear, seem to promise a peculiar amalgam of activist state intervention in certain areas and the possibility of greater autonomy in others, in a "balance" as likely to frustrate as to please those at whom it is aimed.

Discipline

The broad Gorbachëv policy stresses discipline: work, sobriety, order, and honesty. In this, it reproduces the style of the Andropov interregnum, but not quite the "campaign" quality of the early months of 1983, when hapless Soviet citizens, shopping during working hours, were dragooned from queues and asked to account for their involvement in what was, after all, a mass-behavior phenomenon. Although Western commentary at the time tended to perceive enthusiastic mass support for Andropov's attack on the slackness of behavior, the dishonesty, and the corner-cutting that had become epidemic in the latter years of the Brezhnev period, one may doubt that such feelings went very deep. The Andropov campaign literally aimed at the "man in the street," long-starved of goods and convenient hours in which to purchase them. The stick of discipline was felt immediately; the "carrot" of more convenient store hours and better supplies was a matter of future hopes.

Gorbachëv, in contrast, in his first year concentrated more on dismissing, retiring, and otherwise separating from ill-discharged functions party and state leaders at various levels—from national to regional and local. In so doing, he has given Soviet citizens so inclined something to cheer about, as the incompetent, but especially the corrupt (who used elevated positions to enrich themselves), are laid low. The Soviet rank-and-file is, after all, used to taking orders, to waiting upon (or trying to subvert) cumbersome bureaucratic procedures to secure services and decisions. While in the latter half of the 1980's, citizens are surely sophisticated enough to expect no alteration of hierarchical structures out of this, it cannot be a matter of total indifference to them that many of the highly-placed are finally getting a comeuppance.

Less popular, one must assume, is the campaign Gorbachëv has made his own: the one against alcohol and the Soviet population's massive and frequent recourse to it.[10] Barely had Konstantin Chernenko been buried and Gorbachëv settled in the general secretary's chair when *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* announced that the Politburo had discussed means of "combatting drunkenness and alcoholism,"[11] setting the stage for further rhetoric, if not action. The first followed, with a Central Committee resolution and a Council of Ministers decree in mid-May.[12] Beyond familiar pieties about expanded programs of medical treatment, the encouragement of more "creative" (i.e., sober) use of leisure time, and improvement in the quality of anti-alcohol propaganda, the main substance was a set of restrictive police measures. Alcohol sales were barred to persons under 21; there were to be no sales of wine and vodka before 2:00 p.m. on workdays; and the number of retail outlets was to be reduced.

In contrast to the past, the Gorbachëv regime does

[8]Ibid., p. 17.
[9]Ibid., p. 15, emphasis added.
[10]For a recent discussion, see David E. Powell, "The Soviet Alcohol Problem and Gorbachëv's 'Solution'," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Fall 1985, pp. 5–15.
[11]*Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Apr. 5, 1985, p. 1.
[12]*Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, May 17, 1985, p. 1.

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

The adverse impact of alcoholism on work is depicted in this cartoon by Soviet artist L. Samoylova. The caption reads: A Graph of the Fulfillment of the Production Plan at Shop No. 13.

—*Krokodil* (Moscow).

seem intent on enforcing such restrictions. Muscovites and visitors report the novelty of "dry" lunches in restaurants, and changes in the previously bibulous pattern of Soviet official entertaining, including events on the Moscow diplomatic round. Soviet reports cite a reduction in retail sales outlets (those selling wine and vodka) of 50 percent during 1985 and a fall in sales amounting to 25 percent for the same year.[13] Restrictions on hours of sale, surely aimed at reducing workplace drunkenness, may—combined with a crackdown on labor-discipline violations in plants—have had some positive impact. It was claimed, for example, that the rise in industrial production figures in the fourth quarter of 1985 was attributable in part to more "discipline"—part of which must surely be a lessening of drunkenness, absences, accidents, and general slackness related to alcohol.[14]

Over the long term, however, there is ample reason to doubt that a behavior pattern so deeply rooted can be extirpated, especially habits that have put money in the state's pocket via its monopoly on alcohol production (even as they have taken it away in productivity) and have contributed, in some measure, to the relative political quiescence of a population deprived of liberties and consumer goods long common in the West. If the regime, under Gorbachëv, continues to "mean business," it may cut the production of liquor further, but only to see some of its market ceded to the producers of *samogon* (privately brewed alcohol). Illegal distillers, mainly rural, are targeted in Gorbachëv's campaign, but their numbers are large and rural law-enforcement notoriously difficult. Finally, without more goods and services to reward greater discipline and productivity, there will be no positive incentives for the Soviet masses to moderate their drinking.

Discipline at the social level, ultimately, is a matter of motivation—moral as well as self-interested (whether for gain or avoidance of penalty)—to behave within prescribed patterns (the "letter of the law," or something close to it). Moral motivation must be strong

[13] *Pravda*, Jan. 26, 1985.

[14] See the discussion of 1985 performance in Keith Bush, "Soviet Plan Fulfillment in 1985," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 47/86, Jan. 27, 1986.

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Table 1: Attitudes of a Sample of Moscow Industrial Workers Toward Legal Norms

(In percent)

Act punished by a given law	Attitude toward the given law			
	Actively positive	Neutral	Negative	No opinion
Theft from an apartment	92.6	–	–	7.4
Petty theft from an enterprise	16.6	78.6	3.3	1.5
Radio repair: repairman avoids filling out work order and pockets the fee personally	4.7	49.3	40.7	5.3
Swindling customers (charging for false weight, etc.)	76.7	20.7	–	2.6
Money bribe to salesperson to obtain a scarce item	12.0	30.0	54.7	3.3
Influencing criminal investigation to help a friend escape responsibility	44.0	17.3	33.3	5.4

SOURCE: Adapted from A.S. Grechin, "Experiment in the Sociological Study of Attitudes Toward the Law," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 2, 1983, p. 124.

indeed if the consequences for the individual are more negative in adhering to the rules than in learning to sidestep them. Here, Gorbachëv faces a dual burden. Under Brezhnev as never before, negative incentives to obey laws weakened, while positive incentives failed to grow apace with desires for goods and services. (A positive incentive against offering of bribes to salespeople and their asking for same is an adequate amount of the goods involved in the transaction.) Under these circumstances, the views of Soviet people about such issues of everyday morality drifted far from the prescriptions of the laws.

Interesting evidence of this emerges in a 1982 Soviet study of popular attitudes toward legal norms—based on a study of 2,000 workers in Moscow industrial enterprises. Respondents were asked about their attitudes ("actively positive," "neutral," "negative") toward the negative norms declaring certain acts illegal (see Table 1). Nothing about these figures should surprise any student of Soviet affairs—or anyone familiar to any degree with the strictures and opportunities of grass-roots Soviet life. Worth noting, however, is not only the very weak support for prohibitions of behavior that betokens participation in the "second economy," but also the clarity of the separation between public and private "spheres" of moral calculation. Stealing from the workplace is one thing; from an individual's apartment, something else. Bribing a salesperson is "normal"; being short-weighted by the same, reprehensible. If it is Gorbachëv's goal to upgrade public morality to the level of private morality, one can only say that at present the resources to do so, ranging from the coercive to the positively-motivating, are in less than adequate supply. Changing such public attitudes will require more than a campaign. Attempting at the outset to change them mainly by negative and punitive policies could produce, in lowered morale and more sophisticated patterns of avoidance, the opposite of the regime's objectives.

Education: Choice to "Tracking"

"Educational reform" is not a policy innovation of the Gorbachëv era proper—it dates back to 1984—but the new General Secretary has made it his own. At the 27th Congress he stated:

The reform of general education and vocational schools has started. It must be said that the tempo and depth of implementation of the measures envisaged by the reform cannot yet satisfy us.[15]

If we are to take these words at face value (and there are reasons for doing so),[16] they signal commitment to a program with profound implications for social mobility, class composition, and inter-class relations, and for some redefinition of the broad notion of "social justice."

The critical elements of the reform aim at a threefold problem: an "excess" of Soviet teenagers electing to complete academic secondary education, most with an eye toward competing for scarce spaces in higher education; a "shortage" of job-relevant vocational

[15]See the text of his report in *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Report, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 26, 1986, p. 22.

[16]Personnel appointments to relevant posts seem to indicate this. On Dec. 5, 1985, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* reported the appointment of Viktor Kaznacheyev as Chairman of the State Committee for Vocational-Technical Education of the Russian Republic; his previous post was party second secretary in Stavropol' Kray—Gorbachëv's home "turf" (see *Radio Libery Research*, RL 4 I I/85, Dec. 6, 1985, p. 3). On Jan. 13, 1986, Radio Moscow announced the appointment of Leningrad City party first

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training for those in the 16-to-17–year age bracket; and unreadiness," thus, of those completing academic secondary education to enter the working class, because of a lack of skills, because unattractive entry-level jobs "require" considerably less than 10 years of academic education, and because youths aspire to be something more than the workers that economics and demographics dictate they must become. All of these problems, of course, have in recent years been seen against the backdrop of an overall shortage of labor. This has added to the perceived urgency of finding some solutions.

The solution chosen involves a new form of "tracking" for schoolchildren, emphasizing a new kind of secondary educational institution. It promises to involve state authority at an earlier age than hitherto in educational and career planning for children. The reform proposes to increase "by approximately two times" the number of youths who, after completing "incomplete secondary" schooling (now the eighth grade, but when the reform's new age-six school commencement policy is in place, the ninth grade), go to "secondary vocational-technical schools." This institution (*srednoye professional'no-tekhnicheskoye uchilishche* in Russian—hereafter SPTU) has grown since the late 1960's out of granting to some upgraded "vocational-technical schools" (PTU) the right to grant secondary school diplomas. In the past, the PTU provided education of a narrowly vocational sort, usually lasting from 8–9 months to one-and-a-half years, and producing, by aim, "workers" for the economy, without granting the diploma of a secondary education.

Now, the SPTU will evidently absorb the majority of 17-year olds, providing a "comprehensive" education resulting in both vocational training and a secondary-education diploma. Given that Soviet surveys indicate mixed feelings—indeed a lack of enthusiasm—on the part of parents and children about such an "alternative" to the "academic" track most have selected in the past, many will be given no alternative. In a departure from the "spontaneity" that through the whole post-Stalin era has marked educational choice after the eighth year, admission to academic secondary training will become "selective." By one account, "The proportion of ninth-form leavers enrolling in different types of schools to complete their secondary education depends on the requirements of the national economy, with account taken of the abilities and inclinations of the pupils, the wishes of the parents, and recommendations of the schools' teacher councils."[17]

What this means, in effect, is that completion of an academic secondary education—the current 9th and 10th, and the future 10th and 11th grades—will be a reality and option for only a minority of Soviet teenagers, as opposed to the majority today. Granted, those who complete academic secondary schooling in the main do not succeed in entering higher educational institutions (VUZy) today, and have not for some time.[18] But they have until now at least been free to remain in that academic track, and to enter the competition for full admission to VUZy; this will now change. Granted further, graduates of the "basic" vocational-technical schools (PTU) have not to this point been granted the secondary-school diplomas, which the new SPTU—into which all PTU's are slated for conversion—will be in a position to confer. But surely, they will

A cartoon by R. Yorsha in a Soviet humor magazine highlights concern with those who cheat the public. Observing the bejewelled hand of the salesperson, a customer exclaims: "Her hand gets ever heavier."

—*Krokodil* (Moscow).

secretary Anatoliy Dumachev as Chairman of the USSR State Committee on Vocational-Technical Education. See *Radio Libery Research,* RL 35/86, Jan. 17, 1986, p. 5.

[17]"Basic Directions of the Reform of General Education and Vocational Schools," in *O reforme obshcheobrazovatel'noy i professional'noy shkoly, sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (The Reform of General Education and Vocational Schools: A Collection of Documents and Materials), Moscow, Politizdat, 1984, p. 42.

[18]For a general discussion, see Murray Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union,* White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1977, pp. 58–59.

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Students in a chemistry class at a secondary vocational school in Leningrad.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

be conferring diplomas without the education: one cannot "cram" both full academics and serious vocational training into what will be a three-year curriculum. Thus, though SPTU graduates will have their right-by-diploma to apply to VUZy (albeit only after completing an initial work assignment, it seems), their certification is not likely to be treated in the same manner as that of the minority of favored youth who will receive the traditional academic credentials.

Both numbers and social process are of interest here. Excluding the roughly 10 percent of eight-year-school graduates who opt for the para-professional "specialized secondary education" from ninth year on, and the now very small number who drop out of school after eight years, the bulk of 15-year olds (in 1979–80, about 52 percent) has, in the recent past, opted mainly for academic secondary education; only 19.6 percent in the same year opted for SPTU; and 17.7 percent, for PTU.[19] On the basis of these figures at least, a doubling in the numbers attending SPTU (including the "merged" PTU) would shift the proportions radically: about 61 percent would be attending the new institution, and only 28.6 percent would remain in the "academic" track. If we take as a basis for projections the enrollment figures of autumn 1983 (this being the last year for which figures could have been available for the 1984 reform), upward shifts in the SPTU/PTU "base" would leave less than one-quarter of youth attending purely academic secondary institutions.[20]

In social terms, the administrative/selection process outlined above promises to introduce forces at the secondary school level that currently show themselves mainly two years later, during the competition for VUZ entrance. Children of better-paid, better-educated professionals are vastly overrepresented in higher education in comparison to the offspring of workers and peasants. Parental value-inculcation, discipline, example, cultural/economic resources, and connections clearly all play a role. Is there any doubt that these factors will also operate at age 15 to determine that recruits to the SPTU will be largely of average-to-disadvantaged backgrounds, and that those who continue in academic education are likely to be children of already-successful parents?

Such a development will intensify the process of the hereditization of the Soviet working class, already well-advanced, as working-class children are "tracked" into the SPTU's, whose aim is to provide skilled workers for the economy. A "hereditized" working class would, from some perspectives, be judged a welcome development. Workers in such a class would possess better basic skills and be habituated to the urban-industrial environment (in contrast to the former peasants who swelled the ranks of the working class in the Stalin and Khrushchev eras). But from other perspectives, it has the potential of becoming a more "class-conscious" and combative social force, and a greater problem for political management.

This educational reform represents "interventionist" social policy—the intrusion of the Soviet state and its representatives into a process hitherto left largely alone. The evident rationale is, perhaps, not objectionable: if the economy needs "trained hands" and lacks them, and if spaces in higher education are few and

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[19]Figures are calculated from data in Felicity O'Dell, "Vocational Education in the USSR," in J.J. Tomiak, Ed., *Soviet Education in the 1980's*, London, Croom Helm, 1983, pp. 127–28; in F.R. Filippov, *Sotsiologiya obrazovaniya* (The Sociology of Education), Moscow, Nauka, 1980, Ch. 3; and in I. Bolotin and V. Chizhov, "Labor Resources and the System of Public Education," *Planovoye Khozyaystvo* (Moscow), No. 8, 1982, p. 103.

[20]However, in this area, "make haste slowly" may be the operating principle. The target for the autumn of 1985 involved the enrollment of fully 57.6 percent of all eighth-grade graduates into the ninth grade of academic schools—no great decline over previous years. See *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 22, 1985, pp. 1–2.

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most who seek them must fail and enter the world of work, then equipping such youths with the currently-scarce skills for that work is not illogical. But, at base, the manpower needs of the Soviet economy are in part a product of politics and not purely economics, and the low supply of places in higher education versus the demand is also the outcome of political decisions.

More important, the rise of the SPTU as the presumably "model" educational institution of the future reemphasizes the state's tendency to treat its human subjects as "raw material"—to direct them where the state has decided they are "needed," and to fit them not only with appropriate manual skills, but also with—for this is clearly a presumed benefit of the SPTU—attitudes appropriate for entrance into the working strata, rather than aspirations to enter into the intelligentsia. One may even sympathize with a desire to relieve the frustration youth feel from failure to gain VUZ admission, without—at the outset of the Gorbachëv leadership from which liberals seem to expect so much—agreeing that the appropriate path is educational/cultural surgery to excise the aspirations themselves.

The World of Work

For all the costs—political, psychological, economic, and other—that the Soviet state as collective employer and paymaster, as well as pedagogue and policeman, has imposed on its subjects, it has provided rank-and-file workers guarantees against Western-style unemployment and ensured job security in current jobs at the workplace. Indeed, that issues of the quality of Soviet work life have come into sharper focus in recent years in the writings of Soviet economists and sociologists[21] is a mark of a certain industrial maturity, of having solved in the main the basic problems of providing work and sustenance. While not so critical to the ambitious or to the large number each year who do change jobs in the USSR, this security has been, for many, an essential component of a welfare package that links regime and society in a social compact of sorts. It is a benefit to be balanced against the boring, monotonous, sometimes arduous, unmechanized jobs in an industrial economy well behind the West in its evolution toward "post-industrial" or "service economy" characteristics.

There are now signs, however, that the Gorbachëv regime may take steps that will imperil this fundamental security without either enriching the nature of work or increasing the rewards for it. Should this prove to be the case, the adjustments required of society could be, collectively, quite remarkable. The reasons for this departure are a "labor shortage" reflecting both demographic realities (the low numbers of young entrants into the labor force and large numbers of workers reaching retirement age) and an abysmally low level of per capita labor productivity. The latter also reflects overmanning as enterprise policy and underemployment of this "stockpiled" labor.

Experiments of limited scope to deal with this problem are not new—for example, starting in 1967, the managers of the Shchekino chemical complex were allowed to dismiss redundant labor and reward those who remained with higher wages from a retained part of wage-fund savings. But the rhetoric confronting inefficient labor utilization—and, implicitly, the underlying job security—has escalated to a new level over the last year and a half. Early calls by Gorbachëv for harder work and greater efficiency have been accompanied by action, which although not massive, is certainly more than symbolic. In his 27th Party Congress speech Gorbachëv cited the dismissal of 12,000 workers of the Belorussian railway system and cuts in industry and construction personnel of Zaporozh'ye oblast, and he held out the prospect that new machinery in agricultural industry might save the labor of as many as 12 million workers by 1990.

The merger of five ministries and a state committee into a unified "State Agro-Industrial Committee" in November 1985 signalled, to much publicity, the release of several thousand bureaucrats from their jobs. Although it was noted that they would receive benefits equal to their old salaries for a maximum of three months while awaiting placement in (unspecified) new positions, there was no indication of an immediate transfer to other work.[22] Transition payments notwithstanding, they were, effectively, "unemployed."

While one can predict or imagine responses ranging all the way from mild concern to cheers that a set of ministerial bureaucracies had released a reported 47 percent of their apparat,[23] an article in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* by labor economist Vladimir Kostakov at the beginning of the 1986 raised a more alarming specter. If growth targets for labor productivity for the year 2000

[21] The best recent treatment of this discussion is found in Murray Yanowitch, *Work in the Soviet Union: Attitudes and Issues*, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1985.

[22] *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Nov. 23, 1985, pp. 1–2.

[23] As reported by the chairman of the new State Agro-Industrial Committee, Vsevolod Murakhovskiy in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Jan. 22, 1986. However, the same source reported that as of late February (about three months after the redundancies were announced), "virtually all" of the 3,200 released had new jobs. See *Sel'skaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), Feb. 21, 1986.

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Soviet schoolgirls are taught to be shop assistants at a vocational training center in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

were met, he argued, this would allow a reduction by 13–19 million in jobs in manufacturing.[24] He predicted that the "sharpness" of this process would be "significantly moderated" by routine retirements and by the arrival on the labor scene of smaller cohorts to replace larger existing ones. More significantly, Kostakov wrote of a shift of employment to the service sector—long a low-pay, low-status, understaffed part of the economy—as manufacturing "destocked" especially in the area of non-, or minimally-mechanized labor. Indeed, he admitted, in the mid-1980's, "imperfections in the service sphere are harming material production most of all."

Although the image of a more modern economy, somewhat along the lines of "post-industrialism" (without using the term), was a benign one in Kostakov's depiction, the transition from industrial to service employment was cast in terms rather different than those that Soviet audiences are accustomed to hearing:

The need to look for a job, something that many people . . . will certainly face, may also be new and unaccustomed for us. After all, we are used to just the opposite—the job looking for the person. . . . Considerable psychological restructuring will also be required, apparently. We consider it natural and necessary that, if for objective reasons a job slot becomes unnecessary, the employee should immediately be given another job. Very often, that is precisely why staff reduction takes place more slowly than it could even now: the managers of enterprises and institutions . . . prefer not to burden themselves with concern for the job placement of people who have been let go—especially since their possibilities for doing so are very limited. Now we will have to accustom ourselves to the thought that finding employment is, to a considerable extent, the individual's own concern, and that this search may require a certain amount of time—a sufficient, but not unlimited, amount of time.[25]

It was, perhaps, the tone of the commentary, rather than the rough demographic projections, that engen-

[24]In *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), Jan. 4, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. 1–4.
[25]Ibid.

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At the Central Employment Bureau in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

dered unease. Whatever the case, an interview with TASS later in the same month gave Kostakov the opportunity to deny that unemployment would result from technological progress and enhanced productivity,[26] and a later article by him in *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* provided a general discussion of economic progress and its conditions that was less pointed than the earlier one.[27]

Whether this follow-up reflects official Soviet concern with domestic uneasiness or with Western press coverage suggesting that Lenin's sixth lineal heir might preside over the reintroduction of joblessness, the problem is a sensitive one. Soviet labor waste does need correction. The service sector, woefully underdeveloped, is short of manpower by any reasonable international standard (though this is clearly not its only problem). At this point, Gorbachëv's policy, while aiming to avert alarmist reactions, has offered no guarantees that things will continue as usual for a largely "tenured" labor force.

Otherwise, the onset of the Gorbachëv era seems to have brought little new in labor policy. Predictably, the "brigade method" of shop-floor organization was endorsed at the 27th Congress, although the "reality" of its results remains unclear. Although a 1983 report indicated that more than 50 percent of all industrial workers were working under the brigade method,[28] a 1982 article judged that more than 50 percent of the brigades reported were really "paper" constructs.[29]

Of more interest was Gorbachëv's reference in his Congress address to the "brigade" or "team" system in agriculture. He held out the prospect that contracting might be "widely disseminated at the level of teams, links, and *families*."[30] This allusion to a possible return to "family farming" within an unspecified set of collective farm limitations was of particular interest in light of China's successful agricultural "de-communalization." But, despite publication since the Congress of a lengthy decree on agriculture,[31] there has been no major follow-through on this tantalizing Gorbachëv gesture toward private enterprise. It is precisely in this area—where desires to unleash people's capacity to work clash with fears of the social and political consequences of growing unequality and individual enrichment—that the tensions in Gorbachëv's social policy may emerge most clearly.

Enterprise, Equity, and Social Justice

What sort of Soviet society does Gorbachëv seek to shape? What combination of impulses toward achievement and enrichment, on the one hand, and quality and security, on the other, is seen as an "appropriate" public mood? What role will private enterprise—and all its more-than-marginal social effects—be allowed to play, if any? What distinctions will Gorbachëv regime policy draw between "honest" earning of material advantage, and "unjustified" enrichment of individuals, groups, or classes?

The uncertainties here are many, but not so total as to leave us with no clues. It is worth stating at the outset that there seems to be a distinct lack of readiness to countenance a social outcome of the "Hungarian" sort. This is more than to say that the USSR will not adopt a "modified" New Economic Mechanism (since such was never possible in any real sense); it is to suggest a distaste among Soviet leaders for the liberalized, decentralized, competitive, and self-exploiting style and content of Hungarian life as it has developed

[26]Tass interview, Jan. 16, 1986 (see *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 35/86, Jan. 17, 1986, p. 11).

[27]*Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Feb. 1, 1986, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Feb. 19, 1986, pp. 4–5, 23.

[28]N. Safronov, Ya. Shagalov, and A. Shirov, "Reserves for Increasing Labor Productivity in USSR Industry," *Sotsialisticheskiy Trud* (Moscow), No. 7, 1983, p. 13.

[29]A.A. Gorel'skiy, "Defining Brigade Economic Accounting," *EKO* (Novosibirsk), No. 7, 1982, p. 122.

[30]*Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1986, emphasis added.

[31]*Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Mar. 29, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, May 7, 1986, pp. 10–15.

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Vladimir Kobzev, leader of a team of machinists formed in 1985 at Moscow's Krasnyy Proletariy works; the team gets a "collective wage," which members divide according to their individual work contribution.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

since 1968, for the uncertainties of the mix of private/autonomous and public/dirigiste forces in Hungary. Moscow will tolerate it in Hungary, but will seek to avoid such a consequence in its mix of policies for Soviet society.

The real objectives beyond the immediate rhetoric and policy pronouncements are more difficult to discern, but a few things seem clear. First, within the general commitment to maintaining the Soviet welfare state, one can detect a trend toward the shifting of responsibility for certain matters away from the state, and toward the individual. Kostakov's words on workers seeking jobs rather than vice versa, bear this message, and this he was not forced to retract. Similarly, one of the thrusts of recent discussion on wage policy (within a general context of "anti-levelling") involves viewing wages and salaries as the main way of satisfying needs beyond those provided for in collective consumption—the implication being that more "needs" can be afforded, the more one earns. It is one's responsibility to earn the money.[32]

Second, this responsibility does not herald a new autonomy for the Soviet citizen in society and economy. Thus far, at least, the Gorbachëv regime has offered no large range of private-enterprise alternatives for those ready to opt out of the state economy. Though this does not close off all possibility of a future opening to marginal privatization, the current state of mind runs in a different direction. A CPSU Politburo session on March 27 of this year addressed the bugbear of "unearned income," and *Pravda*'s report of the meeting indicated that

> *. . . plans call for the implementation of legal and other measures aimed at eradicating unearned income from illegal operations, theft, bribery, speculation, and unauthorized use of state-owned transport, machines, and equipment for personal profit.*[33]

Considering the broad range of behavior that the Soviet mind has been inclined to view as "speculation" and the ubiquity of unauthorized use of state-owned automobiles and trucks, this meeting targeted a great deal of everyday behavior.

At the same time, Gorbachëv's Congress report suggested some ambivalence—or perhaps, balance—on this score. The General Secretary called for consideration of progressive inheritance taxes (one way of getting at "unjust enrichment"), but followed this proposal immediately with a defense of those who gain "additional earnings through honest labor." Could the latter comprise private-sector activity?

The Central Committee resolution on "Measures to Intensify the Struggle Against Unearned Income" and the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium on "Intensifying the Struggle Against the Deriving of Unearned Income"—both published on May 28, 1986—made this seem unlikely. Though the documents specify that work in "handicrafts" or "individual labor activity" must be of a specially "prohibited" type to be subject to a catalogue of penalties, they fail to indicate what *is* legal or what is to be encouraged in the area of private initiative.[34] Unauthorized use of state-owned means of transport is made a matter of administrative penalties (and of criminal prosecution for recidivists), but there is no reference to the possibility of using private automobiles to offer services as

[32]Bogomolov speaks of "making workers' levels of real consumption more closely dependent on their incomes." Op. cit., p. 14.

[33]*Pravda*, Mar. 28, 1986, p. 1.

[34]*Pravda*, May 28, 1986, pp 1–2.

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part-time taxi drivers in off hours—a modest "privatization" suggested by many economists in recent years.[35]

These documents remind one of the Brezhnev-era "declarationism," which so often proved impotent in dealing with the targeted problems. One recalls that it was only a few years ago, in 1981, that two new articles were added to the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic specifically prohibiting sales under-the-counter or at places removed from retail shops and forbidding state employees to accept bribes for performance.[36]

Proscriptions and penalties for violation of laws will only make social (and ultimately, political and economic) sense if the production of goods and sale of spare parts are boosted and the populace's demand for services is satisfied in the briefest possible time—in other words, if the positive commitments of the Central Committee resolution are met.[37] As indicated above, this is not likely. In the meantime, tight enforcement could force a drying-up and a driving further underground of elements of the second economy and a rise in the prices patrons must pay, with no improvement in the net quality of life or social morale. Although USSR General Procurator A. Rekunkov suggested in an *Izvestiya* interview five days after the new decree that a law on individual labor activity currently being drafted was aimed not at prohibiting but at developing such activity, and that state registration and taxation (to keep charges from rising too high) would encourage such work,[38] one may doubt whether Soviet citizens will see things that way.

Finally, "social justice" remains an aim, an objective to be pursued so that Soviet citizens perceive as equitable the rules according to which opportunity and benefits are allocated. Here, matters are as interesting as they are complex. Equity and "equality" are not the same thing. However, there is a strong egalitarian bent among a significant segment of the Soviet population, and one may assume that the Brezhnev-era wage policy, which saw a "drift" toward minimization of the earning advantages of engineering and technical personnel over manual workers, and continuing advantages of the latter over people in rank-and-file positions in medicine, education and culture, and other services,[39] responded in some fashion to this bent. Gorbachëv seems to have something different in mind—a "shake-up" in favor of those "underpaid" (from the incumbents' point of view) nonmanual and service-sector occupations, which are expected to increase as a percentage of the labor force when manufacturing de-stocks unneeded workers. In the words of Bogomolov,

. . . fundamental changes may be expected in systems of wage rates and in the differentials between pay of particular categories of workers. For example, the Soviet Union . . . intend(s) to raise the salaries of engineers and technicians, scientists, designers, teachers, and medical staff . . . .[40]

This appears to be a clear commitment to rectify the material disadvantage that those holding degrees have experienced in recent decades. The consequences of a shift in the patterns of inequality in the economic sphere may be all the more important if a new flexibility in prices, a concept frequently touched on during the Congress, means higher prices for many items in demand in retail trade, and if—which seems less likely, given construction material shortages and bottlenecks—cooperative housing construction increases markedly, which would allow a modicum of "custom" building and reflect purchasers' differential buying power.

Still, inequalities in result are one thing; inequalities in opportunity, another. For a system that has never identified justice with equality of outcomes, the critical issue may be opportunity. Tat'yana Zaslavskaya, the Novosibirsk sociologist reputed to have Gorbachëv's ear, made a strong argument in early 1986 for a concept of social justice embracing "equal opportunity." Her approach is meritocratic, focused on the conditions that will allow people to develop their own, different, abilities—"children born in families with different social positions must have if not equal, then sufficiently similar 'starting conditions' for the development of their abilities." She then cites a familiar litany of the origin factors that render starting conditions unequal:

The opportunities for the prompt discovery and development of the abilities of children and adolescents still depend to a substantial extent on their place of residence (town or countryside, center or province) and on the socioeconomic position of their parents (level of

[35]See, e.g., Abel Aganbegyan in *Trud* (Moscow), Dec. 12, 1982, p. 2.

[36]See *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), No. 38, 1981, p. 763.

[37]Loc. cit.

[38]*Izvestiya*, June 2, 1986, p. 3.

[39]Whether such a pattern will be reversed is another question. The "inertial" drive away from the peak inequalities of the Stalin era is, after all, a matter of nearly three decades of policy and "drift"—a long time. At the Congress, Ryzhkov even noted that "elements of wage-levelling . . . have intensified recently." *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Mar. 4, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 23, 1986.

[40]Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 14.

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income, position in the management structure, level of social ties).[41]

All very well. Yet it is hard to see how the social process of selection in education, now moving downward (under the above-discussed education reform) in the age structure to the decision point at 15 years of age, will advance these objectives. The assumptions that the selection will be clearly meritocratic, that those intellectually most qualified will continue academic education and pursue its broader career prospects, that the rest will be less talented (if, indeed, such talents can be measured in mid-adolescence) seem rather far-fetched. The Gorbachëv program, such as it is, would seem to leave in place, perhaps strengthen, a major mechanism of inequality.

That "justice" demands a linkage between the quality and quantity of work and its reward is a byword to which, one assumes, most Soviet citizens would subscribe. Current policy, as an official put it, aims

to more accurately and, therefore, more fairly calculate and reward the labor input of each worker and collective and create in them a consistent interest in the utilization of reserves and the increase of production efficiency.[42]

However, this merger of fairness and economic efficiency may result in inequity from the shop floor perspective, which stresses the effort expended rather than the economic result of these efforts. Since the size of material incentive funds is, under new conditions, supposed to be tied to the quality of output (positively through bonuses, and negatively through lower wholesale prices), and quality may depend on more than worker effort—e.g., on the adequacies or inadequacies of suppliers, managers, or designers—the workers' position is less secure. In the past, security has consisted, inter alia, in failure to apply tough standards to output. If policy breaks with this past practice, workers who benefit will doubtless see this as just, but those left behind will hardly feel the same.

Popular Expectations

Generally, the climate of expectations built into today's Soviet population by socialization and experience will not make Gorbachëv's tasks any easier. To assume that 1985 and the near-term future presented a combination of leader whose newness and vigor was welcome to the public with a public mood longing, or at least ready, for a house-cleaning to sweep away laziness and corruption and to "get Russia moving again" is to miss another dimension. The Soviet public, habituated to its own sort of welfare state, does expect much from it leaders. That their material expectations are not at Western levels is not the point; rather, it is the contradiction between those expectations, on the one hand, and the inability of the economy, as well as the refusal of current policy, to meet them, on the other hand, that may present a long-term problem. As Victor Zaslavsky puts it:

Judged from the viewpoint of those within the system, Soviet popular expectations are not modest at all. They are not modest by any standards when one considers what is taken for granted by every Soviet citizen: the stability of state-supported prices of food, basic consumer goods, and services. Thus the price of housing has remained at the level of 1928, which makes housing, heating, gas, telephone, and other utilities practically free. The burden of price subsidies is becoming heavier for the state budget every year.[43]

Further insight into the web of expectations and criteria of evaluation found in the Soviet citizenry is emerging from the results of the Soviet Interview Project—a large-scale survey research program conducted among nearly 2,800 Soviet émigrés of the 1970's and early 1980's. For a leadership that might for economic reasons contemplate price rises for a broad range of items, presumably including food, it must be sobering to ponder how those still in the USSR may resemble the émigrés who, in James Millar and Elizabeth Clayton's words

saw little relationship between the low price of subsidized meat in state stores and supply shortages. They seemed to want (below-cost-of-production) prices and a perfectly elastic supply at those prices.[44]

Even more disturbing to a General Secretary evidently committed to a tighter link between performance and (unequal) pay, and to what must be relative consumer austerity over the next few years, and yet who seeks to appeal to younger adults presumably tired of the rule of old men, are émigré survey findings

[41]See *Sovetskaya Kul'tura*, Jan. 23, 1986, p. 3.

[42]*Izvestiya*, Feb. 8, 1986, p. 3, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1986, p. 53.

[43]Victor Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State*, Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1982, p. 159.

[44]James R. Millar and Elizabeth Clayton, *Quality of Life: Subjective Measures of Relative Satisfaction*, Soviet Interview Project (SIP) Working Paper No. 9, Urbana-Champaign, IL, February 1986, mimeo, p. 10.

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that suggest it is precisely the post-Stalin "generation," born in 1941–60, that views the Brezhnev era as the "peak period" of inequality in Soviet history and is especially attuned to economic issues in judging the regime.[45] The perceptions of Soviet economists, indeed the policy premises of the Gorbachëv leadership, are much to the contrary. It would be a signal success if Gorbachëv could decouple inequality and "illegitimate" privilege, convincing Soviet citizens in their forties and younger that his wage-differentiation policies are equitable and are an antidote to Brezhnev-era excesses which—however visible—existed in a realm of wage-salary inequality nowhere near so extreme, as economists measure things, as under Stalin or Khrushchev.

More workplace discipline, less job security—these are remedies difficult to sell while simultaneously trying to maintain or improve morale. Soviet Interview Project findings indicate that shop-floor personnel *do not* see themselves as the beneficiaries of an easy workpace stemming from overmanning. Paul Gregory finds that "workers and employees performing the actual routine tasks of the economy felt that there was less slack than [did] their supervisors."[46] Redundancy and redeployment are hardly likely to be welcome, especially among blue-collar workers, who will be affected if such policies are pressed forward. In the émigré sample, 37 percent of former workers cited security as a major source of job satisfaction (compared to an average of 31.4 percent for the total sample, and only 21.1 percent for professional people).[47] Even if these figures from an émigré sample cannot be taken as infallible indicators of the feelings of the USSR's citizens in the mid-1980's, they are not likely to be so far off the mark as to vitiate their relevance.

The thrust of Gorbachëv's policy line is likely to be controversial. This in turn puts a premium on symbolism and the management of impressions about the direction in which the regime is moving. In this respect, privilege at the top elite level may have symbolic, as well as material import. Elite privileges have been as characteristic of the Soviet welfare state as have fixed prices, low rents, and employment security at the grass roots. These arrangements constitute the world of "special" stores, hospitals, and sanitoria, of the "certificate ruble" which is not a ruble but a wholly different form of currency guaranteeing its possessors access to goods unavailable for any amount of regular Soviet currency.

On February 13, 1986, a *Pravda* review of readers' letters on the topic ventilated a virtually never-discussed feature of Soviet life: the bureaucratic distribution and reservation of material privilege which figures

A Soviet cartoon depicts the corrupt state of society: outside a shoe factory a worker offers stolen boots, stating, "To you, comrade director, I'll sell them at a discount. If it weren't for your leadership, we'd have long since been without any work."

—*Krokodil* (Moscow).

in no reported wage/salary/income statistics. For whatever reason, the published comments were pointed, and while most rhetorically held up to condemnation "party members," "communists," who live high in rejection of classical Leninist modesty, and hinted at an element of corruption, one member of the party since 1940 from Kazan' went even further in the course of a comment that otherwise accepted the justification of large differences in material rewards:

In discussing social justice, one cannot close one's eyes to the fact that party, soviet, trade-union, eco-

[45]Donna Bahry, *Politics, Generations and Change in the USSR*, SIP Working Paper No. 20, April 1986, pp. 34–36.

[46]Paul R. Gregory, *Productivity, Slack and Time Theft in the Soviet Economy: Evidence from the Soviet Interview Project*, SIP Working Paper No. 15, February 1986, p. 23.

[47]Miller and Clayton, op. cit., Figs. 12A–12D.

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nomic, and even Young Communist League officials sometimes objectively deepen social inequality, taking advantage of all sorts of special refreshment bars, special stores, special hospitals, etc. Yes, there is socialism in our country, and everyone should receive according to his work. Let it be so, without wage-levelling: An official has higher earnings in monetary terms. But in other respects, there should be no privileges. Let a director join everyone else in going to an ordinary store and standing in lines with everyone else—perhaps then the lines that everyone is sick of would be eliminated more quickly. But the "enjoyers of special benefits" will hardly give up their privileges—what is needed here is a law and a thoroughgoing purge of the administrative apparatus.[48]

Yet one can assume that the lines will remain and that the ordinary citizen will not rub shoulders in them with the privileged members of various apparats. This was made clear at the 27th Congress when Yegor Ligachëv directly criticized *Pravda* for going beyond reasonable limits in its discusssion of high privilege.[49] The elite that makes, and presides over the execution of, social policy, will continue to inhabit a special preserve. The policy itself—judging by the early indications reviewed here—*may* bring a new discipline to Soviet society; it *may* create, under new conditions of work organization and reward, as many highly-motivated winners as disgruntled losers; it *may* even, by design or by accident, impart a new dynamism in certain areas of Soviet life. But, all things considered, it is a policy committed to conserving, indeed strengthening, the grip of the state on the critical levers of the social process, to maintaining the old dominant relationship of state over society.

Without arguing the dubious proposition that the Soviet system is today in crisis, or will be precipitated into one by Gorbachëv's social policies, it can be contended that the General Secretary's line of attack may prove more controversial than it seems, even among elements of the leadership that he has raised to power. Given the depth of the economic and social problems he faces at home, the complex maze of opportunities and risks to be negotiated abroad with a newish foreign policy team, and an activism not likely to be welcome in all quarters, it may be that Gorbachëv, however healthy, runs much greater risk of losing power and office than, in retrospect, did Brezhnev in his first five years or so at the helm. Despite the precedent of Brezhnev's 18-year reign, I would rate Gorbachëv's chances of being in power in the year 2000 as no better than even, and probably less. For now, however, he seems committed to an activist-interventionist policy, whose costs he is willing to bear and to impose as well on more than 270 million Soviet citizens.

[48] *Pravda*, Feb. 13, 1986, p. 3, trans. in *CDSP*, Mar. 12, 1986, p. 2.
[49] See *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*, Feb. 28, 1986, trans. in *CDSP*, Apr. 9, 1986, p. 9.

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Worker Roots of Solidarity

Roman Laba

Poland's Solidarity movement, which erupted in August 1980, represents history's severe judgment on the Soviet-style workers' state. With its constituent base in the industrial working class, its organizational strength in interfactory strike committees, its elaborate system of worker delegates and worker spokesmen, and its programmatic dedication to grass-roots democracy, Solidarity can be seen as the ultimate refutation of the Leninist model of the state. It can also be perceived as a refutation of the operative intellectual justification of the Leninist system—namely, the belief that the working class, acting alone, is capable only of serving its immediate material interests and incapable of anything beyond limited trade unionism. Indeed, Solidarity has shown that *ordinary* working people can rise above serving purely economic interests and undertake coherent political activity without being injected with ideology by intellectuals.

Most contemporary opinion does not share this view. The official Soviet and Polish interpretation, predictably, sees Solidarity's program—especially the demand for free trade unions—and its strategy, tactics, and organization as having originated among the radical intellectuals and then having been transmitted by them to the workers. For example, on August 27, 1980, Stanisław Kania, who eight days later became the first secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), remarked: "The demand for free trade unions did not originate among workers but among anti-socialist adventurers. One and a half or two years ago, it was to be found only in Warsaw in [Jacek] Kuroń's clique."[1] Later, in 1985, Vice Premier Mieczysław Rakowski stated: "It is impossible not to notice that KOR activists,[2] among them Jacek Kuroń, prepared the future leaders of Solidarity long before the July-August strikes. They nurtured them in the spirit of struggle with real existing socialism. They openly boasted of this in 1981, as did Wałęsa and many other union activists."[3]

Informed non-government opinion in Poland, surprisingly, generally agrees with the view that the workers' movement was the result of the intellectuals'

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[1] "Teleconference with the First Secretaries of the Provincial Committees of the Polish United Workers' Party on August 27, 1980, at 18:15," in *Sierpień 1980 w Szczecinie* (August 1980 in Szczecin), Szczecin, SZSP, 1981. At the time Kania made this statement he was a member of the Polish Politburo and responsible for security matters.

[2] KOR (The Committee for the Defense of Workers) was founded in September 1976 by 14 intellectuals, among them Jacek Kuroń, one of the most outstanding members of the Polish Opposition. The purpose of KOR was to defend workers persecuted by the state for participating in the protests against the food price increases announced in June 1976. After a year of materially and legally supporting Polish workers, the Committee reformulated its aims and adopted a new, more comprehensive title—The Committee for the Self-Defense of Society "KOR" or KSS-KOR. The number of its formal members rose to 25, but the number of activists working with the Committee rose to several hundred. Numerous social self-defense groups and peasant trade unions became associated with the Committee, as did The Free Trade Union of the Baltic, the various student solidarity support committees, and several dozen uncensored bulletins, journals, and book publishing ventures. KSS-KOR succeeded in creating a broad front among intellectuals against the state. Its platform was built on the issue of human rights. Yet, the extent to which KSS-KOR succeeded in creating a front of opposition throughout the entire country is more difficult to determine. For a passionate treatment of the history of KOR by one of its leading participants, see Jan Józef Lipski, *KOR*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press,1985. See also Leszek Kolakowski, "The Intelligentsia," in Abraham Brumberg, Ed., *Poland: Genesis of a Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1983.

[3] Cited from excerpts of Mieczysław F. Rakowski's "Times of Hope and Disappointment" published in *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 32, Aug. 10, 1985.

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movement. For example, in a June 1981 interview, an editor of the opposition journal *Respublica* noted that "Solidarity is the creation of KOR, and Wałęsa is the creation of Kuroń."[4]

Scholars in the West and Poland also tend to attribute a high degree of influence to intellectuals, but their arguments are often more subtle, taking into account other contributing factors. Alex Pravda, a British scholar, points out that by 1980, "the working class, previously pressing only for material security improvement [stood] . . . for the first time in its history at the forefront of the struggle for civil liberties." According to Pravda, the causes of this "unprecedented expansion and politization of workers' demands" in 1980 lay "in multiple factors—the weakness and incompetence of the state, religious and intellectual influences upon workers, and the lessons of previous worker defeats."[5]

Although Pravda assigns importance to all of these factors, the more prevalent interpretation sees the decisive factor behind the formation of the Solidarity movement to be the conscious-raising and organizing activities of the intellectual opposition. Thus, while Leszek Kołakowski admits that "the strikes occurring in the summer of 1980 were by no means caused by KOR's activity . . . were rooted in the economic and social disasters that the power system had produced, and . . . were organized on the spot by embryonic independent workers' unions," he concludes that "KOR's influence on the way the workers voiced their grievances and articulated their demands was certainly essential."[6] The noted Polish historian and founding member of KOR, Jan Józef Lipski, argues more straightforwardly that "KOR was involved in the preparation of the workers' consciousness for the strikes . . . it familiarized workers with the idea of the strike . . . it indicated the possibility of strike demands that would go beyond economic issues."[7]

Jacek Kuroń (left) with Lech Wałęsa at a Solidarity meeting in November 1980.

—Gamma-Liaison.

An important alternative interpretation sets forth the importance of the Catholic Church for the workers' movement. A proponent of this interpretation is Zbigniew Pełczyński, who identifies a sea-change beginning in 1956 in the Catholic Church—the only alternative institution in Poland. In his opinion, the opposition of the Church to the system, originally based on narrowly religious grounds, took on "a wider and more political character: freedom of speech and publication, political participation, and membership in independent social organizations—including trade unions." Pełczyński maintains: "The rise of groups such as KOR which were secular in character and engaged in organized opposition activities, was, of course, significant, but it was rather an extension of the work of the Church than a pioneering venture."[8]

[4]The quote is from the author's June 1981 interview in Warsaw with the editor, who shall remain anonymous. *Respublica* was one of the several dozen uncensored journals founded prior to 1980 by certain members of the Polish opposition, but it ceased publication once martial law was declared in Poland in December 1981. It was the most self-conscious representative of that political trend in Polish intellectual life in the early 1980's which advocated returning to liberal (i.e., Manchester Liberal) 19th-century tenets combined with a belief in elites and the need for their existence and a pessimism concerning the democratic potential of mass societies.

[5]Alex Pravda, "The Workers," in Brumberg, op. cit., pp. 68–91, esp. p. 90. Scholarly opinion on the narrow economism of the working class before the formation of KOR is nearly unanimous. For example, British sociologist David Lane points out that as late as 1970 "the chief thrust of the manual workers' grievances" was still "economic, not political, and was for an immediate improvement in conditions." See David Lane, "The Role of Social Groups," in David Lane and George Kolankiewicz, Eds., *Social Groups in Polish Society*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1973, pp. 302–26, 313. A similar statement can be found in, among others, Jadwiga Staniszkis's, *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 122.

[6]Leszek Kołakowski, loc. cit., pp. 54–67, esp. 65. Another example is Adam Bromke's statement that "the workers' demands were drawn largely from a report on the Polish economic crisis issued by some prominent Polish intellectuals." See *Poland*, Oakville, Ontario, Mosaic Press, 1981.

[7]Jan Józef Lipski, op.cit., p. 424.

[8]Cited from Zbigniew Pełczyński's review essay of Bogdan Szajkowski's book *Next to God . . . Poland: Politics and Religion in Contemporary Poland*, and Maciej Pomian-Średnicki's book *Religious Change in Contemporary Poland*. See "Holy Fatherland," *The Times Literary Supplement* (London), Mar. 2, 1984, p. 211.

There are, to be sure, exceptions to the near unanimous opinion that Polish worker radicalism was due to external factors. A. Ross Johnson, for one, argues: "It is true that [in 1970] the workers did not raise the question of the validity of 'socialism' or of Communist party rule itself. Yet, in fact, the workers'

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A variation of this interpretation stresses the workers' dependence on the intellectuals due to the former's linguistic limitations and inability to generate symbols. Proponents of this view underline the workers' political incompetence and their unstable commitment to democratic values, and they emphasize the leading role of the intellectuals' superior language skills and their broader political horizons and coherent political ideologies.

Polish scholar Jadwiga Staniszkis argues that workers are characterized by "utopian and anarchic forms of thought" and "very strong anti-hierarchical and egalitarian aspirations." According to her, the same working class "is profoundly authoritarian" and afflicted with a "semantic shame and incompetence" when faced with more semantically competent party or opposition intellectuals. Their aggression displayed during the 16 months of Solidarity "reveals the self-hatred of workers, rooted in a depth of frustration connected with their own limited semantic competence."[9]

For American scholar J.M. Montias, writing in 1980, the workers' incapacities are not necessarily permanent: "KOR may gradually supply the workers with elements of an ideology—a set of symbols to which they can relate their experience. This ideology is essentially patriotic, legalistic, socialist, and democratic. With its emphasis on legalism, KOR may enable workers to formulate more abstract system-related demands . . . ."[10] While offering the possibility of political development, this judgment also implies that workers have little or no ability to create an ideology, to abstract from their experience, or to generate symbols to express that experience.

According to such interpretation, workers, when provoked, may react with authoritarian methods. Not fully understanding the self-limiting strategy of the movement, they may also be excessively radical in their aims, setting out demands that are at once utopian and radical, such as free elections or the elimination of censorship.[11] With their "crude and brutal language"[12] and their "deeply rooted authoritarianism,"[13] workers gyrate between the most narrow economism and utopianism. Therefore, it is contended, the essential contribution of intellectuals is to politicize worker demands and at the same time moderate them by infusing workers with a sense of the limits of political action.

All these opinions reflect the explicit view of the Polish working class as a social formation with a sharply circumscribed capacity for coherent thought and action. Yet there is evidence that suggests otherwise, most notably, that revealed in the thousands of demands advanced by 403 Baltic seacoast workplaces during the years 1970-80. Such data, when subjected to a statistical analysis employing standard empirical methods (see below), support the following theses: that the program and organization of Solidarity was first created by the workers who initiated the little-known Baltic Seacoast strikes of December 1970;[14] that worker demands presented to the government during 1970-80 did not evolve from narrow economic to broad political concerns under the tutelage of the intellectuals, but that the workers were in fact continually politically conscious; and that the origins of Solidarity can be traced further back in history and are more widely and deeply rooted in Polish society than previously thought. This article questions the by now traditional formula that workers in Solidarity supplied the muscle while the intellectuals—especially the

protestations represented a devastating critique of the whole post-1956 system." See "Polish Perspectives Past and Present," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1971, pp. 59–72, esp. p. 70. Similarly, George Kolankiewicz suggests that the "qualitative change" in August 1980 "can only be explained in terms of the specific heritage of 1970–71, which had remained rooted in the consciousness of the populations on the northern seaboard, in Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Elbląg." See his "Poland 1980: The Working Class under Anomic Socialism," in Jan F. Triska and Charles Gati, Eds., *Blue-Collar Workers in Eastern Europe*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 136–56.

[9]Staniszkis, op. cit., pp. 51–52, 115–26, at p. 122. For a similar position, see Aleksander Smolar, "The Intellectual Opposition and the Popular Movement," in *Solidarité Résiste et Signe* (Solidarity Resists and Bears Witness), Paris, Nouvelle Cité, 1984, pp. 147–48.

[10]J.M. Montias, "Observation on Strikes, Riots, and Other Disturbances," in Triska and Gati, op. cit., pp. 173–86, esp. p. 184.

[11]Smolar, loc. cit., p. 148.

[12]Ibid., p. 147.

[13]Staniszkis, op. cit., p. 51.

[14]The 1970 strikes began on December 14, 1970, when a group of workers from the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk marched on the provincial party headquarters to protest a sudden rise in food prices. Police attempts to supress the protest provoked street fighting which culminated in the burning of the party headquarters on the following day, December 15. That same day, large armored detachments entered Gdańsk. Despite the swift police action that left dozens of people dead and hundreds wounded, protests spread to other cities on the Coast, namely Elbląg, Słupsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin. By December 17, the military had occupied all these cities.

In Szczecin, city-wide streetfighting evolved into a general strike that spread throughout the province. Street demonstrations and strikes also occurred in Kraków, Wrocław, Katowice, Łódź, and Wałbrzych. On December 18, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party received a letter from the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union calling for a political resolution of the crisis. On December 19, the Polish Politburo met and replaced First Secretary Władysław Gomułka with Edward Gierek. This change in leadership was confirmed by a Plenum of the Central Committee and officially announced on the subsequent day. It failed, however, to resolve the crisis. In January, a second wave of strikes swept the Coast and led to the opening of direct negotiations between high-ranking officials (First Secretary Edward Gierek, Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz and Minister of Defense General Wojciech Jaruzelski) and the Warski Shipyard workers. In February 1971, the textile workers of Łódź struck, and the Gierek regime finally rescinded the price increases.

For the first time in the history of People's Poland, direct proletarian action forced a change in the policy and leadership of the country.

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members of KOR—provided the brain power. It maintains, indeed, that Solidarity disproved Lenin's assessment that workers are incapable of functioning as an independent political force.

Sources

The materials that serve as a basis of analysis in this article come from three different sources that constitute a part of the Archives of the Gdańsk Solidarity Region.[15]

The first is made up of the demands advanced by enterprises registering with the Interfactory Strike Committee founded in August 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk. Many of the workplaces joining the committee chose not only to support the 21 demands of the Gdańsk Interfactory Strike Committee—the founding platform of Solidarity—but also to write their own demands. After the successful conclusion of the strike on August 31, 1980, these demands and other records of the strike committee were deposited in the Archives of the Gdańsk Solidarity Region.

The second source consists of demands written by workers during the strikes of December 1970. With the one exception of a list of demands presented by the Warski Shipyard in January of 1971, all the demands in this collection were written between the 15th and 22nd of December 1970. Among these is the one-page protocol of the agreement signed between the strike committee of the city of Gdynia and the city's President, Jan Mariański. Also preserved is a folder containing all demands written by factory members participating in the Szczecin general strike. This folder and three others, constituting the basic archive of the strike committee, had been locked in the safe of the director of the Warski Shipyard after the three-day strike ended, where they remained until a new wave of striking workers claimed them back in August 1980 and ultimately passed them on to the Gdańsk Region Archive.

The third source, also assembled in the archive, consists of materials originally gathered after the defeat of the December 1970 strikes as the new government of Edward Gierek fulfilled its promise to consult with the working class when making important decisions regarding them. A suggestion- and demand-gathering campaign was carried out in early 1971 by union, party, and enterprise directors.[16] Despite the fact that demands were collected from workers under circumstances of intensified police surveillance and arrests, they prove to be neither self-censored nor censored by the factory apparatus. Indeed, the 1971 demands strongly resemble the demands of 1970 in substance and tone, frequently even going into much more detail on specific aspects of the political and working situation. Often advanced by individual shops, they offer an extraordinary view of the internal political and social differences within the enterprises. (For example, the Lenin shipyard in February 1971 produced 85 pages of such demands, grouped according to shop.)

The three sources represent, in aggregate, no less than 403 separate bodies of worker demands, many produced by entire enterprises, others by shops and sections within enterprises. The precise breakdown is as follows: entire enterprises—39 sets of demands for 1970, 8 for 1971, and 261 for 1980; shops and section within enterprises—20 sets of demands for 1970, 31 for 1971 and 44 for 1980. The total of 403 sets of demands is the sum of 308 sets of enterprise demands plus 95 sets of shop and section demands.

Since all the documents identify the workplace originating the demands, we know that most came from manual workers, although a significant part came from other groups, such as teachers, nurses and doctors, shop clerks, truckers, administrative clerks, and artists. The data allows for a broad differential analysis of all state employees from the Baltic seacoast of Poland, or as it is better known, "the Coast."[17]

[15]The Archives of the Gdańsk Solidarity Region were founded in 1980 as part of an effort to preserve the history of the Solidarity Movement on the Baltic seacoast and to safeguard important historical documents. Besides preserving documents pertaining to Solidarity, in fall of 1980, the Gdańsk and Szczecin regions began to collect historical materials for an exhibition commemorating the tenth anniversary of the events of 1970. Joanna Wojczechowicz and Antoni Wręga, both employees of the Gdańsk Solidarity, were particularly active at this time in gathering historical materials. By the end of the year, the Gdańsk Solidarity Region created a six-person historical team to continue investigating the December 1970 strikes. The members of this team were Janusz Krupski, Wiesława Kwiatkowska, Ewa Dering, Aleksander Klemp, Jan Stepek, and Krzysztof Żurawski. They worked for 11 months—until martial law was declared—gathering materials that later became part of the Gdańsk Solidarity Archives. Their efforts preserved a vital part of Poland's postwar history.

During my stay in Poland in 1980 I was granted permission by the Gdańsk Solidarity Region to photograph large portions of the archive's documents, including the entire August 1980 and December 1970 collections. The copies that I made of these documents are now in the Houghton Library at Harvard University. They are organized according to year (1970, 1971, 1980).

[16]The strike demands of 1970 and 1980 issued out of open meetings at which workers discussed what to include in their enterprise manifesto. In 1971, when the government did not allow the workers to assemble, demands were gathered anonymously.

[17]With the one exception of a group of private farmers from six villages who met and wrote their own demands, all other demands came from state employees. "State employees" also includes the workers of "cooperatives," which I first counted separately and then again according to their branch of industry. In addition to the group of peasants mentioned above, the category of rural workers includes those working on state farms, as well as those involved in such rural occupations as forestry and bee-keeping.

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A sign in Szczecin in 1971 proclaims: "We are in solidarity with the working class of the Coast."

—Photo from author.

As source materials, the demands of the workers from the Coast are strikingly unique in that they are self-produced. Given the fact that the demands were advanced by the same workplaces at different times and in different political contexts, they provide a useful comparative framework. The data from 1970, 1971, and 1980 thus offer a number of cases that lend themselves to generalization and make it possible to understand what had changed and what had remained the same in the political and social consciousness of the workers of the Coast.

Methodology

To ensure against bias and allow the values and priorities workers assigned to each demand to emerge from the material itself rather than be imputed to them, I recorded the demands advanced by every third workplace. These demands were then sorted according to frequency and place of origination in order to establish whether or not different workplaces repeated the same demands. This yielded 94 demands, each of which was coded according to the year and date of the demands, the branch of industry presenting them, the adressee on the list of demands (the Interfactory Strike Committee, party, government, enterprise director, or parliament), the location of the workplace (a large, medium, or small town, or the countryside), whether or not the demands were from an entire enterprise or a shop, and whether they came from blue- or white-collar workers. The final criterion concerned the size of the workplace. An enterprise of over 1000 workers was defined as "large," 100–1000 as "medium," and under 100 as "small."[18] The demands were then coded by

[18]These broad numerical categories are necessary because I do not have access to factory employee lists.

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workplace. These demands and the coding sheet of each workplace were reviewed and verified by two social science investigators and the results transferred onto computer punch cards. After being verified one more time, the results were fed into a computer for analysis.

Rather than analyze all 94 demands, I focus here on two: the demand for trade unions that would be independent of party, state, and enterprise direction; and the demand for the elimination of the political and economic privileges of the state apparatus. I selected these two because of their systemic nature and the importance given them by the workers themselves.

Although the most narrow demands generated by the smallest shop had systemic implications for the highly centralized Polish state, which—except in the area of agriculture—is the sole employer of the working masses, the demands for free trade unions and the abolition of apparatus privileges were clearly the most systemic in character in all three years. The demand for free trade unions constituted the essential, irreducible core of the platform of Solidarity. The only non-negotiable one of the Gdańsk 21 Demands presented in August of 1980,[19] it sought the formation of an independent organization that would represent Polish society. Questioning elite privileges and demanding that they be eliminated amounted to a questioning of the state's legitimacy. It concretely raised the issue of power in Poland and the new elite's illegitimate use of it. The weight the workers gave to these demands is evidenced by the fact that both ranked among the top ten (of the 94) demands in 1970, 1971, and 1980 (see Table 1).

Let us now place the two above-mentioned demands within a general context and analyze the development over time of worker consciousness.

Free Trade Unions

The first two of the Gdańsk 21 Demands of August 1980 were for free trade unions independent of the party and employers and for the guaranteed right to strike. Of course, both demands were irreconcilable with the theory and practice of trade unions in societies based on the Soviet model. According to Lenin, unions are "a school of administration, a school of economic management, a school of communism." They are meant to serve "as transmission belts from the Communist Party to the masses," while the party's leadership "is a guarantee of success in the work of our unions." For Lenin, "an independent trade union is a counterrevolutionary machination."[20]

More concretely, Soviet-style constitutions and labor and penal codes define work as an obligation to the state; rights are bestowed by the state as it deems fitting. Any attempts to strike or form work associations independent of the party are met with administrative, legal, police, or psychiatric measures. As a Polish joke notes ironically: "Under capitalism the unions are to protect workers from the capitalists; under socialism, they exist to protect the socialists from the workers." The joke captures the gist of an editorial published during martial law in the official paper of the Polish government, *Rzeczpospolita*, specifying that the new official trade unions would play the essential role of protecting the government from the working class: "Trade unions defend the working class against the bureaucratic abuses of their own state. But on the other hand, their task is to defend the workers' state from the anarchic, instinctive, or actual defense of their rights by workers."[21]

A review of the workers' demands suggests that official concern over workers' efforts to liberalize trade unions is not unfounded. Seven of the 94 significant demands specifically concerned the issue of trade unions. They called for: new elections to the existing trade unions; changes in the electoral procedure; the right to strike; payment for the period of the strike; personal safety for the strikers; support for the Strike Committee; and free trade unions independent of party, government, and enterprise direction.

Of these, the right to strike, the payment of wages for the period of the strike, and safety for strikers are complementary to the demand for free trade unions independent of the state. The demands for new union

[19]The Gdańsk 21 Demands, which constitute the founding charter of Solidarity, were written during the night of August 16 and 17, 1980. They served as the basis for negotiations between the Gdańsk Interfactory Strike Committee and the State Commission. When negotiations concluded on August 31, 1980, the workers won their demand for free trade unions: the interfactory strike committees were allowed to take on the functions of free trade unions. At first, Polish state officials hoped to confine the validity of the August 31 Gdańsk Agreement to the Gdańsk region, but a wave of strikes in other regions dashed these hopes. On September 17, 1980, a meeting of interfactory strike committees from all over Poland met in Gdańsk and agreed to form one single union, NSZZ Solidarność. With its loose, federative form, the new trade union left most decision-making to the regions and factories.

For a valuable, edited translation of the transcript of the Gdańsk negotiations and an analysis of these negotiations written by a participant in them see: A. Kemp-Welch, *The Birth of Solidarity 1980*, London, St. Anthony's Macmillan Series, 1983.

[20]Quoted according to Joseph Godson, "The Role of the Trade Unions," in Leonard Schapiro and Joseph Godson, Eds., *The Soviet Worker*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1981, pp. 106–29. Also see Lenin's statement about the subordination of trade unions to the party and his denunciation of such "counter-revolutionary machinations as independent trade unions," in *Left-Wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder*, as cited in Robert C. Tucker, Ed., *The Lenin Anthology*, New York, Norton Press, 1975, pp. 572–73.

[21]*Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), Feb. 23, 1982.

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Table 1: Polish Worker Demands, 1970, 1971, and 1980

(Top ten demands, in percent of workplaces making demand)

1970 (N=59)	Frequency of demand	1971 (N=47)	Frequency of demand	1980 (N=308)	Frequency of demand
1. Pay raise	68	1. Reform of pay system	59	1. Pay raise	65
2. Free trade unions	**61**	**2. Free trade unions**	**59**	2. Increase in family subsidies to equal those of the apparatus (party, gov't, police state, army)	63
3. No reprisals against striking workers	58	3. Pay raise	56	3. Non-working Saturdays	53
4. Freedom for arrested workers	44	4. Earlier retirement	54	**4. Free trade unions**	**52**
5. Pay for the strike period	4	5. Punish those guilty of shooting workers	51	5. Reform of pay system	51
6. Punish those guilty of shooting workers	39	6. New elections to existing unions	51	6. Additional housing	44
7. Full information on the December strikes in the mass media	32	7. Freedom for arrested workers	46	7. Support for Interfactory ‚Strike Committee	42
8. Publish demands of Strike Committee	31	8. Protective work clothing	44	8. Improvement of working conditions	40
9. Punish those responsible for economic crisis	31	**9. Eliminate the privileges of apparatus (party, gov't, army, police)**	**36**	**9. Eliminate privileges of apparatus**	**39**
10. Eliminate privileges of apparatus (party, police, gov't, army)	**24**	10. Organizational reform of work	36	10. Earlier retirement	37

NOTE: These percentages reflect frequency with which a demand appeared among lists from workplaces (defined as enterprises, large parts of enterprises, or single shops).

elections and for a change in electoral statutes are demands for change in the existing state unions and hence are more reformist and less systemic than the demand for free trade unions. Of the seven demands, the demand for free trade unions led in each year.

In 1970, 61 percent (N = 59) of the workplaces demanded free trade unions. Only 9 percent wanted new elections to the existing unions, and none bothered to demand a change in the existing unions' statutes. In the December 1970 strike in the city of Szczecin, 55 striking workplaces were entered into the register kept by the strike committee of the Warski and Repair shipyards. Some sent no demands of their own but simply expressed support and registered their strike. In so doing, they implicitly approved the founding document, the 21 demands of the Warski and Repair shipyards. The first of these demanded "the dissolution of the Central Council of Trade Unions, which has never defended the working masses," and creation of "trade unions that will represent the working class."[22] Of 31 workplaces that sent a list of their own demands to the Warski Shipyard, 27 explicitly demanded free trade unions. The flavor of these assertions is perhaps best conveyed by direct quotation.

Post Office Number 5 in Szczecin: "We demand independent trade unions that will really represent workers' interest."

ZTSL Truckers in Szczecin: "We demand the independent operation of trade unions in the defense of working people and the return of the right to strike."

The ZPS Tool and Die Factory in Szczecin: "[We demand] freeing trade unions from the party and state administration and guarantee of the right to strike."

The Szczecin Provincial Printing Plant: "We demand fully self-governing union organizations which will truly express the will of workers."

The Selfa Electronics Factory in Szczecin: "We demand completely self-governing trade unions which will really represent the will of workers."

What kinds of reform were proposed to ensure that unions "really" represented the will of the workers? The agreement signed on December 15, 1970, between the city of Gdynia and the seven-person Gdynia Strike Committee includes as its ninth point a reform proposal for worker autonomy: "Workers will choose new

[22]The demands are reprinted in Ewa Wacowska, Ed., *Poznań 1956–Grudzień 1970* (Poznan 1956–December 1970), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1971, pp. 217–28.

The Szczecin Construction Enterprise (South) sent no demands but wrote to the Warski Shipyard, "We send you brotherly workers' greetings. We support your demands. We inform you that we recognize you as the workers' authority /*władza*/ and will faithfully carry out your orders."

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A 1980 Solidarity demonstration in Warsaw demands "Independent, Self-Governing Trade Unions."

—SIPA/Special Features.

officers in the trade unions." On December 16, 1970, workers of the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk demanded that "trade unions on all levels should be made up of non-party members," while workers from the Gdańsk Repair Shipyard wrote on the same day, "eliminate the interference of the party in the work of the trade unions." Gdańsk port workers demanded that "trade unions should be non-party and must support the working class."

Ten years later, the essential demand for unions independent of the party remained the same. Workers of the Wood Industry Enterprise at Gdynia said simply: "We demand free trade unions," while those at the PZPS "Alka" factory in Słupsk put it this way: "Create trade unions free and independent of the party and government and conditions for their independent activity." A Gdańsk construction worker called for the "creation of new, independent, uncontrolled trade unions."

The nature of the "free trade unions that would express the workers' will" was carefully considered in the demands. The documents are so specific that they anticipate the details of the Solidarity Union Statute, which was written by the lawyers Jan Olszewski, Wiesław Chrzaniawski, and Władysław Siła-Nowicki and brought to the Gdańsk Shipyard during the August strike of 1980.[23] For example:

- In 1971 the Lenin Shipyard specified the need to abolish the holding of several positions simultaneously in the highest state, party, and union posts, and even more broadly, required "that union activists not be party members." The 1980 statute decreed that "union posts cannot be occupied by persons who have an executive function in a workplace . . . or executive post in a party organization"(Article 9, point 6).
- Control of the union's purse was considered a crucial ingredient in keeping locals strong and avoiding domination by central union or party authorities. The Lenin Shipyard in 1971 proposed that 9 percent of union dues should remain at the disposal of the locals.

[23]The statute written during the strike for the Gdańsk region was later modified for the national union Solidarity after the meeting of 17 regions on September 17, 1980. After the Solidarity Congress, September-October 1981, further amendments were made, notably the one providing for a permanent executive resident in Gdańsk. My citations are from the pre-congress statute as published in the collection of texts, *Protokoły Porozumień Gdańsk, Szczecin, Jastrzębie—Statut Założenia Ustawy o Związkach Zawodowych NSZZ Solidarność* (The Texts of the Gdańsk, Szczecin, Jastrzębie Agreements—The Statute of the Founding of Trade Unions NSZZ Solidarity), Warsaw, Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1981.

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A decade later the Solidarity Statute set membership dues at 1 percent of earnings and guaranteed control of revenues by the workplace locals. The latter were to decide what percentage to give to regional and national union bodies.[24]

- Under the system of multiple controls, the state's union officers had been paid not from union members' dues, but from the state. The Lenin Shipyard workers in 1971 demanded tersely that: "Union officials should be paid out of union dues," a phrase repeated 10 years later in the union statute.
- In 1971 the Lenin Shipyard asked for "the publication of an independent newspaper of the trade unions," while the statute simply stated that "the union [should] possess its own press and publications."

This attention to detail demonstrates the extraordinary influence of the negative lessons administered on a daily basis to Polish workers by the state-controlled unions, state-appointed factory managers, and party secretaries in their factories.

Clearly the most significant finding to emerge from a comparison of the demands of 1970–71 and 1980 is the continuity among Polish workers of the demand for independent trade unions free of the party. Indeed, the workers' devotion to this demand is so consistent that in reading the documents, it sometimes seems as if nothing had changed in Poland between 1970 and 1980. On this demand there is no evolution, no turning point. In fact, the overall support for this demand was slightly higher in 1970 (61 percent) and 1971 (59 percent) than in 1980 (52 percent).

Willingness to work for reform within existing government unions was as weak in 1970 (9 percent) as in 1980 (also 9 percent). Not surprisingly, this method of reform received considerably greater support (51 percent) during the government-sponsored suggestion-gathering campaign of 1971, but even under these conditions, the preference for a deferential or moderate approach was expressed less frequently than the demand for free trade unions. The lack of group consultation and the unpromising political situation after the December-January defeats seem to have had an effect on the results, as the same factories and shops demanded both free trade unions and reform of existing unions.[25]

We may conclude, therefore, that the heart of the Solidarity platform—free trade unions—was as present in 1970 and 1971 among Polish workers, without benefit of clergy or intellectuals, as it was in 1980. This demand for free trade unions independent of party, government, and factory direction, when examined within the context of the Leninist state, does not reflect "trade union consciousness," but rather signifies the emergence of political or systemic consciousness.

Political and Economic Equality

The second striking feature of the workers' demands was the large number that focused on what can only be described as elimination of systemic inequality. The range of workers' perceptions of systemic injustice was many-faceted—from economic issues and support for an egalitarianism worthy of English Levellers to questions of political power and privilege.

Political equality. Most significant, the workers addressed the issue of political privilege, as if in an ironic application of Lenin's tenet: "The primacy of politics is the ABC of Marxism." Since, in a Leninist state, power and privilege derive from offices bestowed by the state rather than from the control of capital, the workers displayed an understanding of the realities of the system in which they lived and worked.[26] Demands directly criticizing the privileges of the state's apparatus—the government administration and party, the uniformed police (Citizens' Militia or MO) and secret police (Security Service or SB), the People's Polish Army—are encompassed in two formulations: (1) eliminate the privileges of the apparatus; (2) raise family subsidies to the level of the subsidies received by the apparatus. Both demands are egalitarian, and both question illegitimate state privileges.

Growth in support for the equality issue from 1970 to 1980 is demonstrated in Table 2. The first demand, which asks for the elimination of illegitimate privileges, remained more or less a constant demand over the 10 years, occupying ninth and tenth place among the 94 demands. The second, which asks that privileges be extended to the whole society rose to second place in

[24]This varied from 40 percent in regions such as Leszno, Płock, Radom, and Rzeszów, to 15 percent elsewhere. Most frequently it was in the range of 20–30 percent. See an unpublished article by Jacek Kurczewski, "Solidarity from Within," Warsaw, 1981, p. 15.

[25]Other examples of formulations that were classified as demands for reforming existing unions are those asking that "trade unions [be] closer to the working people" (Gazy Technicze—a technical gas firm, 1970) and "that trade unions be separated from the strong influence of the party" (ZPO DANA Garment Factory, 1970).

[26]For the most thorough scholarly study of privilege in the socialist system, see Merwyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1978. Matthews book contains an interesting comparison of Soviet and Polish communist elite privileges. On privilege in communist Poland, see also Jan Malanowski's chapter on anti-egalitarian tendencies in *Polscy Robotnicy* (The Polish Workers), Warsaw, Książka i Wiedza, 1981, pp. 111–58.

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Table 2: Equality Issues, 1970-80

(Share of workplaces making demand, in percent)

	1970	1971	1980
Abolish apparatus privileges	24	36	39
Raise family subsidies to level of apparatus	9	5	63

1980 (63 percent), just behind the demand for a pay hike (65 percent).[27] The shifting weight of the two demands highlights a change in the workers' psychology, from the perception of sharing scarcity to that of sharing in the optimism of rising expectations.

Coastal workers striking in 1980 found the issue of equality to be a mobilizing one and included it as part of the 12th of the Gdańsk 21 Demands. The text of this demand read: "Abolish the privileges of the police security service and the party apparatus by leveling family subsidies and abolishing special supplies, etc." This demand went futher, questioning the very criteria employed by the state in selecting functionaries by demanding the introduction of "the principle of cadre selection on the basis of qualification, not on the basis of party membership."

The range of worker perceptions of systemic inequality was many-faceted during the years 1970–80. In December 1970, a message in chalk on a Szczecin factory wall read: "Level the pay of members of the Central Committee of the party to the average pay of a worker" (see photo on p. 57). The Szczecin Ship Repair Cooperative simply asked for the liquidation of all privileges of workers of the secret police, the militia, and the army. The Szczecin steel mills demanded "limiting and leveling the pay of workers of the government and party apparatuses to the average earnings in industry." Three more specific demands asked for the "elimination of lower taxes for the army, police, and party apparatus," the "abolition of low prices in cafeterias for the police and party apparatus," and a distribution of housing "without favor to privileged social groups."[28] Post Office No. 5 in Szczecin demanded reducing the swollen apparatus at all levels and sections—both in the party and the government—in order to reduce the state budget. In 1980, the Gdańsk Northern Shipyard called for the abolition of "commercial shops and special shops in city administrations, provincial party committees, commissariats of the citizens' militia, police, and army, for all working peoples should have equal access to food and other goods." The thought was echoed by the Elbląg brewery: "Abolish the privileges of the militia, party, and army, for all working peoples should eat the same bread . . . ."

Not surprisingly, the workers addressed the matter of retirement. In 1980, workers at the Kwidzyn Branch of the Gdańsk Industrial Construction Firm demanded: "Bring everyone up to the level of retirement and pension pay of the army and the militia." Gdańsk Naval Shipyard workers demanded: "Do not hire former workers of the army and political police who are receiving 100 percent of their pensions." And employees of the Printing Cooperative in Słupsk wrote: "We demand rights equal with those of the privileged (railway, militia, and army), such as years worked to [qualify for] retirement, pay raises, leveling of family subsidies, and health- and hospital-care and retirement benefits."

One of the more sensational revelations during Solidarity's 16 months was that, in 1972, the Polish Council of State had issued two decrees, one on pay and another on retirement benefits for high officials and their relatives. Only the bare outlines came to general attention in late 1980. The range and scale are still not known, but they were important theoretically because they exposed a strong tendency to pass on the benefits of state office to future generations. Even grandchildren, parents, and collateral relatives were included, and a short term in office sufficed to qualify for them. For this reason, they were popularly referred to as the "dynastic decrees," with Warsaw cynics (or possibly just clear-eyed observers) claiming they were the cause for the expansion of ministerial level posts in the 1970's. One workplace in 1980 attacked these unpublicized decrees directly: "Immediately abolish the Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers on special pensions for high dignitaries of the government, party, and the trade unions, for it is contrary to elementary sentiments of equality and social justice and to the decree on universal right to retirement. Introduce equal criteria for distributing pensions and abolish extraordinary pensions given to artists, singers, musicians, journalists, publicists, and radio and television journalists."[29]

On the subject of housing and housing allowances,

[27]Only one workplace, the Gdańsk Construction Enterprise, demanded that family subsidies be made equal to those of the apparatus and then specified that, should this prove impossible, subsidies received by the apparatus should be lowered to that of the standard family.

[28]These came from the Szczecin Fertilizer Plant; from the Warski and Repair shipyards and the Szczecin Steel Works; and from the Warski and Repair shipyards, respectively.

[29]Film Distribution Enterprise, Gdańsk, 1980. The decrees were published in *Dziennik Ustaw* (Warsaw), Oct. 7, 1972. Also, see the discussion of these decrees by the distinguished jurist Andrzej Stelmachowski in *Kurier Polski* (Warsaw), Jan. 3, 1981, and the excerpts from it reprinted in *Solidarność Białystok* (Białystok), No. 14, Mar. 3, 1981. Professor Stelmachowski notably observes that, in the decrees, executive posts are classified higher than legislative posts, even though, according to the

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Painted on a wall during the strikes on the Baltic seacoast of Poland in 1970-71 is the demand that pay of members of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party be equal to the average pay for workers.

—Photo from author.

truckers in Malbork called for "a just division of housing—that is, an equal waiting time for everyone, including the army and the militia." Słupsk printers added: "Abolish the housing grants given to the State Security Forces and the Militia."

The goal of egalitarian medical services was expressed in general terms. In a state-controlled economy, access to life-saving drugs is dependent on office, with many drugs not available in pharmacies and hospitals open to the general public. There are special apparatus clinics and hospitals open only to office holders and their families. Workers therefore demanded that the government "create conditions for obtaining drugs equal to those in the militia and army," and "bring medical care up to the level of other employees—railway, militia, and army."[30]

Workers of Hartwig International Transport in Gdynia focused in 1980 on inequalities in cultural facilities: "Scrupulously respect the bases of social justice and abolish unwritten privileges of the workers of the party and government organs regarding access to such material and cultural goods as vacation and recreation. Combat the enjoyment of these privileges by dint of holding high office." Gdańsk film workers creatively proposed: "All vacation centers of the Central Committee of the Central Council of Trade Unions, of the

Constitution, they rank lower, and party posts are included even though they are not government or state offices. Stelmachowski notes: "The ruling cadre, which bases its legitimacy on its high qualifications, must have well-defined privileges. They cannot be something shameful, swept under a rug. I believe that their revision lies in the best interests of this cadre which today is under the not always well-founded suspicion of immorality and even common ordinary theft." I disagree with Professor Stelmachowski on this point. Because of socialist ideology, privileges in socialist states have to be shameful and kept secret. Professor Stelmachowski's proposal that they be openly defined and established is utopian. His claim that the Polish ruling elite "bases its legitimacy on its high qualifications" is ingenuous, considering that the PZPR bases its legitimacy on the tautology that they have the right to have power because they took power in 1944.

[30]From the PZPS "Alka" and the Printing Works Cooperative, both in Słupsk.

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Bureau of Council of Ministers, and other state administrations should be obliged to make 50 percent of their vacation resources available to workplaces which do not have their own vacation facilities."

Demands extended to the general conception of law. Workers of the Słupsk Construction Firm asked for "equality before the law without regard to office or function." Workers of the Central Union of Agricultural Cooperatives in Gdańsk demanded "elimination of corruption and bribery in administration and public institutions." The workers of another factory, the Słupsk Logging Machine Factory were even more forthright: "Begin actions for the open trials of those in the party and government apparatuses who are guilty of economic crimes."

Workers also demanded an equal obligation to work. One aspect of corruption and mismanagement in the factories has been the creation of sports teams paid for out of the enterprise wage fund, in part for the amusement of the apparatus, in part as a device to provide sinecures for favorites. At the Gdańsk Travel Production Enterprise, workers demanded "an examination of the financial records, and the liquidation of fictitious work positions," and at the Bydgoszcz Construction Firm "East," they asked that "the work positions of those who never work be eliminated." The latter also wrote: "Raise work discipline for all posts from the director to the night watchman," and added: "Reduce the number of positions at managerial level. Resolutely discipline all those employees who do not fulfill their agreed-upon tasks."

At points, the demands took on the character of an existential affirmation of the right to dignity: "Cease ignoring the co-op workers and start treating them as partners—let the managers finally cease treating the cooperative as private property," demanded workers at the Elblag Gardening Cooperative. Textile workers at the "Unity" Cooperative in Gdańsk asserted: "The time has finally come to knock these Oriental despots off their thrones and to teach them to work for the pennies they offer us working people, whom they treat as black slaves, as nothing."

All these demands for eliminating political privilege drive to the heart of the political system by attacking the Polish state's claim of maintaining socialist hegemony. They indicate that workers' hatred and fear of the apparatus that enjoys those privileges is patent throughout. Interestingly, while the police and party receive special attention, the army is also included as part of the privileged strata.[31]

Economic equality. If political privilege represented the illness and free trade unions the remedy, the workers placed both within the context of a broader criticism of systemic inequality throughout Polish society. While workers in the United States tend to define distributive justice as equality of opportunity and merit, Polish workers define justice as an egalitarianism under which everyone should get more or less the same because everyone has more or less the same needs. As Lech Wałesa has put it, "every one has just one stomach."[32] The more the socialist regime threatened basic needs of food and shelter, the more it stimulated a sense of justice of the most egalitarian kind.

One of the most dramatic manifestations of workers' attack on inequality was the accord of striking workers of Gdynia with City President Mariański and the City Presidium signed on December 15, 1970. Fundamentally an agreement to negotiate, the accord was broken the same day, when police assaulted and arrested the Strike Committee in their command post in the port's recreation club. Still, the agreement is an extraordinary document, only one of two such agreements to be signed by the representatives of the state with Polish workers until the Gdańsk Accords of 1980.[33] Its substance is dominated by the issue of equality. Point four of the document reads: "The earnings of manual unskilled workers should be about 100 zlotys per month below those of skilled workers." Point five: "The differences between the earnings of unskilled manual workers and those with higher education should be about 200 zlotys monthly" (this would include engineers and managers). Point six: "The director of the enterprise should earn no more than 1,000 zlotys more than an employee with higher education."

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[31]The naming of the army as a part of the privileged strata does not tally with studies claiming that the army had social prestige before martial law was declared on December 13, 1981. An example is the account based on government and Solidarity polls found in David S. Mason, "Solidarity, the Regime and the Public," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), No. 35, 1983, pp. 545–53. The reality is actually more complex. The army is hated, loved, and feared all at once. Ordinary Poles must serve in this dependent army with its Petainist symbols of national sovereignty (national in form, Soviet in content). Yet, as part of the state, its cadre participates in the system of secret privilege, not justified under socialist ideology.

[32]This saying is received wisdom among Polish workers, and numerous sociological studies confirm its importance. See, .e.g., Bogusław Błachnicki, "Equality in the Consciousness of Industrial Workers," *Studia Sociologiczne* (Warsaw) 4 (67), 1977, pp. 135–53. For an introduction to the abundant literature on egalitarianism in postwar Poland, see H. Malewska-Peyre, "Research on Egalitarian Modes of Thought," *Sociologie du Travail* (Paris), No. 3, 1982, pp. 333–46; and H. Flakierski, "Solidarity and Egalitarianism," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* (Toronto), September 1983, pp. 380–91.

[33]On December 20, 1970, the Strike Committee of the City of Szczecin signed an agreement with provincial party, government, and union authorities. The text of the Szczecin agreement is published in Małgorzata Szejnert and Tomasz Zalewski, *Szczecin,* London, Aneks, 1986, pp. 55–58. The first edition of this volume was published in Warsaw in 1984 by the underground press Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza (NOWa).

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On the night of August 31, 1980, Polish Deputy Premier Mieczysław Jagielski (left) and Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa sign the historic agreement ending the August strike at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk.

—Photoreporters.

At that time the average wage of an unskilled manual worker was about 2,500 zlotys. If we adopt that as our base figure, then skilled workers could earn 2,600 zlotys, engineers and managers would earn 2,700, and the director of the Paris Commune Shipyard, one of the largest factories in the country, with a workforce of 14,000, would earn 3,700 zlotys. The range of rewards in this workers' society would be less than 2:1, far smaller than in capitalist or Leninist societies.

All the demands included in the enormous category of pay issues are saturated with implicit categories of justice defined by equality as well as merit. Workers did not simply ask for a raise but explained how rewards should be divided. Elbląg construction workers justified their strike "by the unjust division of the earnings of working people." Gdańsk garment workers asked 1000 zlotys for each worker from "the cleaning lady to the very top." Gdynia bus service workers proposed another way to achieve more egalitarian wage rates: "In setting wage raises, follow the principle of lower raises for the higher-paid and higher raises for the lower-paid."

Workers and employees demanded certain changes in the basic nature of the system and offered reasons or justifications for them. For the purpose of this study, these justifications were grouped according to whether they expressed corporate reasons (asked for something by branch, for example, for all railway workers or shipbuilders); a notion of general equality; or a quest for justice on the basis of merit, using criteria such as age or qualification.

Ten percent of workplaces proposed merit criteria based on professional qualification; 31 percent, based on age. Twenty-three percent asked for corporate privileges, 8 percent asked that the least well-off be favored, and 66 percent made arguments on the basis of equality, demanding equal pay. The latter could have meant either raising or leveling pay, but it included a wide range of issues extending far beyond the economic realm.

Protests against inequality were the most dynamic element in the workers' demands over the 10-year period. The demand for the elimination of commercial shops which sold meat at one-and-a-half times the

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state's established price was specifically expressed by 8 percent of the workers in 1970, none in 1971, and 45.9 percent in 1980. The Gdańsk Yacht Shipyard in 1980 addressed the issue squarely: "Abolish the commercial prices since, in view of their low wages, the majority of the working class cannot patronize them."

A second issue to come to the fore was the demand to cease selling domestic production in internal export shops (for foreign currency). The percentage of workers behind this demand grew from none in 1970 and 1971 to 18.4 percent in 1980. Some workplaces simply demanded abolishing foreign currency shops entirely; one asked that "a foreign currency subsidy be included in the basic wage so that purchases could be made in these shops."[34]

A third issue was the demand for rationing of supplies, particularly food. The employees of CTO in Oliwa demanded: "Introduce a just division of goods for rationing cards. Cease dividing the society." This issue had an egalitarian constituency because it seemed to promise equal access in a supply crisis. Here the evolution was from none in 1970 and 1971 to 27 percent in 1980.

Differences by Branch of Industry

While the register of the members of the strike committee of Szczecin in December 1970 confirms the breadth of the strike and the importance of the basic industries, in particular metalworking and construction, there are not enough lists of demands to allow for a meaningful breakdown according to industry.[35] The data for 1980, however, permits an analysis of demands by branch, by size of workplace, and, to some extent, by the size of the town in which the workplace was located.[36]

In order to arrive at a branch breakdown of demands in 1980, I divided industry into ten branches. The statistics indicate the differing degree of support for Solidarity by branch: heavy industry, 55 workplaces; light industry, 45; transport, 59; service, 71; state administration, 9; education, 18; health, 12; rural industry, 8; construction, 30; and commerce, 10.[37] The heavy-industry category comprised large factories, some as huge as the Lenin Shipyard (at that time numbering around 24,000 workers, including the contracting firms located on its grounds) or the Paris Commune Shipyard (14,000 workers). Some light-industry and construction workplaces were also relatively large, numbering up to a 1,000 workers. All the other categories were Lilliputian by comparison—the staff of a vocational school, the clerks in a supermarket, a planning office in the local government, the clerical workers of a branch of the Polish National Bank. Even though there were many hundreds more of these white-collar workplaces, they were almost uniformly unable to summon up enough political resources to send in their own demands in August. As we shall see, those that did tended to express more economistic and less systemic demands than did blue-collar workplaces.

In 1980, support for free trade unions appeared on demand lists of 52 percent of the workplaces, but when broken down according to branch, two branches showed even greater support: heavy industry at 75 percent and construction at 67 percent. Compared to heavy industry, light industry expressed weaker support for free trade unions (49 percent). Trailing were the white-collar employees in education (33 percent) and services (39 percent). An apparent anomaly was the 56 percent level of support given by workers in administration, but, in addition to having some of the most economistic workplaces, such as the clerical staff of a branch of the Polish National Bank, this category also included several planning and computer bureaus. These had a demand profile not at all like that of low-echelon workers in state administration. The intellectual opposition may have had an impact here.

The degree of support for free trade unions was also closely related to the size of the workplace. A breakdown according to size indicates that 77 percent of

[34]Gdańsk Przed. Robot. Mont. (a Gdańsk construction firm), 1980.

[35]There are only 24 lists from heavy industry, 11 from construction, 8 from light industry, 5 from transport, 6 from services, and 1 from state administration. Lists of demands advanced by enterprises in Gdańsk come from heavy industry.

[36]Since nearly all the 1970, 1971, and 1980 lists of demands in my possession were advanced by enterprises in large Baltic towns such as Gdańsk, Gdynia, Sopot, and Elbląg, there is insufficient material for a serious comparison of these demands and those sent by enterprises located in middle-size towns. Yet, even a comparison based on the few lists from middle-size towns yields surprising results. Middle-size towns (those with 50–100,000 inhabitants) showed a higher percentage of demands for free trade unions (70 percent) and against apparatus privileges (60 percent), including family subsidies (78 percent), than did the large towns of Gdańsk, Gdynia, Sopot, and Elbląg, where the percentages for the same demands equalled 45, 36, and 61 respectively. The ratings for medium-size towns were skewed by Słupsk, a Pomeranian city of 83,000, with no heavy industry and few large factories, but extensive military garrisons, including Soviet troops. The demands from Słupsk included numerous demands against military privileges. The military presence overrode the strong correlation to branch of industry.

[37]The number of cases totaled 317 rather than 305, because several workplaces were counted in two branches, for example, truckers were counted as part of both the transport branch and the health branch. Their demands had characteristics of both branches. The "advantages" of the greater information base outweigh the "disadvantages" of minor threats to interpretation.

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Workers at a sit-in ("okupacyjny") strike in Szczecin in December 1970.

—SIPA/Special Features.

large workplaces (above 1000 workers) opted for free trade unions, 54 percent of medium workplaces (100–1000), and 48 percent of small workplaces (less than 100 workers).

In 1980, 39 percent of workplaces called for abolishing apparatus privileges. Here again, differences among branches of industry are considerable: heavy industry (53 percent), construction (47 percent), and transport (44 percent). Notably below the average are: the health sector (17 percent), education (28 percent), service (32 percent), and light industry (36 percent).

Overall, 63 percent of lists demanded family subsidies equal to those of the apparatus. The highest percent was in: construction (87 percent), heavy industry (76 percent), transport (70 percent), and light industry (67 percent). Below the average were educators (39 percent), health sector workers (39 percent), and commercial sales personnel (30 percent).

The same branches of industry led the way on equality issues. For the elimination of commercial shops, where the general percentage was 46 percent, the leading advocates were workers in construction (70 percent), heavy industry (62 percent), and transport (54 percent).

The demand to end sale of domestic goods in foreign currency shops appeared less frequently. Average support was 18 percent, the leading sectors being construction (24 percent), light industry (24 percent), and heavy industry (22 percent).

Because most of the demands have dates on them, it is possible to determine whether or not the August strike grew in its radicalism from August 14 to August 31. Generally, the demands became more limited, less political, and less systemic over time. The strongest workplaces were the first to strike and were progressively joined by small enterprises which had never before dared to lift their heads and whose demands were generally more economistic than those put forward by the large factories.

Evidence from the 1970 strikes strongly suggests that the politically active elements—those who struck, went out on the streets, elected strike committees—were almost exclusively blue-collar workers. The white-collar employees remained passive, often

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locked in their offices during the sit-in strikes at the shipyards and other workplaces. Although the impetus in August 1980 still remained with the industrial workers, they were joined—in contrast to 1970—by large numbers of white-collar employees.

This impression of the situation in 1970 is confirmed by the 1971 demands where, in some cases, notably at the Lenin Shipyard, it is possible to distinguish the political and economistic sectors. Demands reflecting a broad political consciousness emanate from the classical metalworking shops—hull-welding, fitting, and engines—while the more economistic of all is the highly feminized clerical bureau of the shipyard. Generally (there are exceptions), feminine workforces tend to be the least systemic and most economistic in their demands, but their political consciousness varies not by sex but by location in industry. Thus women's light industry has a profile like men's light industry, and women's administration is also like that of men. However, there are too few women in heavy industry to compare.

Debunking Myths

Worker demands in all three years contradict the thesis of worker utopianism or radicalism. In 1970 and 1971, there were no intellectuals on the scene to moderate demands. In 1980, the strikes occurred too rapidly and were too decentralized for intellectuals to have had a chance to affect the degree of radicalism. Although systemic and political, the demands place much more emphasis on the Solidarity program for a free trade union than on such demands as free elections or an end to censorship.

As an explanation for this realistic maturity, it seems fruitful to focus on the collective historical experiences of the Polish people. In addition to the historical memory of the uprisings of 1831, 1863, and 1944, there are the more recent events of 1956, 1968, 1970, and 1976. Given the character of Solidarity (which when first founded was not an organization capable of issuing hierarchical orders), this kind of collective learning through historical experience seems a more adequate explanation of the movement's self-discipline than does the concept of moderation imposed or provided by intellectuals.

Strong evidence against the thesis of utopian radicalism is provided by the almost total lack of mention of the USSR, as if by collective wisdom this were a taboo not worth taking on. Instead, the subject of imperial relations is approached indirectly, with demands for the elimination of Polish foreign aid to other socialist countries and for a review of the conditions of foreign trade generally or specifically with the Soviets. The USSR is mentioned sarcastically only twice, in the question raised by the Lenin Shipyard workers in 1971: "Why do our leaders fly to Moscow whenever there is a crisis?" and again in their demand: "Let us have Saturdays free from work as [is the case] in the most progressive country—the USSR."

Did workers' demands support the thesis of "workers' authoritarianism"[38] by demanding harsh repressive measures against "undesirable" or parasitic elements of society? I examined two issues as symptomatic of authoritarianism: anti-Semitism and the demand to punish "social parasites." Linking these issues together is empirically justified by the fact that the Polish state has continuously aimed mass media campaigns against both the Jews and so-called social parasites (the social stratum with no visible means of support), singling them out as the causes of social ills.

Besides being stimulated by the highly visible presence of communists of Jewish origin at the highest levels of the state immediately after World War II, anti-Semitism in Poland was fanned by three state-sponsored anti-Semitic campaigns (in 1956, 1968 and 1976–85). Although the state failed to mobilize anyone but its own apparatus, the attitude of the Polish population to these campaigns is still not very clear. Indeed, as Adam Michnik said at the March 1981 Warsaw commemoration of the events of March 1968, the attitude of the *pays profond,* in particular the workers, remains unknown.[39]

The state's linking of anti-Semitism with social parasitism in an authoritarian syndrome became most evident in 1968. It is best illustrated by the articles published that year in the weekly, *Prawo i Życie* (Law and Life)—one of the most active state anti-Semitic newspapers. Often written by the same authors, these articles alternately attacked Zionists and social parasites.

Despite government efforts, workers did not succumb to such state propaganda. While their demands are full of less than flattering references to the party, police, and army (a particularly cutting one in 1970 asks that the police be restrained from robbing and looting in the city of Gdańsk), not the slightest hint of anti-Semitism appears. On the contrary, several factories in 1970 and three in 1971 demanded that the victims of the state's anti-Semitic campaign of 1968 be

[38]A thesis propounded by Staniszkis, op. cit., p. 51, and Neal Ascherson, *The Polish August,* New York, Viking Press, 1982, p. 275, citing the Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak who "has described the high incidence of authoritarian and punitive attitudes in Polish society."

[39]Cited according to the brochure, *Marzec 1968* (March of 1968) published in Warsaw by NOWa.

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released. One factory in Elbląg demanded that Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski (both leaders of Solidarity ten years later) be immediately freed.[40]

In 1970 and 1971, no workplaces demanded that "social parasites" be forced to work. However, in 1980, nine workplaces, or 3 percent, asked that "something be done about social parasites." Three workplaces (1 percent) demanded that "social parasites" be placed in forced labor camps. Clearly, few Polish workers accepted the scapegoats proffered to them by the Leninist state. The absence of support for state campaigns against these scapegoats seriously undermines any claim of workers' authoritarianism.

Regional vs. National Origins

Was the emergence of Solidarity the result of a nation-wide development, or was it in large part a regional one, which was subsequently taken up by the rest of the country?

The demands examined here clearly show that the fundamental plank of Solidarity—the demand for free trade unions—was as strong among coastal workers in 1970 and 1971 as it was in 1980. But the question remains: if we had demands from other regions of Poland, would they indicate Solidarity was the result of a nation-wide evolution of workers and society?

Two types of evidence support the hypothesis that popular attitudes embedded in the experience of 1970 were specific to the workers of the Coast: (1) the results of a comparison of workers' demands from the Baltic Coast and Lublin; (2) the results of a regional comparison of organizational forms employed by the workers against the party.

When the assertions from the Coast are compared to demands from another region of Poland—Lublin—there is a considerable difference in the level of political consciousness.[41] The Lublin demands are recognizably the creation of workers and employees, but the strongest demands among them generally attain the level only of the weaker workplaces on the Coast in 1970–71 and 1980. Lublin workers demand pay raises, guarantees for the strikers, and egalitarian aid for the less well-off through the raising of family subsidies to the level of the apparatus. They also attack commercial food prices and the selling of domestic products in foreign currency stores. But even the strongest factories only rarely call for free trade unions independent of the party, choosing instead to ask for new elections to the state's trade unions. They also avoid seeking the abolition of political privileges of the state apparatus, except for the demand for family subsidies equal to those of the apparatus (on the Coast this demand was mostly voiced by the weakest factories).[42]

These results are also significant because Lublin's two universities and propitious mix of intellectuals and workers later made it one of the strongest regions of Solidarity. It was a region well within the reach of KOR's influence, one in which *Robotnik* and other opposition journals found a certain audience in the factories. Yet the pattern of the July 1980 demands shows little or no effect of KOR's propagandizing efforts.

Examining the differences—if any—by region in the organizational forms utilized by workers against the party offers broader implications than those pertaining to the question of the regional development and origin of Solidarity. It also sheds light on what organizational forms undergirded the varying ideological assertions by Polish workers, and which forms were adequate to realize these assertions.

The oral tradition concerning the formation of Solidarity, prevalent in Poland and now part of the scholarly literature, is that it was Jacek Kuroń of KOR who told workers to cease burning party committee buildings and begin building their own trade union structures. But the little-known events of December 1970 indicate that Polish workers from the Coast at that time independently, even desperately, searched for an organization and a program adequate to their struggle. First, they gathered in orderly assemblages to protest before various enterprise administrations along the Baltic coast. Such assemblages escalated, in stages, to higher forms of protest: marches on government and party buildings in Gdańsk, Gdynia, Elbląg, and Szczecin; attacks on party and police buildings in Gdańsk and Szczecin; sit-in strikes directed against specific enterprises; even formation of conspirational political groups.[43] In this rapid evolution of political forms, the

[40] I was informed of this demand by a historian of the Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences in April 1982.

[41] The Lublin demands were extensively excerpted in the excellent Solidarity regional journal *Miesiące* (Lublin) No. 1, 1981. The entire first issue is devoted to the July strikes. Since the demands are not complete, I could not do a computer-based analysis.

[42] One exception in Lublin was the Fabryka Samochodów Ciężarowych FSC—a truck factory—where workers asked for "freeing the activities of trade unions from the state administration and party apparatus, permitting press coverage of everything that bears on economic and political life." Ibid., p. 23.

[43] On January 13, 1971, the members of the Interfactory Strike Committee of Gdynia who had been released from prison were arrested because they had founded a revolutionary workers' party which aimed at seizing power from the Polish communist party. A document concerning the founding of the revolutionary party was discovered by the Gdańsk 1970 Historical Research Team. A copy of the act of indictment is in my possession.

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Workers of the Polish Baltic coast learning from experience: at left, workers attack a police vehicle during the December 1970 riots; at right, delegates to the Interfactory Strike Committee during deliberations in August 1980 at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk.

—Gamma-Liaison.

coastal workers discovered the interfactory strike committee uniting all factories and other workplaces against the central state.

In fact, in its 16 months of liberty Solidarity rested on the creative organizational lessons learned in 1970 on the Coast and not the reverse. The events of December 1970 taught the coastal workers that they had to stay in their factories in order to protest. Marches in the street and assaults on party buildings were hopeless as long as there was no chance for overthrowing the state. Such acts offered too inviting a target for the distortion of the strikers' aims by the state. By comparison, workers from other regions protesting during the more widespread strikes of 1976 left their factories. In Radom and Płock, they attacked the party headquarters. In Ursus, they blocked and tore up the international railway line. Not until Solidarity was founded in August 1980 were the organizational lessons learned in 1970 by workers from the Coast transmitted to workers across the country.

Even when individual strikes rippled across Poland after July 1, 1980, no region formed an interfactory strike committee until one was created August 16 at the Lenin Shipyard. Again the Coast demonstrated its more sophisticated organizational abilities. The closest attempt to found such a strike committee elsewhere was made in Lublin. But though workers from Lublin had been on strike for over two weeks in July 1980 and had elected strike committees, written demands, and negotiated with management and government, they did not create an interfactory strike committee. They, like workers from other factories outside the coastal area, negotiated with the state through individual factory committees. Only after the formation of the interfactory strike committees (or territorial councils) in Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Elbląg, was this organizational form adopted by work forces in other regions.

Given the evidence available, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Solidarity's origins are rooted in the local experience of workers from the Baltic Coast. During the strikes of 1970–71, these workers developed both the main plank of the Solidarity program—free trade unions—and Solidarity's primary mechanism for organizational strategy, the interfactory strike committee.

Assessments

The massive evidence generated in the workers' written demands of 1970, 1971, and 1980 overwhelmingly contradicts widespread misconceptions regarding the impetus for Solidarity. The demands of 1970–71 are as political and systemic in their criticism of the Leninist system as the demands of 1980. Before the founding of KOR or the social activation of

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the Catholic Church, the workers clearly set forth the program that would be championed by Solidarity: free trade unions independent of party, government, and factory management. Their concerns extended beyond wage and working conditions within the factory to the Leninist state itself, and they contained a broad structural criticism of its power and privilege. Even more significant, they were not simply anti-state, destructive in their aim, but proposed alternatives which included the major postulates of Solidarity—in program and in organization. In their general thrust, they offered no support to interpretations which detect strong worker sentiment for utopian radicalism or authoritarianism.

The evidence also strongly suggests the importance of the local regional history of the Baltic coast. Various sociological factors may have influenced this local history: immigration from Poland's *Kresy* (or eastern borderlands), with their more exacerbated national pride and their keener sense of Soviet domination; the greater openness to the world (and hence the opportunity to make comparison) of a coastal region engaged in world-wide fishing, shipping, trading, and shipbuilding; or the special quality of a new territory—a frontier region settled by immigrants seeking a new life after 1945. Whatever these sociological factors may have contributed,[44] the decisive formative experience was December 1970. With the rise of Solidarity in August 1980, the rest of the country caught up very quickly, but on the basis of the patterns of program and organization discovered in that one week ten years earlier in Gdańsk, Gdynia, and Szczecin.

In the intervening decade, many other factors contributed to make the heritage of December 1970 viable: the coming of age of a generation with no direct memory of the war and Stalinism, the further activization of the Church and secular intellectuals in the Constitution struggle in 1975, workers' protests in 1976, the founding of KOR and the development of a broad intellectual opposition. Probably the most important of all was the Gierek regime's economic incompetence and its unwillingness or inability to physically repress society.

In this light, 1970 takes on the character of a decisive moment for political consciousness and organization. The Church and KOR appear rather in the role of helpful and intermittently heroic auxiliaries rather than initiators of Solidarity. The years 1976 (the founding of KOR) and 1980 (the August Strike) became moments of confluence where opposition intellectuals and Polish workers from other regions joined the broader and deeper current with its sources in the Baltic workers.

The Historical Context

The Baltic workers called their 1970, 1971, and 1980 gatherings strike assemblies, but at any other moment in history such gatherings might have been called parliaments, and their actions perceived as the drawing-up of a social contract, or the founding of a new society. By striking, by holding these assemblies, by winning concessions from the state for the demand-gathering campaign in 1971, Polish workers created a political space for reflection on the state of their commonwealth. Under Leninist rule, nothing like it had ever been seen before, but this was not the first time in world history that it had occurred.

For the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville points out the vast implications of a similar demand-gathering campaign—the Cahiers de doleánces: "In those countries, where political assemblies are elected by universal suffrage, every general election must deeply involve the people, unless their freedom of voting is a lie, but here not only a universal vote but a universal deliberation and inquest were to be taken. Every citizen of one of the greatest nations in the world was to be asked not what he thought of this or that particular problem but what he had to say against every law and every social and political institution in his country. I think that no such spectacle had ever been seen before."[45]

In Poland, the coastal workers impressed "the idea of a radical revolution"[46] on their own minds when they shifted from sporadic, anarchistic protest against Leninist power to a deliberation on that power. The sit-

[44]This sociological explanation is bolstered by the fact that, of the five interfactory strike committees formed in August 1980, the leading three—Gdańsk, Szczecin, and Elbląg—were on the coast. They were joined somewhat later by Wrocław, also in the new territories. The last to join (on August 28) was Jastrzębie, geographically situated in prewar Poland but an area of new industrialization and new settlement with a work force composed of recent migrants from the countryside.

[45]Alexis de Tocqueville, *The European Revolution* and *Correspondence with Gobineau*, introduced and edited by John Lukacs (the projected second volume of *The Old Regime and the Revolution*), Gloucester, MA, Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 81–82.

[46]Today, thanks to the work of Barrington Moore, Marc Ferro, and Paul Avrich we are able to assess just how radical the Polish workers' movement was by comparing it to previous workers' movements in Germany (1848–1933) and Russia (1917).

German, Russian, and Polish workers all advanced industry-specific and factory-specific demands. All three asked for more decent and humane treatment—a rather ironic comment on Polish workers' conditions under mature socialism. All three also demanded better working conditions, work clothing, and supply of work tools by the factory management. However, neither the German nor Russian workers generated a systemic solution to the problems of industrial society. Moore concludes that this fact "fully

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in strikes and assemblies and their extension into unions of striking factories against the state deepened that deliberation. It was lent confirmation by the demand-gathering campaign in early 1971, when the new Gierek regime enlisted thousands of workers and cadres into enterprise committees to collect workers grievances. The campaign instigated a ferment and a hope that something could be changed. When the regime felt sufficiently secure—by April 1971—it buried the demands in its file drawers.[47] In so doing, Poland's rulers lit a delayed-action fuse under their own throne.

The Irony of the Leninist Legacy

The political controls of the Leninist state are so direct, so unmasked, that they generate a critique of state power within the workplace. Indeed, as Max Weber has suggested, such controls are transparent and "members of . . . subordinate groups are able to perceive an immediate connection between their personal situation and the overall structure of power and privilege."[48]

How did this perception arise, say, among workers of the Paris Commune Shipyard or the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk? First, as is the case today, shipyards, like other Polish enterprises, were subject to a poorly functioning central plan. As a result, workers frequently suffered delays in the monthly production cycle due to the lack of parts and materials, as well as to poor management. As a consequence, they then had to "storm" to fulfill the monthly quotas and make semblance of keeping to the yearly plans. The lesson constantly driven home was as simple as it was stark: any other system had to be more rational and efficient.

Second, after 1970, the shipyards were included in Gierek's cooptive system of direct consultations between 131 leading factories and the Central Committee in Warsaw. The visibility of the state's responsibility for the poor conditions of daily life and work was thus further increased.

Third, the connection of political power to daily conditions was already patently clear to the most benighted worker because of the presence of the state's hierarchical command structure within the shipyards: the industrial police, the management, the cadre and employment section (loosely cooperating with and partly staffed by the political police), the government trade unions, and the party organizations. Even the nomination of the lowest foremen had to be cleared by the party. It was evident that not only complex, but even the most elementary matters within the shipyard were subject to the state.

And fourth, since a considerable portion of shipyard production was destined for the Soviet Union, and Soviet contract-fulfillment supervisors were present in the shipyards, the focus of the grievances of the already politicized workers naturally expanded beyond the Council of Ministers and Central Committee

supports the Leninist thesis that industrial workers on their own do not create anything except pure trade unionism." But he also points out that there is no evidence to indicate that radical intellectuals were able to infuse industrial workers with a program for radical change as Lenin had hoped.

Polish workers from the Baltic seacoast differed markedly from the German and Russian workers, most notably in their conception of economic justice. By comparison, Polish workers were radical levellers. While the Germans and Russians focused on working conditions and wages (factory- and industry-specific demands), Polish workers demanded systemic changes, going far beyond the limits of the workplace and the horizons shrouded by so-called bread-and-butter issues. Bypassing many cultural issues that touch on religion, education, and historical legacy, and avoiding the subject of Poland's geopolitical relation to the USSR, Polish workers focused with sustained intensity upon the state.

In their demands Polish workers criticized the state's incompetent, unreliable, and excessive control of industry. They proposed introducing competent management and economic egalitarianism. They advocated the widest possible democratic associations and proposed abolishing the privileges of the state apparatuses. If their demands were not revolutionary in the sense of calling for a violent overthrow of the political and social system (most probably a result of political prudence), they were nonetheless incompatible with the prevailing order. See Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*, White Plains, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1978, pp. 368–70, 475–83; Marc Ferro, *The Revolution of February 1917*, translated from the French by J.L. Richards, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1972, pp. 113–45; Paul H. Avrich, "Russian Factory Committees in 1917," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (Yearbooks for East European Affairs), Vol. 11, Book 2, 1963, pp. 61–182.

[47]The experience of the Paris Commune shipyard in 1971 is instructive. At Warsaw's orders, the shipyard's cadres gathered demands from their workers in December 1970 and January 1971. The Shipyard Committee for the Fulfillment of Employee Suggestions and Demands registered a total of 825 such demands, suggestions, and questions. Of these the Committee classified 447 as external to the shipyard and not within its competence. Of the matters within the shipyard's competence, a relatively high number—150 out of 378 demands—were in fact related to the December strikes, that is, they were highly political.

Of the 447 demands that concerned the wider system beyond the shipyard, 60 related to pay, 16 to housing, 13 to social conditions, 2 to occupational safety and health, 83 to national economic affairs, and 283 to national political affairs. As the Committee diplomatically noted, these demands (the most numerous and the most important) were handed over to the shipyard's party authorities "which sent them on to the appropriate higher authority." No further mention of them was made in the document. The overall point seems evident. By their own criteria the shipyard directors acknowledged their incompetence in the face of the systemic political demands made by their workforce. *Biuletyn Informacyjny o stanie realizacji wniosków i postulatów zgłoszonych w stoczni w miesiącach: Grudniu 1970 r, oraz styczniu 1971 r.* (Information Bulletin on the Realization of the Demands and Suggestions Submitted at the [Paris Commune] Shipyard in December 1970 and January 1971), Stocznia im. Komuny Paryskiej w Gdyni, Zakładowy Zespół Do Realizacji Wniosków.

[48]Frank Parkin, *Class Inequality and Political Order*, New York, 1971, p. 161, citing H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber*, Oxford, England, Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 184.

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A poster and badge popular with Polish workers in June 1981 ironically reproduces a Stalinist-era picture idealizing the socialist worker, with more recent official epithets—dating from 1956, 1968, 1970 1976, and 1980—of "anarchist," "antisocialist element," and "provocateur."

—Photo from author.

in Warsaw, even if this perception did not find its way into specific demands.

When socialism is transformed into Leninism, there is an inherent contradiction in the Leninist state between the socialist theory of worker control and equality and the Leninist practice of elitist power and privilege. This contradiction confers a prima facie validity on worker grievances against their rulers. Recognizing the gap between theory and practice, workers exploit it to fight the injustices they endure, at times appropriating socialist arguments and terminology.[49] Indeed, for their part, Polish workers seem to have taken seriously the state's official ideology, its cant about democracy, equality, and workers' management. As a result, the demands they have advanced and the organizations they have developed in their struggle reflect the clear influence of the Leninist state: they stand in a negative dialectical relationship to it. Instead of the *nomenklatura* and privilege, workers are striving for equality. Instead of hierarchical pillars of control, they ask for a highly decentralized democracy and far-reaching safeguards for the new democratic forms. It is as if the Leninist state were a very incompetent teacher trying to impart learning, and the workers, its recalcitrant and unruly students, who absorbed their lessons only in reverse. Ironically, the demands and the organization generated by workers in 1970–71 and 1980 are so connected to the Leninist state and its control of political and social life that this state—and not the Catholic Church or opposition intellectuals—gave workers the language and structure of their demands, defined their concerns, and lent them the forms of organization to realize them. The Leninist state has thereby generated its own nemesis.

[49] I am indebted to Professor James C. Scott for this observation.

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Notes

Soviets on Nuclear-War-Fighting

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

WHEN Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov was dismissed on September 6, 1984, from his post as Chief of the Soviet General Staff, some Western analysts speculated that his dismissal was due to a conflict between the party and the military leaderships over Soviet military doctrine. In this view, the conflict surfaced openly in a protracted debate between Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitriy Ustinov and Ogarkov, in which the Defense Minister represented the party's view and the Chief of the General Staff became spokesman for the professional military. The central issue of contention was whether victory in nuclear war is possible. Ustinov and the party leadership basically came to accept the concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as the basis of Soviet military policy and advanced the argument that in a situation where both the Soviet Union and the United States had acquired a second-strike retaliatory capability, victory in nuclear war is not possible. Ogarkov was opposed to this assumption, and emphasized instead capabilities for waging protracted nuclear war and insisted on the possibility of victory in nuclear war. A strong proponent of this explanation has been George Weickhardt, who saw Ogarkov's dismissal as a victory of the party over the military that in turn ended the debate.[1]

Even before Ogarkov's dismissal, some analysts had discerned a debate between the party and the military over military doctrine. Dan and Rebecca Strode viewed the debate as an internal struggle between "diplomacists," who believed that "in the nuclear age, the USSR cannot secure its national security and foreign policy objectives without some degree of cooperation with the West," and "unilateralists," who had concluded that "in the face of determined Western opposition . . . only redoubled defense efforts can secure the strategic gains which the USSR made in the 1970's."[2] David Holloway also recognized two contradictory tendencies in Soviet military writings, that is, emphases on both parity and nuclear-war-fighting, but unlike the Strodes, argued that "in terms of the structure of Soviet military thought, the first principle is more important than the latter because it has been articulated by the party leadership and expressed as a doctrinal position that takes account of the realities of the strategic nuclear balance." Although acknowledging that the combination of defensive doctrine enunciated by the party and offensive strategy planned by the military was ambiguous and threatening, Holloway argued that in the Soviet setting these two aspects of military thinking do not conflict but complement each other.[3]

In the hierarchy of Soviet military theory, of course, military doctrine is determined by the political leadership and always has supremacy over military science, which lies in the domain of the General Staff (see box). Soviet literature assumes that the two complement each other and that contradictions between them do not arise. But in actuality, there is a possibility of friction between the party and the military over the formulation of military doctrine for several reasons.

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[1]George G. Weickhardt, "Ustinov versus Ogarkov," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1985, pp. 77–82.

[2]Dan L. Strode and Rebecca V. Strode, "Diplomacy and Defense in Soviet National Security Policy," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1983, pp. 91–116. The quote comes from pp. 107–08.

[3]David Holloway, *The Soviet Union and the Arms Race*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 48–55.

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First, in the structure of Soviet military theory there is no built-in guarantee that the sociopolitical and the military-technical factors will always be complementary. Military science provides an input into the formulation of military doctrine, but its parameters are simultaneously determined by military doctrine. This structure makes friction possible between the military (which insists that military science should influence military doctrine) and the party leadership (which imposes limits on the scope of military science).[4]

Second, although in the party-military relationship, the party's superiority is firmly established, the factor of

[4]Ibid., pp. 30–31. In the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate this difference was clearly expressed. According to Ustinov, "in accordance with changes in military-political situations in the world and taking into account the constantly increasing economic potential of the USSR, [the party] determines the content and basic direction of development of Soviet military doctrine." D.F. Ustinov, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i* (Collected Speeches and Articles), Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1979, p. 498. In contrast, Ogarkov stressed the input side of military science in the formulation of military doctrine: "The sociopolitical and military-technical aspects of doctrine are in close dialectical mutual relations and mutual dependency. They are inseparable from each other, and exist together only in the correct mutual relationship. Political objectives of war must completely correspond to the military potential of the state, the military capability of the armed forces, and the methods of conducting military actions by them." N.V. Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'* (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, pp. 58–59.

Structure of Soviet Military Doctrine

There is a clear distinction among various components of Soviet military theory. Military doctrine (voyennaya doktrina) occupies the highest place in the hierarchy of Soviet military theory. Military science (voyennaya nauka), next in the hierarchy, constitutes an important element in formulating military doctrine and comprises the theory of military construction, of military education, and of military economy, military history, and most important, military art. Military art (voyennoye iskusstvo) is composed of strategy, operations, and tactics.[1]

Soviet military doctrine is defined as "the system of views that a state holds at a given time on the purposes and character of a possible war, on the preparation of the country and the armed forces for it, and also on the methods of waging it." It includes both political-social factors and military-technical factors. According to Ogarkov,[2] military doctrine answers the following questions:

(1) What is the possibility of war in the future? If a war is to occur, what country or countries should be considered the potential enemy or enemies?

(2) If a war is to occur, what sort of war should the nation and the military expect to fight?

(3) If such a war is to occur, what objectives and tasks should be assigned to the military? In order to achieve such objectives and to fulfill such tasks, what level of military power should the nation maintain?

(4) In order to prepare the nation and the military for war, what military organizations should the state create?

(5) If a war is to occur, what fighting methods should be used?

Obviously, answers to the first three questions from a purely military-technical point of view would be inadequate since they require a broader political-social perspective. This is not the task of professional soldiers but of the highest party leadership—the Politburo—which formulates military doctrine after a careful analysis of the "correlation of forces" in international politics and of domestic economic, ideological, and political considerations. Professional soldiers in the Soviet Union do not dispute the party's supremacy in formulating military doctrine.

But the military-technical factor also plays an important if not primary role in the formulation of Soviet military doctrine. A doctrinal decision based on a broad sociopolitical perspective could be wrong if it ignores military factors. Moreover, a decision on military doctrine by the political leadership must be translated into military language in order to be implemented. In other words, the military-technical factor becomes essential for answering the last two questions posed by Ogarkov. This factor is called "military science" in the Soviet Union, and is defined as "the system of knowledge about the character and laws of war, the preparation of the armed forces and the country for war, and the methods of waging it."

Military science is monopolized by professional soldiers. It is specifically concerned with the following questions: what military organizations should be created and what importance should be assigned to each organization (theory of military construction); what sort of military education should be conducted to educate the soldiers as well as the citizens (theory of military education); how should the national economy be mobilized in peacetime as well as in time of war (theory of military economy); what lessons can be drawn from past experiences of war (military history); and what methods of war, or more specifically, what strategies, operations, and tactics should be employed in waging war (military art). Thus, military science takes as its starting point the assumption that war can break out, and plans accordingly.

[1]See "Military Science," in *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 2, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, pp. 183-89; "Military Art," in ibid., pp. 211-18; "Military Doctrine," in ibid., Vol. 3, 1977, pp. 225-28; "Military Strategy," in ibid., Vol. 7, 1979, pp. 555-65.

[2]N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva* (Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982, p. 53; idem, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'* (History Teaches Vigilance), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1985, p. 75.

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bureaucratic politics cannot be ignored. The Soviet military, like any other military, has the mission to prepare its country and armed forces for war and, should war occur, to fight it as best it can. It tends to view international as well as domestic politics from this specific point of view. When the military believes that a decision made by the political leadership is likely to make the preparation for war more difficult, there is the possibility of military opposition to the decision.

Third, the Soviet military has a monopoly on the knowledge and information required for making military decisions. Although it has been argued that in recent years the number of specialists on military affairs has been widened to include academics and journalists, this group is still too small to influence significantly the formulation of Soviet military doctrine or to provide a real alternative to the military's input.

The Ustinov-Ogarkov debate should be understood in this context.

Brezhnev's Military Doctrine

The impetus to the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate was an attempt by the party, under General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's personal leadership, to rewrite military doctrine to fit the new age of strategic parity achieved in the 1970's.

Under Brezhnev's predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev (1953–64), Soviet military doctrine had become predicated on the following assumptions:

(1) War between the imperialist and the socialist systems was no longer inevitable.

(2) But if a major war between East and West were to erupt, it would develop into an all-out nuclear war, and the outcome of such a war would be determined in a short period of time.

(3) Nuclear weapons would be decisive in such a war. (For this reason the Strategic Rocket Forces were established in 1959, and Khrushchev proposed a reduction by one-third in the ground forces, which he saw as obsolete.)

(4) The only safeguard against war was the military superiority of the Soviet Union.

(5) If the imperialists decided to unleash a war against the Soviet Union, capitalism would perish and socialism would triumph.

In the first half of the Brezhnev period (1964–72), two partial revisions were made in Khrushchev's military doctrine. First, in response to the military's dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's predilection for nuclear forces at the expense of other services, Brezhnev introduced a balanced development of all services. Second, the assumption that nuclear war would be short was revised to take account of the possibility that there could be a limited war as well as a protracted nuclear war. However, military doctrine in the early Brezhnev years still rejected MAD. The doctrine retained the goal of military superiority and maintained that victory in nuclear war was possible.[5]

It was not until after 1972 that significant changes were introduced in Soviet military doctrine. The Soviet Union concluded the SALT I Agreement with the United States in 1972, and so gained, at least numerically, strategic parity with the United States. By the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union reached strategic parity not merely quantitatively but also qualitatively by developing a fourth generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles as strategic reserves. This meant that for the first time the question whether the Soviet Union should pursue military superiority or whether it should be content with parity arose as a real policy choice. Second, the conclusion of the ABM Treaty together with the SALT I Agreement restricted the deployment of a comprehensive antiballistic missile defense. These agreements were the first step toward accepting MAD in the sense that the Soviet Union now accepted the concept of mutual vulnerability.

It was in this environment of strategic parity that Brezhnev delivered his noted 1977 speech in Tula which stated:

Of course, we are perfecting our defense. It cannot be otherwise. We have not made, nor will we ever make any concessions regarding the security of our country and the security of our allies.

But it is nonsense and completely baseless to argue that the Soviet Union is doing more than what is necessary for defense or that we are striving to gain military superiority, to acquire "a first-strike" capability. . . . The Soviet Union has been and will be a firm opponent of such an idea.

The purpose of our military power is directed to avoid not only a first strike but also a second strike, and to prevent a nuclear war itself. We can sum up our idea on this problem in the following way. The defense potential of the Soviet Union must be sufficient so that no one should risk threatening our peaceful life. No aspect of our policy aims at superiority in armaments. Our policy aims to reduce military power and lower the possibility of military confrontation.[6]

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[5]On the evolution of Soviet military doctrine, see Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Herspring, *The Soviet Union and Strategic Arms*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1984, pp. 9–28.

[6]*Pravda* (Moscow), Jan. 19, 1977.

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This speech was the first major step toward rejecting a principal pillar of existing Soviet military doctrine—the pursuit of military superiority. Only when the Soviets reached parity did they confront the question of what the outcome of striving for military superiority would be. Holloway puts it as follows: "The choice that the Soviet leaders faced was not one between parity and superiority (for superiority is clearly desirable), but between parity and a dangerous competition for superiority, the outcome of which was by no means certain."[7]

But the rejection of military superiority had broader implications. Military planners needed to adjust the force posture and strategic planning that had hitherto been aimed at a first-strike, counterforce capability. At the operational level, the rejection of superiority led to Brezhnev's declaration that the Soviet Union would not use nuclear weapons first. However, the rejection of military superiority was bound to precipitate also a debate on victory in nuclear war, since achieving victory in nuclear war clearly implied possessing superior military power.

It seems certain that this revision of military doctrine provoked resistance from the military. The military seems to have raised objections both to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons as well as to the rejection of a preemptive strike. Yet, ultimately the military leaders accepted both policies, or so their open statements indicate. But the military did not give way on the aim of victory in nuclear war. This was not merely an abstract question, but also an issue of practical military policy—for example, should the military plan a strategy aimed at fighting a nuclear war to achieve victory, or should it develop a strategy and force posture based on MAD, which posits that in a nuclear war the concept of victory has no meaning?

It should be noted that the rejection of superiority did not immediately lead to a rejection of victory in a nuclear war. It took at least four years for this issue to be publicly raised by the political leaders. In his report to the 26th Party Congress in 1981, Brezhnev declared: "The military strategic parity that exists between the Soviet Union and the United States and that exists between the NATO nations and the Warsaw Pact nations is an objective guarantee of world peace. We never intended in the past and do not intend now to seek military superiority against our adversary." While this statement clearly rejected superiority, Brezhnev also added: "To try to prevail over the other in the arms race or to count on victory in a nuclear war is dangerous madness."[8] This was the first instance when a political leader publicly raised questions regarding victory in nuclear war.

As Dan and Rebecca Strode have perceptively noted, however, this statement was not a direct rejection of victory in nuclear war. That one cannot "prevail over the other" in the arms race was a foregone conclusion because Soviet leaders, both political and military, renounced military superiority. But Brezhnev did not say that to prevail over the other in nuclear war is dangerous madness. What is dangerous is to "count on victory in nuclear war." It might be dangerous, but once deterrence failed and a nuclear war began, one might seek victory.[9] It is possible to hypothesize that the ambiguity was purposely intended by the political leadership, which decided to raise the issue gingerly in the face of expected, or already ongoing, resistance from the military.

By October, however, Brezhnev and his supporters may have decided to ride out the military opposition. In an interview in *Pravda* on October 21, 1981, Brezhnev made the following remark:

Among ourselves we say the same thing that I said for everyone to hear from the rostrum of the 26th Party Congress: that is, it is dangerous madness to try to defeat each other in an arms race, to count on victory in nuclear war.[10]

We learn from this statement that Brezhnev's report at the 26th Party Congress represented a consensus of the Politburo.[11] Brezhnev went on to say:

I will add that only he who has decided to commit suicide can start a nuclear war in the hope of emerging victorious from it. Whatever strength the attacker may have and whatever means of starting a nuclear war he may choose, he will not achieve his aims. Retaliation [vozmezdiye] is unavoidable. That is our essential point of view.[12]

As Dan and Rebecca Strode have noted, this was an important departure from the previous view.[13] According to Brezhnev, not only would it be dangerous madness to count on victory in a nuclear war, but to start a nuclear war would be an act of suicide. Clearly this conclusion was based on the reality that both the Soviet Union and the United States had attained sec-

[7]David Holloway, "Military Power and Political Purpose in Soviet Policy," *Daedalus* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1980, p. 20.
[8]*Pravda*, Feb. 24, 1981.
[9]Strode and Strode, loc. cit., p. 98.
[10]*Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1981.
[11]Strode and Strode, loc. cit., p. 98.
[12]*Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1981.
[13]Strode and Strode, loc. cit., p. 98.

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ond strike retaliatory capability. One should note that Brezhnev used the expression "the attacker" rather than "the enemy," thus depicting a rather neutral scenario in which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could achieve its objectives by a first strike. Also, as I will explain below, the term "retaliation" as used by Brezhnev seems closer to "countervalue," or at least has a broader meaning than "counterforce mission." If so interpreted, what Brezhnev was saying was a textbook copy of the concept of MAD. It can therefore be argued that by October 1981 at the latest, Brezhnev and his supporters had come to fully accept MAD as the basis of Soviet military doctrine.[14]

Immediately after Brezhnev's Tula speech, the military appeared to serve notice on the political leadership of its intentions to resist a drastic rewriting of military doctrine. The *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* published in 1976 had stated that "the strengthening of the defense capability of the Soviet Union and all the socialist allies requires the guarantee of military-technical superiority over the armed forces of imperialist, aggressive blocs," and that Soviet military doctrine "provides the program of action to insure military-technical superiority over the armed forces of probable enemies."[15] Volume three of the *Encyclopedia,* published in 1977, under the entry "Military Doctrine" quoted Brezhnev's Tula speech, thus endorsing the rejection of military superiority. However, it defined "military doctrine" as "the system of guiding principles and scientifically based views of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet government on the essence, character, and methods of conduct of war, which the imperialists might unleash against the Soviet Union, and also on military construction, preparation of the Armed Forces and the country for the destruction [razgrom] of the aggressor."[16] To destroy the enemy is of course to defeat the enemy and to achieve victory. While it is possible to argue that this description in a transitional period of military doctrine both adopted the new direction enunciated by Brezhnev and retained remnants of the old doctrine, it is also possible to speculate that the military, recognizing the implications of the new direction, preempted it by insisting on victory and so endorsed the rejection of military superiority in words only. In any case, in 1977 the issue of victory in a nuclear war was clearly becoming the focal point in a debate over the rewriting of military doctrine.

[14]The same expressions reoccurred in Brezhnev's speech on the anniversary of the October Revolution. See *Pravda,* Nov. 7, 1981.

[15]*Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia—hereafter *SVE*), Vol 2., Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1976, p. 253.

[16]Ibid., Vol. 3, 1977, p. 229.

[17]Weickhardt, loc. cit., p. 79.

The Ustinov-Ogarkov Debate

It was not as though Brezhnev had neglected to lay the groundwork for his revisions of military doctrine. Dmitriy Ustinov was appointed Minister of Defense in April 1976. Ustinov was not a professional military man but an expert in defense industry. Since there had been only three ministers of defense in Soviet history who were not professional soldiers (Trotsky in the 1920's, Stalin during World War II, and Nikolay Bulganin from 1947 to 1949), Ustinov's appointment was unusual. From 1957 to 1961, at a time when Brezhnev was the secretary in the Secretariat of the Central Committee overseeing the defense industry, Ustinov had served on a commission to develop Soviet missile and space industries. The personal connection between the two men was close. One may speculate that after the death of Defense Minister Marshal Andrey Grechko, who was believed to be a staunch supporter of the existing military doctrine, Brezhnev appointed his close ally Ustinov in order to overcome the expected resistance from the military to Brezhnev's attempts to rewrite the doctrine.

Moreover, in January 1977 Marshal Viktor Kulikov, who was believed to be also a supporter of the old doctrine, was relieved of the post of Chief of General Staff and General Nikolay Ogarkov (later promoted to Marshal) was appointed to this post. Ogarkov had been the military's representative at the SALT I negotiations, and had published an article supporting the SALT Agreement. He was expected to advocate the Brezhnev line.[17] Contrary to expectations, however, Ogarkov turned out to be a formidable opponent of Brezhnev's revision of military doctrine.

Ogarkov's first salvo against the Brezhnev line was made under the entry on "Military Strategy" in Volume 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia,* published in 1979. This entry stated that Soviet military doctrine expects a world war in the future to be "a decisive confrontation between the opposing socioeconomic systems, socialism and capitalism." Such a conflict would inevitably involve not only the Soviet Union and the United States, but also other states, and would develop into a decisive military confrontation of unprecedented scope and destructiveness. Such a war might begin with conventional weapons, but would develop into an all-out nuclear war, in which nuclear weapons, particularly strategic nuclear weapons, would become the decisive factor. Although the Soviet Union's policy was not to be the first country to use nuclear weapons, Ogarkov warned that "any aggressor must remember that in the case of a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies he will

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receive a crushing [unichtozhayushchiy] second strike [otvetnyy udar]." Such a nuclear war might end in a short time, but it could also be protracted. In that case, the Soviet people and armed forces would undergo a severe test, but compared to imperialists, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had the advantages of just-war objectives and of progressive social and state systems. Such advantages "will guarantee the objective possibility to achieve victory."[18]

In this article, the emphasis is clearly placed on a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. Moreover, Ogarkov mentioned the possibility of victory in an all-out nuclear world war. This article indicates that by 1979 the lines were clearly drawn between the military and the supporters of Brezhnev; and that a debate was going on within the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev's speech to the 26th Party Congress should be interpreted in this context. His comment that "to count on victory in nuclear war is dangerous madness" can thus be viewed as aimed not only at the United States but also at the Soviet military, which was planning a strategy for winning a nuclear war.

Brezhnev's position was defended by Defense Minister Ustinov. In an article published in *Pravda* on June 22, 1981, Ustinov quoted Brezhnev four times, and argued that there was no alternative to détente for ensuring peace. He also stated: "At present the Armed Forces possess everything necessary to give a timely and decisive rebuff to any aggression, no matter from where it might come. The enormous striking power of the nuclear-missile weapons available to our army and fleet has been and will be a serious factor deterring any military adventure."[19] Ustinov did not raise the issue of victory in nuclear war in this article, but by stressing that the second retaliatory strike was sufficient for deterrence—and he was specific in using the term deterrence (sderzhivaniye)—Ustinov was clarifying the point made by Brezhnev at the 26th Party Congress.

An Ogarkov article appearing in July 1981 in *Kommunist* was a curious mixture of concessions to the Brezhnev-Ustinov line and of insistence on a war-fighting strategy. On the one hand, Ogarkov dropped all references to victory in nuclear war and to destruction of the enemy. He further mentioned that the Soviet strategic forces "serve as a basic factor deterring [sderzhivayushchiy] an aggressor, and possessing the capability to inflict immediately a crushing [sokrushitel'nyy] retaliatory strike in case of enemy attack with strategic weapons against the Soviet Union and its socialist allies."[20] This statement is similar to Ustinov's statement quoted above.

On the other hand, Ogarkov's article contained parts criticizing the Brezhnev-Ustinov line. He commented that the young generation in the Soviet Union had grown up without the experience of war and, therefore, to argue simplistically that war was evil and peace was good without looking at the issue from a Marxist-Leninist point of view could lead to an underestimation of the dangers of war in the contemporary world. This could be taken as a tacit criticism directed at Brezhnev and Ustinov.[21] Although Ogarkov cited Brezhnev at least seven times, his references skillfully ignored the essential thrust of Brezhnev's policy toward accepting MAD. Instead, he quoted Brezhnev selectively to stress the necessity of maintaining Soviet military power.[22] Ogarkov built his argument by paraphrasing Lenin's famous thesis that as long as imperialism exists, the danger of war also exists. Ogarkov warned: "As long as world imperialism exists, those who forget the danger that ceaselessly threatens us, forget the workers' republic that we have created."[23]

The most important aspect of this article was Ogarkov's continued emphasis on the necessity for a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. The characterization of a future nuclear world war between capitalism and socialism as described in Volume 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* was repeated here. In order to prepare for such a war, "the party demands that everything regarding defense be accomplished well, accurately, and in a timely fashion."[24] But, unlike in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, the reference to the "destruction" of the enemy was omitted in this article.

Can these two contradictory tendencies in the *Kommunist* article be reconciled? It is plausible to argue that under pressure from the party leadership, Ogarkov dropped his insistence on the possibility of victory in a nuclear war and paraphrased Ustinov's statements. However, he skillfully avoided repudiating his own views entirely, and he even managed to include criticism of the position he was being asked to endorse. This was a tactic to which Ogarkov was also going to resort later.

The debate intensified in the latter part of 1981. As mentioned earlier, Brezhnev himself rejected the concept of victory in nuclear war in his October *Pravda*

[18] *SVE*, Vol. 7, 1979, p. 564.
[19] *Pravda*, June 22, 1981.

[20] N. Ogarkov, "Guarding Peaceful Endeavor," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 10, 1981, p. 87.
[21] Ibid., p. 90.
[22] Ibid., pp. 80, 84–86, 88, 90–91.
[23] Ibid., pp. 80, 85.
[24] Ibid., pp. 85–89.

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interview. In an article commemorating the October Revolution, Ustinov wrote:

In order to explain Soviet military doctrine, politicians and strategists in the West persistently argue that the Soviet Union is planning a "first counterforce nuclear strike" [pervyy obezoruzhivayushchiy yadernyy udar] in order to survive and win a victory in a nuclear war. . . . But it is completely baseless nonsense to attribute to us the concept of a "first strike."[25]

He quoted then from Brezhnev's *Pravda* interview and declared that Brezhnev's position corresponded fully to Soviet military doctrine.[26] While appearing to criticize strategists in the West, Ustinov's criticism was also directed at the Soviet military planners' first-strike counterforce strategy, the core of the nuclear-war-fighting strategy.

In January 1982, Ogarkov published a pamphlet, *Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland,* that closely followed the line he had advocated since 1979. The major emphasis was on the necessity to have a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. Nuclear weapons were not set apart from other weapons; both would have to be integrated into operational planning.[27]

Regarding nuclear weapons and war, Ogarkov stated: "Strategic nuclear weapons have a deterrent [sderzhivayushchiy] role on the aggressor, and are intended to inflict on the aggressor a timely crushing [sokrushitel'nyy] second strike, should an aggression by nuclear attack be unleashed against the Soviet Union and its allies."[28] This statement seems at first glance quite similar to Ustinov's. But Ogarkov did not neglect to add that such an attack would be an offensive retaliatory strike and aim "to destroy [gromit'] the enemy under any circumstances." In this pamphlet there was no explicit reference to victory in nuclear war, although "destruction of the enemy" carried that implication.

As though in response to Ogarkov's challenge, Ustinov in May 1982 published his own pamphlet, entitled *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause.* In it Ustinov repeated Brezhnev's position as given in the *Pravda* interview, and declared: "To count on victory in the arms race and especially in nuclear war is madness. And this madness is dangerous. We do not need military superiority over the West. We only need reliable security, and to ensure this, it is enough to have a rough balance and parity."[29] This was both a reaffirmation of MAD, and a tacit criticism of Ogarkov and the military. Ustinov chided those who adopted a narrow military-technical viewpoint on future wars: "If the major developmental trends in the military sphere, the level achieved and the prospects for growth of the economy, the sociopolitical and spiritual development of Soviet society, and the achievements of scientific and technological progress were not taken into account, the effective administration of the structuring and improvement of the armed forces would be impossible."[30]

But Ustinov's sharpest criticism of Ogarkov appeared in *Pravda* on July 12. In an article entitled "To Remove the Danger of Nuclear War," Ustinov admitted that "we have no illusion that the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons will be immediately accepted by other countries," and further stated:

It is completely natural that the Soviet people, our friends, and progressive people in the world are raising a question: Is the moment for such a step wisely chosen? Wouldn't we subject our people, our countries and the cause of socialism and progress in the world to an extreme danger by such a one-sided obligation? Don't we have weighty historical experience, when an aggressor made a surprise attack on us and unleashed the machine of destruction? Is it possible to ignore all this?[31]

This was a candid admission that Brezhnev's declaration of no first use of nuclear weapons had provoked resistance from various quarters. But it is possible to infer that criticisms were raised not merely against the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, but also against a whole host of issues advocated by Brezhnev and Ustinov, including the issue of victory in nuclear war and the rejection of a nuclear-war-fighting strategy, particularly the counterforce targeting policy.

Ustinov argued that the rejection of military superiority was based on the realization that the existence of enough nuclear weapons to eliminate all biological life on the earth made striving for military superiority senseless. He declared: "The Soviet Union does not count on victory in nuclear war. Understanding the impossibility of prevailing in such a conflict is the rationale for refusing to use nuclear weapons first."[32]

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[25]*Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1981.
[26]Ibid.
[27]N.V. Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti k zashchite otechestva*, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982, pp. 32–34.
[28]Ibid., p. 49.
[29]D.F. Ustinov, *Serving the Country and the Communist Cause*, tr. by Penny Dole, Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1983, p. 42.
[30]Ibid.
[31]*Pravda*, July 12, 1982.
[32]Ibid.

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Defending MAD, Ustinov further explained:

If the aggressor unleashes a nuclear attack, he will inflict upon our people incalculable calamity. But the aggressor must also know that the advantage gained from the preemptive nuclear strike will not bring him victory. Committing a crime against humanity, he will not gain the expected result. Under contemporary conditions of available weapon systems and alertness of the strategic nuclear means of the Soviet Union, the United States will not be able to carry out a counter-force attack [obezoruzhivayushchiy udar] against the socialist countries. The aggressor will not escape an all-crushing, retaliatory strike [vsesokrushayushchiy otvetnyy udar]. Those who imagine a "perfect prescription" for waging a victorious nuclear war, and who, more figuratively speaking, count on one knock-out strike to "decapitate" the enemy, are issuing a death sentence against themselves. . . . The conditions of military potential and military-technical possibilities that exist on both sides are such that either in the stage of preparations for a nuclear war or at the moment when they attempt to start this war, the imperialist forces cannot attain military superiority.[33]

This article is probably the strongest defense of MAD ever to be published in the Soviet Union, as well as the harshest critique of Ogarkov's position. Nevertheless, it did not silence the military opposition. For one thing, Brezhnev's failing health exacerbated the political near-paralysis in the last months of his regime. In this regard, Brezhnev's appearance at a meeting of 500 generals and officials of the Ministry of Defense on October 27, 1982, was a curious episode. In his speech at this meeting Brezhnev said nothing that touched on military doctrine. His explanation that he had come to the conference at the invitation of Ustinov indicates that there was sufficient friction between the party and the military to warrant bringing in the ailing General Secretary.[34]

Did Ogarkov Recant?

George Weickhardt made the argument that Andropov's accession in November 1982 changed the nature of the debate over military doctrine. Presumably under pressure from Andropov and Ustinov, "Ogarkov began to moderate his line." Weickhardt offers four pieces of evidence to support his view: (1) A *New York Times* interview in which Ogarkov "publicly rejected the concept of limited nuclear war, disavowed Soviet adherence to a launch-on-warning doctrine, and endorsed Andropov's arms control initiatives."[35] (2) In the aftermath of the Korean airliner incident, the Politburo and Ustinov tried to "clamp down on Ogarkov's insubordinate views on strategic doctrine," and forced Ogarkov to "recant." In an *Izvestiya* article, Ogarkov fully recanted, acknowledging "that starting a nuclear war would be suicide and that, even after sustaining a first strike, each side would still be able to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on the other side." Ogarkov's reference to former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to explain the concept of "unacceptable damage" is taken by Weickhardt as evidence of Ogarkov's complete acceptance of MAD.[36] (3) In an interview given in *Krasnaya Zvezda* on May 9, 1984, Ogarkov "reconfirmed and extended . . . [his] previous recantation of his war-fighting theories." He not only acknowledged "unacceptable damage," but also "explicitly renounced the concept of a limited 'decapitating' first strike."[37] (4) Ogarkov's demotion can be explained by the attempts of the Politburo and Ustinov "to show the outspoken Ogarkov who is the boss on the key issues of strategic doctrine." By removing Ogarkov, the party once and for all ended the debate on nuclear war, and "one can anticipate that no further open nuclear-war-fighting talk will appear in the Soviet military press."[38]

It seems certain that during Andropov's tenure pressure was put on the military to end the debate.[39] Furthermore, Ogarkov's *Izvestiya* article on September 23, 1983, at first glance appears to confirm Weickhardt's conclusion that Ogarkov recanted. This article includes the following passage:

The United States is building up strategic nuclear forces in earnest in order to acquire the capability to inflict a "counterforce" [razoruzhayushchiy] nuclear strike against the USSR. This is a senseless policy. About twenty years ago the United States could have still in some ways counted on the possibility of achieving such a result. Today this is pure illusion. In the contemporary development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, a sufficient quantity of nuclear

[33]Ibid.
[34]Strode and Strode, loc. cit., pp. 109–10.

[35]Weickhardt, loc. cit., p. 80.
[36]Ibid.
[37]Ibid., p. 81.
[38]Ibid, pp. 80–81.
[39]This can be seen from the description of "Military Doctrine" in the *Encyclopedic Military Dictionary*. In this description, the expression "to destroy [razgromit'] the enemy," which appeared in the like-named entry in Volume 3 of *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* published in 1977, was omitted. See *Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* (Encyclopedic Military Dictionary), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1983, p. 240.

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means will remain with the defender to enable him to inflict with a second strike upon the aggressor "unacceptable damage," as defined by former minister of defense R. McNamara in his time. In other words, the quantitative changes in recent years change the qualitative aspect of the phenomenon. Such is the dialectic. Therefore, under contemporary conditions, only those who decide to commit suicide would count on a first nuclear strike.[40]

As Weickhardt noted, this article was studded with references to key words used by Brezhnev and Ustinov in support of MAD, such as "only those who decide to commit suicide," "unacceptable damage," and "retaliatory strike." Even an additional gratuitous reference to US Secretary of Defense McNamara was included to render the theory of Ogarkov's complete capitulation to MAD plausible.

Ogarkov similarly seemed to embrace MAD in the interview given in *Krasnaya Zvezda* in May 1984, when he stated:

We have a paradox. On the one hand, it seems that there is a process of continuous heightening of the possibility for the nuclear states to eliminate their opponent, but on the other hand, the possibility of the aggressor to achieve a so-called "counterforce strike" against the chief enemy is equally continuously, and, I would say, even more sharply decreasing. The fact is that with the existing quantity and diversity of nuclear-missile means, it is already becoming impossible for the aggressor to eliminate those of the opponent with one strike. It has become inevitable under present conditions that even with the limited number of nuclear warheads that remain with the defender, a crushing second strike could inflict upon the aggressor "unacceptable damage."[41]

It seems plausible to argue, as Weickhardt does, that Ogarkov in this interview accepted MAD by rejecting a first strike and by admitting that both countries now possess a second-strike capability to inflict "unacceptable damage" upon the other side.

However, a careful reading of Ogarkov's statements suggests that a different interpretation is possible. First, the *New York Times* article, which is based on Leslie Gelb's interview with Ogarkov, contains nothing to indicate that Ogarkov had changed his previous point of view. According to Gelb, Ogarkov "struck a moderate posture . . . by modifying his previous position and saying that once nuclear war began it could not be limited and controlled." In Gelb's view, the interview was intended to "curtail speculation about civilian-military rifts over nuclear doctrine." Since Ogarkov had previously written in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* about the possibility of protracted nuclear war, Gelb concluded that the rejection of a limited war was a departure from his previous position and put Ogarkov's position more in line with that of the civilian leaders.[42] But denying that nuclear war can be limited does not mean excluding the possibility of protracted nuclear war. Moreover, Ogarkov had repeatedly made similar statements in his previous writings.[43] The issue that separated the party leaders from the military in the debate on nuclear war was not the issue of limited war but the issue of *victory* in nuclear war. Gelb's interview with Ogarkov added nothing on this. As for Ogarkov's denial of launch-on-warning and his support for Andropov's position opposing Western deployment of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), which Weickhardt cites as evidence for Ogarkov's moderating position, they have little to do with the central issue of the debate. The *New York Times* interview, therefore, cannot serve as evidence that Ogarkov had experienced a change of heart.

Regarding the *Izvestiya* article, an interpretation that differs from Weickhardt's is also possible. As he states, this article was probably written under pressure from the party leaders, possibly from Ustinov personally. Not only did Ogarkov avoid any reference to "victory in nuclear war," or "destruction of the enemy," but he also borrowed expressions used by Brezhnev and Ustinov to defend MAD. But one could also conclude that in seeming to accept his opponents' position by using their very language, Ogarkov skillfully continued to defend his own position. According to Brezhnev and Ustinov, "only those who decide to commit suicide can start a nuclear war expecting to emerge as victor." Ogarkov merely stated: "only those who decide to commit suicide can count on the first nuclear strike." What Ogarkov discounted was not victory in nuclear war, but the decisiveness of a first nuclear strike. Ogarkov stated that under contemporary conditions the defender can inflict on the aggressor "unacceptable damage." But Ogarkov was careful not to conclude that, therefore, there cannot be victory in nuclear war. Thus, the *Izvestiya* article cannot be taken as proof of Ogarkov's "complete recantation."

[40] *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 23, 1983.
[41] *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), May 9, 1984.
[42] Leslie Gelb, "Soviet Marshal Warns the US on its Missiles," *The New York Times*, Mar. 17, 1983.
[43] See Ogarkov, *Vsegda v gotovnosti. . .*, p. 16; *SVE*, Vol 7, p. 564.

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Ogarkov's reference to Robert McNamara is indeed curious. In espousing MAD, neither Brezhnev nor Ustinov had ever explained that this was actually a US strategic policy developed by McNamara in the 1960's and that they were therefore borrowing a strategic concept from their adversary—a concept previously denounced by Soviet party ideologues. One could say that Ogarkov's reference to McNamara and "unacceptable damage" constituted a real tour de force: while seemingly accepting Ustinov's position, Ogarkov was revealing that the Defense Minister of the Soviet Union was actually copying a strategic concept of the enemy.

In the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview, Ogarkov rejected the possibility that either side could take out the nuclear weapons of the other side with a first strike, in other words, achieve a first-strike counterforce capability. With the remaining nuclear warheads, the defender would be able to inflict on the attacker "unacceptable damage." But here, too, Ogarkov did not reject victory in a nuclear war. In line with the argument presented in the *Izvestiya* article, it is possible to surmise that victory would be possible after the defender inflicted upon the attacker "unacceptable damage."

Moreover, this part in the interview should be viewed in conjunction with the rest of what Ogarkov said. He also referred to the progress in military technology, particularly as a result of advances in high technology. He advocated that military planners take this change into consideration in carrying out the modernization of weapons systems and methods of waging war. What was implied here was the necessity to revise the war-fighting strategy to correspond to the new technological means. The emphasis remained on war-fighting strategy in modern conditions, in which nuclear weapons were only one variable. Therefore, the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview, too, cannot be taken as evidence of Ogarkov's change of opinion.

With regard to Ogarkov's dismissal from the post of Chief of the General Staff, here I am in partial agreement with Weickhardt. There may have been other reasons for the dismissal, but in the context of the important debate over military doctrine Ustinov might have wanted to show "who is boss." It is possible, as Weickhardt argues, that Ustinov decided to fire Ogarkov regardless of the latter's complete recantation. But if Ogarkov stubbornly continued to adhere to his own opinion, as I have argued, Ogarkov's sudden dismissal becomes more understandable.

Moreover, the debate over victory in nuclear war certainly did not end with Ogarkov's dismissal. Two subsequent publications by Ogarkov have appeared. One was an article in *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* in November 1984, the other, a 96-page pamphlet entitled *History Teaches Vigilance* which appeared in April 1985.[44]

According to Weickhardt, the *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article can be interpreted as an extension of the *Izvestiya* article and the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview: Ogarkov accepted the view that nuclear war would extinguish human civilization, thereby no longer serving any political and strategic aims, and that "it would be impossible for either side to launch a disarming first strike."[45] Ogarkov's new pamphlet, however, defied such ready classification. On the one hand, Ogarkov reiterated that nuclear war could result in the extinction of the human race, thus continuing to voice the party line he had accepted since the *Izvestiya* article. On the other hand, he returned to the previous position that the Soviet Union could win in a nuclear war. This baffled Weickhardt, who concluded that Ogarkov was "neither clear nor consistent on some major strategic issues."[46]

In a sense, it is true that the *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article was an extension of the *Izvestiya* article and *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview. In this article Ogarkov stated: "Only by completely abandoning common sense can one attempt to find such arguments and to realize such an aim as to justify the unleashing of a world nuclear war, which would bring human civilization itself under threat of complete elimination." Then he quoted the incumbent General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko: "It is criminal to regard thermonuclear war as a rational and as it were 'legal' continuation of politics."[47]

Subscribing to Chernenko's statement was the closest that Ogarkov came to capitulation. Nevertheless, this article cannot be considered as a complete surrender. For one thing, Ogarkov never acknowledged that there could be no victory in nuclear war, as Ustinov and Brezhnev had done. Second, he used curiously different phrases in referring to the impact of a first strike. The *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article contained a phrase almost identical to that which appeared in the *Krasnaya Zvezda* interview. After noting the paradox of increasing destructive power available to both sides and the diminishing possibility of a

[44]See N. Ogarkov, "The Unfading Glory of Soviet Arms," *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 21, November 1984, pp. 16–26; and idem, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'*.

[45]George R. Weickhardt, "Ogarkov's Latest Fulminations on Vigilance," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 325/85, Sept. 27, 1985, p. 2.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Ogarkov, "The Unfading Glory. . . ," loc. cit.

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successful counterforce strike, Ogarkov stated:

The fact is that with the existing quantity and diversity of nuclear missile means it is simply impossible for the aggressor to eliminate the analogous means from the opponent with one strike. Even with a limited quantity of nuclear weapons remaining with the defender, an immediate, crushing answer is inevitable under contemporary conditions—an answer that deprives the aggressor subsequently of the possibility not only to conduct the war but any serious operations.[48]

In the *Krasnaya Zvezda* article, Ogarkov had stated that with the remaining quantity of nuclear weapons, "a crushing second strike will inflict unacceptable damage upon the aggressor."

For Brezhnev and Ustinov, the second strike was associated with the expression "crushing" (sokrushitel'nyy) or "all-crushing" (vsesokrushitel'nyy) strike. These terms had an apocalyptic meaning for Brezhnev and Ustinov—signaling an event so catastrophic that it would be impossible to even conceive of a continuation of normal life, not to speak of a continuation of war. In this sense, they were close to what Robert McNamara had defined as "unacceptable damage." But the *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* article makes it clear that Ogarkov was seeing the concept of a second strike in totally different terms from Brezhnev and Ustinov. Ogarkov judged second strike in the context of war-fighting in nuclear war. The second strike would make it impossible for the aggressor to conduct war and mount serious operations. It was this that was defined as "unacceptable damage."

It is curious that Ogarkov appears to list the impossibility of continuing war as a less serious consequence of a second strike, and the impossibility of conducting operations as a more serious consequence. The first seems to indicate the state of powerlessness after a second strike, and the second the impossibility by the other side to organize military operations out of the remaining forces after a second strike, either because such military forces would be effectively dismembered and/or because the C^3I system would be rendered inoperative. In any case, Ogarkov's statements indicate that he continued to think of the second strike in the context of war-fighting in nuclear war.

It should be stressed that Ogarkov never repudiated victory in nuclear war in the 1984 article. Nuclear war could be so catastrophic as to put human civilization at risk, and the first strike would not give victory to the attacker. Nevertheless, if the imperialists unleashed such a war, the Soviet Union would do its best to fight it to ensure victory. Despite the pressure from the party and despite his concessions to this pressure, Ogarkov continued to adhere to the position that he had consistently held all along.

His pamphlet *History Teaches Vigilance* was published five months after Ustinov's death in December 1984, and a few weeks after Mikhail Gorbachëv's accession, although the manuscript itself had surely been sent to press before Gorbachëv came to power. Ustinov's death and Chernenko's withdrawal from the political scene due to illness seemed to have weakened the pressures on Ogarkov.

As Weickhardt points out, Ogarkov certainly mentioned the dangers arising from a world thermonuclear war.[49] But the line of argument he pursued in this pamphlet—far from being confused or ambiguous, as Weickhardt argues—decidedly advocated war-fighting in nuclear war, that is, repudiated MAD. Returning to the formulations he had used at the climax of the debate, Ogarkov repeated his vision of future nuclear war as a decisive confrontation between capitalism and socialism. In *History Teaches Vigilance,* he even went one step further than in previous writings when he stated that war "will continue until complete victory against the enemy" is achieved.[50] Furthermore, Ogarkov declared: "Soviet military doctrine demands gaining the capability of carrying out a crushing second strike and destroying the enemy under any conditions that might unfold in the situation." In addition, he stated that "the military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine . . . envisages the conduct of active, decisive military actions with the use of military power of the state and its Armed Forces until the complete destruction of the aggressor."[51]

History Teaches Vigilance can be taken as the clearest expression of Ogarkov's idea on nuclear-war-fighting. It also allows one to argue that Ogarkov adhered consistently to a war-fighting strategy in nuclear war and to the necessity of seeking victory in nuclear war. Ogarkov's position was clearly at variance with the party line advocated by Brezhnev and Ustinov. But despite pressure, Ogarkov made no concession on these two cardinal points. Furthermore, the publication of *History Teaches Vigilance* indicates that Ogarkov's position was not without supporters—among the professional military and possibly among the political leaders as well.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Ogarkov, *Istoriya uchit bditel'nost'*, p. 68.
[50]Ibid., p. 77.
[51]Ibid., p. 89.

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Conclusion

The focal point of the Ustinov-Ogarkov debate—the possibility of victory in nuclear war—concerned a core part of Soviet military doctrine. The debate extended to the related issues of whether nuclear weapons should be considered as a magnification of conventional weapons or as something qualitatively different from conventional weapons; whether the level of military power should be sufficient to ensure a second-strike retaliatory capability; what was meant by the second strike and "unacceptable damage"; and whether or not the military should prepare a nuclear-war-fighting strategy. Furthermore, although it did not surface explicitly in the open debate, there may have been behind-the-scenes arguments over the characteristics of weapons systems.

The debate was due partly to differing perceptions of threat and security, as the Strodes argue, and partly to the different tasks assigned to the party leadership and the military leadership, as Holloway stresses. But neither the Strodes nor Holloway diagnose the debate fully. The Strodes put the "diplomacists" and "the unilateralists" on the same plane, as if they are equal parties with equal rights to determine national security policy. Within the structure of Soviet military theory, the party leaders and the military leaders cannot be equal partners, and this stratification of elite functions in formulating military doctrine must be taken into consideration. Yet, Holloway's argument that the division of tasks between the party and the military is invariably complementary also cannot be sustained. There was a genuine debate and genuine frictions that led to Ogarkov's dismissal.

The Ustinov-Ogarkov debate showed an inherent contradiction in the way Soviet military doctrine is formulated. Although the party's supremacy was not questioned even by Ogarkov, there are areas where the political-social requirements cannot mesh with military-technical requirements. The relationship between deterrence and nuclear strategy is one such area. This is by no means peculiar to the Soviet Union. The inherent contradiction in this relationship, in which effective deterrence depends on a more credible nuclear strategy, while a credible strategy makes a nuclear war more likely, is a dilemma that neither superpower can escape.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this debate. First, no matter how sincere Brezhnev and Ustinov were in accepting MAD, the Soviet military has resisted this concept. The political leadership has so far failed to persuade the military to accept MAD completely at the operational and force-posture level. Second, insofar as the conflict between Ustinov and Ogarkov was rooted in basic contradictions in the structure of military doctrine, the conflict is not likely to disappear in the foreseeable future. The party leadership can fire a recalcitrant polemicist who voices his dissatisfaction too openly. It can muzzle dissension in open literature. It is presumed that under Gorbachëv the party's control over the military has become more effective than it was under his ailing predecessors. The rejection of victory in nuclear war has even been written into the party program adopted at the 27th Party Congress. Yet, it seems to me that as long as the military functions as it does and has a monopoly on military expertise, the party leadership cannot expect to suppress the military's resistance completely. Old soldiers never die, and—since Ogarkov was reelected as a member of the Central Committee at the 1986 party congress—they apparently also did not fade away.

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Shifts in CPSU ID

Wallace Spaulding

AS OF JUNE 1986, Anatoliy Dobrynin, long-time Soviet ambassador to the United States, had emerged as chief of the International Department (ID) of the CPSU Central Committee.[1] Unlike his predecessor, Boris Ponomarëv, Dobrynin is not an alternate member of the party Politburo, but he has been named a party secretary for foreign affairs. Two other top-level appointments have also occurred recently in the ID leadership. The first is Georgiy Korniyenko, a former first deputy minister of foreign affairs, who has been named a first deputy chief of the ID.[2] The other is Lt. Gen. Viktor Starodubov, formerly the Soviet commissioner at the Standing Consultative Commission (for US-Soviet arms control discussions),[3] who has been brought into the International Department presumably as chief of a sector dealing with arms control matters, a topic of great importance in Gorbachëv's current foreign policy orientation.

Korniyenko has a background amazingly similar to that of the existing ID first deputy chief, Vadim Zagladin—both were made full CC members in 1981 and both have had experience in US affairs and disarmament matters.[4] It is not clear whether the long-term intent of the Gorbachëv leadership is to retain two first deputies in the ID (i.e., to divide major responsibilities) or perhaps to ease Zagladin out. Starodubov's appointment may be yet another indication of reduction in Zagladin's responsibilities in the disarmament area.

The appointments of Dobrynin, Korniyenko, and Starodubov suggest that the ID will see to it that the CPSU's relations with the "Free World" political parties and its control of the international front organizations—the two main ID functions—will more than ever be undertaken in the context of the USSR-US relationship (conceivably to the detriment of Third World concerns). This seems all the more certain since the next-ranking ID official, Deputy Chief Karen Brutents, was reportedly "named to head the USA Desk,"[5] apparently signifying that the USA-Canada Sector will come under his supervision. If so, Brutents—who replaces Anatoliy Chernyayev as the sole ID deputy chief having candidate membership on the party Central Committee and hence holds the next highest party rank behind the ID's chief and two first deputy chiefs—also appears to have whittled away some of Zagladin's prerogatives (the latter was formerly presumed to have supervised the US relationship).[6]

To date there is no clear evidence of a major change in the functions of the ID. At the same time, there has been a fair amount of shuffling in the lineup of sector and desk chiefs and responsibilities since our mid-1984 enumeration. Fully a third of the citations below are new since that date, although it cannot be deter-

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[1]The precise date of his appointment is not known. The first reference to him as ID chief came in Moscow TASS, June 9, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), June 10, 1986, p. G/3.

[2]Moscow TASS, June 23, 1986, transcribed in *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1986, D/1.

[3]*Kansan Uutiset* (Helsinki), July 17, 1986.

[4]See Wallace Spaulding, "Addenda on the International Department," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1984, p. 68; and *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1986.

[5]*The Washington Post*, May 24, 1986. It is assumed that this report signaled "supervisory" functions rather than direct leadership, since Dmitriy Lisovolik was identified as chief of the department only in March (see *Pravda* [Moscow], Mar. 14, 1986). There has been no indication whether Brutents has relinquished his supervision of Middle Eastern affairs (see Spaulding, loc. cit., fn. 4).

[6]Chernyayev is now a "foreign policy assistant" to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachëv. See *The Washington Post*, Feb. 23, 1986.

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mined whether this reflects increased ID activity, increased openness, or better tracking of data. The information is ordered geographically in conformity with the Checklist of Communist Parties, published in the March-April 1986 issue of *Problems of Communism,* although the major geographic groupings indicated in parentheses do not necessarily reflect the way in which the ID operationally divides up the world. Question marks indicate responsibilities, sector names, or geographic areas within a sector or desk that are inferred but for which there is no clear current evidence.

The following division of supervisory responsibilities by sector among the top ID officials is suggested but not conclusively established: First Deputy Chief Zagladin–the "Latin Europe," "Germanic Europe," and "Southeast Europe" sectors[7]; First Deputy Chief Korniyenko—the "UK-Ireland," "Australia/New Zealand," and "Arms Control" sectors[8]; Deputy Chief Brutents—the Latin America, USA-Canada, and the Middle East and North Africa sectors[9]; Deputy Chief Rostislav Ulyanovskiy—the "Black Africa" and "South Asia" sectors, plus the sector dealing with "Afro-Asian/Trade Union" and possibly other front activities[10]; and Deputy Chief Vitaliy Shaposhnikov—the "Nordic Sector," and the sector dealing with the "Peace Movement" and possible other fronts[11]; and Ivan Kovalenko—the Japan, Southeast Asian, and "Friendship Associations" sectors.[12]

[7]See Moscow TASS, June 9, 1986, tr. in *FBIS-SOV,* June 10, 1986

[8]Moscow TASS, June 23, 1986, tr. in *FBIS-SOV,* June 24, 1986, p. D/1; and *The Washington Post,* May 24, 1986.

[9]*Izvestiya,* Apr. 2, 1986.

[10]*Pravda,* Dec. 1, 1985; and *Bakinskiy Rabochiy,* May 15, 1976 (identifying him as a vice-president of the Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity.

[11]Radio Moscow, Apr. 19, 1986, tr. in *FBIS-SOV,* Apr. 21, 1986, p. G/4; and *New Perspectives,* No. 2, 1986, p. 2 (identifying him as a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council).

[12]*Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), May 13, 1986; and *Pravda,* Dec. 20, 1973 (identifying him as deputy chairman of the USSR-Japan Society).

Leaders of International Department Sectors and Desks

Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	GEOGRAPHIC SECTOR	
	(Africa and the Middle East)	
Andrey Urnov (head)[13] Yevgeniy Denisov (dep.)[14]	**"Black Africa Sector"**	
Boris Petruk[15]	Angolan/Ethiopian/ Ghanian Desk	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola/Party of Labor Workers' Party of Ethiopia Provisional National Defense Council (Ghana)
Yevgeniy Korendyasov[16]	Congolese/Malian/ Senegalese Desk	Congolese Labor Party Democratic Union of the Malian People Independence and Labor Party (Senegal)
Eduard Kapskiy[17]	Mozambique Desk[11]	Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo)
B. V. Yegorov[18]	Guinean/Sao Tome and Principean Desk	Military Council of National Redressment (Guinea) Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe
Vladimir Sharayev[19]	Tanzanian Desk	Revolutionary Party of Tanzania
	Other desks (?)	Benin People's Revolutionary Party National Revolutionary Council (Burkina Faso) Unity for National Progress (Burundi) African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde

[13]*Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 8, 1984.

[14]Radio Bamako, Feb. 8, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East & Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-MEA*), Feb. 11, 1985, p. T/4.

[15]On respective areas of responsibility, *Pravda,* Aug. 10, 1982; *Sovetskaya Moldaviya* (Kishinev), May 14, 1983; and Accra, GNA, Apr. 27, 1973, *FBIS-MEA,* May 2, 1973, p. W/2.

[16]On respective areas of responsibility, *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Aug. 13, 1983; *L'Essor* (Bamako), Mar. 30, 1979; and *Pravda,* Sept. 30, 1984.

[17]*Pravda,* Apr. 26, 1985.

[18]On respective areas of responsibility, ibid., Dec. 1, 1984; *Sovetskaya Kirgiziya* (Frunze), Oct. 24, 1978; and *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), Mar. 15, 1984.

[19]*Daily News* (Dar-es-Salaam), Aug. 7, 1982. This identification is tentative, for Sharayev was not specifically named as being associated with the ID.

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Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(Africa and the Middle East, continued)	
	Other desks (?)	Communist Party of Lesotho (?) Congress Party for Madagascan Independence (AKFM) Party of the Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution (AREMA) Southwest African People's Organization (Namibia) Socialist Working People's Party (Nigeria) Seychelles People's Progressive Front All People's Congress of Sierra Leone African National Congress (South Africa) South African Communist Party United National Independence Party (Zambia) Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
Yuriy Gryadunov (head)[20] Sergey Kuzmin (dep., N.Af.)[21]	**Middle East and North Africa Sector**	
Gregoriy Nechkin[22]	Egyptian/Iraqi/ Jordanian (?)/ Sudanese (?) Desk	Egyptian Communist Party National Progressive Unionist Party of Egypt Iraqi Communist Party Communist Party of Jordan Sudanese Communist Party
Nikolay Slepov[23]	Israeli Desk	Communist Party of Israel
Vyacheslav Matuzov[24]	Lebanese/Palestinian (?)/ Syrian (?) Desk	Lebanese Communist Party Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon) Democratic Front for the Liberationn of Palestine Palestinian Communist Party Palestine Liberation Organization Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Arab Socialist Renaissance (Ba'ath) Party of Syria Syrian Communist Party
Aleksandr Guskov[25]	South Yemeni/Saudi (?)/ Bahraini (?) Desk	Yemeni Socialist Party Communist Party of Saudi Arabia Bahrain National Liberation Front
Andrey Kuzmin[26]	Morrocan Desk	Independence Party (Istiqlal) Party of Progress and Socialism Socialist Union of Popular Forces
	Other desks (?)	Algerian National Liberation Front General People's Congress of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah Social Destourian Party (Tunisia) Tunisian Communist Party
	(The Americas)	
Mikhail Kudachkin (head)[27] Igor Rybalkin (dep.)[28]	**Latin America Sector**	
Aleksey Mineyev[29]	Argentinian/Colombian/ Panamanian Desk	Communist Party of Argentina Communist Party of Colombia People's Party of Panama

[20]*El Moudjahid* (Algiers), Mar. 15–16, 1985; Radio Aden, July 21, 1986, in *FBIS-MEA*, July 21, 1986, p. C/3.
[21]*Al Nida* (Beirut), Mar 30, 1984; *El Moudjahid*, Mar. 15–16, 1985.
[22]Elizabeth Teague, "The Foreign Departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU," Radio Free Europe–Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), Oct. 27, 1980, Supplement, p. 36. Tentative (Nechkin is identified with Egypt and Iraq only, and that as of October 1972).
[23]*Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1981.
[24]*Al Nida*, Mar. 30, 1984. Tentative—Matuzov was identified with Lebanon only.
[25]*Rabochiy klass i sovremenny mir* (Moscow), No. 1, 1979, p. 91. Tentative—Guskov identified with South Yemen only.
[26]*Al Bayane* (Casablanca), Mar. 25, 1983.
[27]*Asi Es* (Mexico City), Aug 12–18, 1983.
[28]*Hoy* (La Paz), May 28, 1985.
[29]On respective areas of responsibility, *Leningradskaya Pravda*, June 28, 1979; *Pravda*, Nov. 4, 1984; and *Sovetskaya Latviya* (Riga), Jan. 4, 1983.

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Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(The Americas, continued)	
Aleksandr Ignat'yev[30]	Bolivian/Chilean Desk	Communist Party of Bolivia Chilean Socialist Party Communist Party of Chile MAPU Worker-Peasant Party of Chile Radical Party of Chile
Dmitriy Pastukov[31]	Brazilian Desk	Brazilian Communist Party
Konstantin Kurin[32] *Vladimir Travkin (?)*[33]	Costa Rican/Dominican/ *Mexican/Nicaraguan Desk*	Costa Rican People's Party *People's Vanguard Party (Costa Rica)* Dominican Communist Party Unified Socialist Party of Mexico *Sandinista National Liberation Front (Nicaragua)*
Pëtr Nikolayev[34]	Ecuadoran Desk	Communist Party of Ecuador
Yuriy Kozlov[35]	Honduran/Venezuelan/ Uruguayan Desk	Communist Party of Honduras Communist Party of Venezuela Communist Party of Uruguay Socialist Party of Uruguay
	Other desks (?)	Communist Party of El Salvador Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador) Guatemalan Party of Labor Unified Party of Haitian Communist Paraguayan Communist Party American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Peru) Peruvian Communist Party
Dmitriy Lisovolik (head)[36]	**USA-Canada Sector**	
Vladimir Ulasevich[37]	Canadian Desk	Communist Party of Canada
Sergey Semivolos[38]	English Caribbean Desk	Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (Grenada) People's National Congress (Guyana) People's Progressive Party (Guyana) People's National Party of Jamaica Workers' Party of Jamaica Puerto Rican Communist Party (?)
Igor Mikhaylov[39]	USA Desk	Communist Party, USA
	(Asia and the Pacific)	
Aleksey Senatorov (head)[40]	**"Japan Sector"**	
Yuriy Kuznetsov[41]	Japanese Desk	Japan Communist Party
Vasiliy Saplin[42]	Japanese Desk	Japan Socialist Party

[30]On respective areas of responsibility *Hoy* (La Paz), May 28, 1985; and Radio Moscow, Jan. 4, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 7, 1985, K/3.
[31]*Sovetskaya Litva* (Vilnius), Aug. 6, 1982.
[32]On respective areas of responsibility, *Pravda Vostoka* (Tashkent), Nov. 27, 1975; *Sovetskaya Litva*, Mar 5, 1983; *Asi Es*, June 21, 1985; and *Barricada* (*Managua*), July 19, 1984.
[33]*Asi Es*, June 1, 1984 (possibly Kurin's assistant for Mexico).
[34]*Pravda*, Nov. 27, 1983.
[35]On respective areas of responsibility, Elizabeth Teague, loc. cit., p. 32; *Tribuna Popular* (Caracas), Aug. 1–7, 1980; and *La Hora Frentista* (Montevideo), Dec. 19, 1985.
[36]*Pravda*, Mar. 14, 1986.
[37]*Sovetskaya Litva*, Aug. 10, 1983.
[38]Undated Grenadian Soviet Embassy document, "Year of Political and Academic Education," US National Archives Collection of Grenada Documents, Washington, DC.
[39]*Kommunist* (Yerevan), Sept. 9, 1978.
[40]*Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1982.
[41]Moscow, TASS, Sept. 19, 1984, *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 20, 1984, p. C/1.
[42]*Akahata* (Tokyo), July 11, 1985 (Saplin may have replaced Kuznetzov).

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Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(Asia and Pacific, continued)	
Pëtr Kutsobin (head)[43]	**"South Asia Sector"**	
Gebrich Alekov[44]	Afghan (?)/Iranian/ Pakistani (?) Desk	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan Fedayeen-e-Khalq (Majority) (Iran) People's Party of Iran (Tudeh) Communist Party of Pakistan
Vladimir Vykhukholev[45]	Indian Desk	Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Indian National Congress
Unknown	Bangladeshi (?)/ Sri Lankan (?)/ Nepalese Desk	Communist Party of Bangladesh National People's Party of Bangladesh Communist Party of Sri Lanka Communist Party of Nepal
Vladimir Tolstikov (?)[46]	**"Southeast Asia Sector"**	
Aleksandr Malov[47]	Burmese/Filipino Desk	Burmese Socialist Program Party Philippine Communist Party (PKP)
Unknown	Indonesian/Kampuchean Desk (?)	Communist Party of Indonesia Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party
	(Western Europe)	
Viktor Rykin (head)[48]	**"Germanic Europe Sector"**	
Yuriy Koshelev[49]	Austrian/Luxembourg/ Netherlands (?) Desk	Communist Party of Austria Communist Party of Luxembourg Communist Party of the Netherlands Netherlands Labor Party
Viktor Tyutonov[50]	West Berlin Desk	Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin
Vsevolod Yezhov[51]	West German Desk	German Communist Party Social Democratic Party of Germany
Yuriy Zuyev (head)[52]	**"Latin Europe Sector"**	
Dmitriy Moisenko-Yelikiy (head)[53]	Belgian/Swiss Desk	Communist Party of Belgium Socialist Party of Belgium Swiss Party of Labor
Vitaliy Gusenkov[54]	French Desk	French Communist Party Socialist Party of France

[43]*Pravda*, Mar. 21, 1982. Kutsobin is also identified as a vice-president of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Society; see *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 4, 1985, p. 217.

[44]Radio Kabul, June 24, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: South Asia* (Washington, DC), June 25, 1986. Tentative—Alekov is not specifically identified as representative of the ID, nor is he linked publicly with Iran or Pakistan.

[45]*The Statesman* (Calcutta), Dec. 23, 1985.

[46]Radio Manila, Dec. 19, 1981, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan 13, 1982, p. E/1. *Leninskoye Znamya* (Moscow), July 7, 1984, referred to Tolstikov as a sector chief dealing with the Congo at a time when Urnov was noted as sector chief for Black Africa (see fn. 7).

[47]On respective areas of responsibility, *Leningradskaya Pravda*, Oct. 19, 1974 (noted as Central Committee official dealing with Burma); *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Mar. 25, 1978 (tentative, noted only as a vice-president of USSR-Philippine Friendship Society).

[48]*Izvestiya*, May 23, 1986.

[49]On responsibility for Austria and Luxembourg, *Pravda*, May 8, 1980, and Oct. 28, 1980.

[50]*Die Wahrheit* (West Berlin), May 16, 1981.

[51]*Pravda*, Jan. 19, 1982.

[52]Moscow, TASS, Oct. 8, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 10, 1985, p. G/2.

[53]*Le Drapeau Rouge* (Brussels), Apr. 22, 1986; *Voix Ouvrière* (Geneva), Mar. 26–June 1, 1983.

[54]*Pravda Vostoka*, July 23, 1980.

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Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	(Western Europe, continued)	
Nikolay Komin[55]	French Overseas Departments Desk (?)[56]	Guadeloupe Communist Party Martinique Communist Party Réunion Communist Party
A. A. Krylov[57]	Italian (?)/ San Marino Desk	Italian Communist Party Socialist Party of Italy Communist Party of San Marino
Viktor Krasnykh[58]	Portuguese Desk	Portuguese Communist Party
Vladimir Pertsov[59]	Spanish Desk	Communist People's Party of Spain Communist Party of Spain Spanish Socialist Workers' Party
Boris Pyshkov (head?)[60]	**"Southeast Europe Sector"**	
L. V. Khlebnikov[61]	Cypriot Desk	Progressive Party of the Working People
Karl Shemenkov[62]	Greek Desk	Communist Party of Greece Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
Unknown	Turkish Desk	Turkish Communist Party
Ivan Rozdorozhnyy (head)[63]	**"Nordic Sector"**	
Vladimir Savko[64]	Danish Desk	Communist Party of Denmark
Vladimir Fedorov[65]	Finnish Desk	Communist Party of Finland
Stepan Smirnov[66]	Finnish Desk	Finnish Center Party Finnish Social Democratic Party
Unknown	Norwegian Desk	Communist Party of Norway
Yevgeniy Vorozheykin[67]	Swedish Desk	Communist Workers' Party Party of the Left-Communists Social Democratic Labor Party
Dzavad Sharif (head)[68]	**"UK/Ireland Sector"**	
Yevgeniy Lagutin[69]	UK/Irish/Maltese (?) Desk	Communist Party of Great Britain Labor Party (United Kingdom) Communist Party of Ireland Communist Party of Malta Malta Labor Party
Unknown	**"Australia/New Zealand Sector" (?)**	Association for the Unity of Communists (Australia) Socialist Party of Australia Socialist Unity Party (New Zealand)

[55]*Justice* (Fort de France, Martinique?), Apr. 17, 1980.
[56]Existence of desk tentative; Komin was noted only as dealing with Martinique. See ibid.
[57]Moscow, TASS, Jan. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 24, 1986, p. G/4.
[58]*Sovetskaya Litva*, Oct. 18, 1980.
[59]*Mundo Obrero* (Madrid), Dec. 23–29, 1983.
[60]*Pravda*, June 2, 1981.
[61]Moscow, TASS, May 6, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 7, 1985, p. G/3.
[62]Moscow, TASS, June 23, 1986, trans in *FBIS-SOV*, June 24, 1986, p. G/1.
[63]*Pravda*, Nov. 28, 1984.
[64]*Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Sept. 5, 1980.
[65]*Hufvudstadsbladet* (Helsinki), Mar. 1, 1986.
[66]*Leninskoye Znamya*, June 26, 1981, and *Bakinskiy Rabochiy*, Oct. 29, 1982. (Smirnov may have been replaced by Fedorov.)
[67]*Sovetskaya Estoniya* (Tallinn), Feb. 20, 1982.
[68]*Pravda*, Oct. 6, 1981.
[69]Ibid., Nov. 4, 1985; and Moscow, TASS, Jan. 28, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 29, 1986, p. G/9.

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Chief (or deputy)	**Sector**/desk	Parties having relations with the CPSU
	FUNCTIONAL SECTORS	
Grigoriy Shumeyko[70]	**"Afro-Asian/Trade Union" (and other fronts?) Sector**	
Viktor Starodubov[71]	**"Arms Control" Sector (?)**	
Aleksey Legasov[72]	**"Friendship Associations" Sector**	
Yuliy Kharlamov[73]	**"Peace Movement" (and other fronts?) Sector**	
Unknown	**"Travel" Sector**[74]	
	Other sectors (?)[75]	
	MISCELLANEOUS UNITS	
	Consultants Group	**Specialty**
Yuriy Zhilin, chief of group[76]		Spain and Portugal[75]
Vadim Sobakin		France[77]
Oleg Ivanitskiy		Italy[78]
Genrikh Smirnov		Italy[79]
Vsevolod Rybakov		Latin America[80]
Stanislav Menshikov		USA and economics[81]
I.A. Skolov		English Caribbean[82]
Venyamin Midtsev		Africa[83]
Yuriy Krasin[84]		Ideology
Aleksey Kozlov		Ideology[85]
Nikolay Koval'skiy		Ideology (?)[86]
M.I. Kovalev[87]	**Secretariat**	

[70]*Moskovskaya Pravda,* Jan. 16, 1982, identifies Shumeyko as a sector chief; AAPSO, *Tenth Meeting of the AAPSO Presidium,* Cairo, 1982, p. 149, demonstrates his Afro-Asian involvement; on trade union responsibilities, see Tenth World Trade Union Congress (February 1982), *List of Participants*, p. 60.

[71]*Kansan Uutiset,* July 17, 1986.

[72]*Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), Dec. 9, 1973, identified Legasov as an ID sector chief dealing with friendship associations; *Leningradskaya Pravda,* Jan. 22, 1982, said he was sector chief of an unidentified department dealing with friendship associations.

[73]*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR* (Moscow), No. 22, Dec. 3, 1982, p. 447, identifies Kharmalov as a sector chief; World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War (June 1983), *List of Participants,* p. 170, for involvement in peace movement. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, an ID deputy chief who also is identified as a member of the World Peace Council Presidential Committee (see *New Perspectives* [Helsinki], No. 2, 1986, p. 2), possibly oversees Kharlamov's sector.

[74]Escorts foreign party delegations around the USSR. Grant Akopov was deputy chief of such a sector prior to his 1974 appointment as undersecretary for the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva. See *Leningradskaya Pravda,* June 5, 1973.

[75]V.G. Kostikov deals with veterans affairs, and Georgiy Danilov deals with youth affairs, although the sectors they serve under are not known. See Radio Rangoon, Dec. 25, 1985, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Asia & Pacific* (Washington, DC), Jan. 9, 1986, p. G/1; and *Leningradskaya Pravda,* July 6, 1982.

[76]*Pravda,* July 27, 1981, and June 21, 1983.

[77]Ibid., June 28, 1979; *Leninskoye Znamya,* May 30, 1980.

[78]*Moskovskaya Pravda,* Sept. 11, 1980; *Sovetskaya Estoniya,* Mar. 5, 1982.

[79]*Pravda,* May 4, 1981.

[80]*Voz* (Bogota), Nov. 8, 1984.

[81]Moscow, APN, Jan. 14, 1982, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service, (Washington, DC), JPRS No. 80146, Feb. 22, 1982, p. 17; Radio Moscow, June 17, 1983, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* June 20 ,1983, p. AA/3; unclassified US Department of State cable: Moscow:1557, Feb. 8, 1984.

[82]Moscow, TASS, Dec. 12, 1984; trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Dec. 13, 1984, p. K/1.

[83]*Leninskoye Znamya,* Sept. 28, 1979; *Izvestiya,* Apr., 14, 1981.

[84]*Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), No. 4, 1980, p. 31. Krasin is also pro-rector of the CPSU Academy of Social Sciences. See *Pravda,* Feb. 8, 1985.

[85]*Leninskoye Znamya,* Oct. 28, 1982.

[86]*Bakinskiy Rabochiy,* Feb. 26, 1982.

[87]*Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR,* No. 52, Dec. 28, 1978, p. 1070.

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Books

Soviet Third World Policy

Mark N. Katz

JERRY F. HOUGH. *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1986.

BRUCE D. PORTER. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945–1980*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

S. NEIL MACFARLANE. *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, and London, Croom Helm, 1985.

THE THIRD WORLD has gradually emerged as a major arena of Soviet-US competition. At any moment, it is the scene of numerous local conflicts in which the superpowers—each to varying degrees—involve themselves and which consequently have the potential for drawing the two into a wider conflict. In this respect, competition in the dynamic and instable Third World has replaced the struggle to shape postwar Europe or to achieve nuclear superiority as the most likely flashpoint in superpower relations.

The competition between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Third World was slow to evolve in the postwar period. This was due to the continued predominance of the European colonial powers in Asia and Africa and of the United States in Latin America, as well as to Stalin's lack of interest or optimism regarding Soviet prospects in the Third World. With the coming to power of Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet interest in the region increased. But though the Soviets became influential in some important Third World countries (most notably Egypt), the superpower competition in the region appeared to be of secondary importance.

Soviet involvement in the Third World became progressively greater, however, especially in the 1970's, when all of Indochina fell to the communists and Marxist revolutions occurred in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and elsewhere. Moreover, following the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia, the USSR and its allies became more heavily involved in Third World conflicts than ever before. The intervention of large numbers of Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia, of Vietnamese in Cambodia, and of Soviet forces themselves in Afghanistan heralded an expanded Soviet presence in the Third World. Not only did the coming to power of Marxist regimes in several Third World countries constitute a setback for the West, but it raised the added possibility that from these countries the Marxists could more easily threaten other, more important Western allies in the Third World.

The United States, though, was not alone in suffering setbacks in the Third World. The Soviet Union also experienced some reversals. Several pro-Soviet radical civilian leaders were overthrown in the mid-1960's. In the mid-1970's, both Egypt and Somalia dramatically expelled their Soviet advisers and abrogated their treaties of friendship and cooperation with Moscow. And in the mid-1980's, the new Marxist regimes in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua have been unable to defeat their armed internal opponents even though in some cases (e.g., Angola and Afghanistan), the

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ruling socialist states have intervened militarily on their behalf. Thus, the Third World has proven volatile for both players, with rapid gains and rapid losses following in quick succession.

The stakes in the Third World are considerable. From the Western perspective, the Third World contains areas such as the Middle East and southern Africa, which possess vital petroleum and mineral resources. The West would not want to see the USSR dominate these regions and be in a position to deny access to these resources. Third World countries also control sea lanes of vital importance to the West both economically and militarily. And while some might argue that a number of the Third World nations that have become Marxist are unimportant in themselves, they border countries that are important both to the West and to their regional neighbors.

From the Soviet perspective, Third World countries are important for security reasons and as points of further penetration. Perhaps more important, the Soviets have a strong interest—both ideological and practical—in seeing that once a Third World nation becomes Marxist, it remains so. For a Marxist regime to be overthrown by its own people not only would mean the loss of an ally for the Soviets, but also would set a dangerous precedent for other beleaguered Marxist regimes in the Third World.

THE INCREASED involvement of the USSR in the Third World and the resulting potential for superpower confrontation has generated a need for more serious study of Soviet foreign, military, and economic policies in this arena. But this is by no means an easy task. The Third World spans most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, encompassing countries with widely differing histories, geographic locations, economic situations, ethnic and social problems, political structures, and international relationships. Also, Soviet interests and policies with regard to various Third World regions and countries differ widely. Finally, information about Soviet–Third World relations is often scarce and unreliable. Many Third World governments are even more secretive than the Soviet Union, releasing very little information about their foreign policy intentions and relations. Making generalizations about Soviet policy toward the Third World, then, is extremely difficult.

In the West, there have been two main approaches to studying Soviet foreign policy toward the Third World: what one might call the "micro" and the "macro" approaches. Each has its advantages and disadvantages.

The micro approach has concentrated on studying Soviet foreign policy toward a particular region or country. Studies of this type have the advantage of analyzing Soviet policy in great detail, revealing how Moscow often pursues conflicting goals, faces unforeseen events, sometimes hesitates over how to respond to difficult situations, at other times positions itself to benefit no matter what the outcome may be, and in general makes good, bad, and outright foolish moves. The disadvantage of these studies, however, is that because the analysis is specific to one region or country, one cannot draw reliable generalizations regarding Soviet perceptions, intentions, and strategy with respect to the Third World as a whole. There is also a tendency in many of these studies to see Soviet policy toward a given region or country as of priority concern to Moscow, and not to examine how particular Soviet moves fit into Soviet foreign policy as a whole.

The macro approach, by contrast, directly addresses the larger questions of Soviet intentions and strategy toward the Third World. It is this approach that each of the three books being considered here generally takes.

Within the macro approach, there are two means by which scholars seek to learn about Soviet intentions and strategy: (1) by examining what the Soviets write about the Third World; and (2) by examining what the Soviets actually do there, particularly in the military realm. Scholars, of course, do not focus on one of these means to the complete exclusion of the other; some indeed try to integrate the two.[1] Nonetheless, there is a trend to give one factor or the other—actions or statements—greater weight in analyzing what Soviet motives are.

Some believe that the debates over the Third World carried on by academicians and others in the Soviet Union have little relationship to actual foreign policy; the way to understand what the Soviets are likely to do in the future, it is maintained, is to examine the evolution of Soviet policy over time. Others feel that Soviet actions alone are ambiguous; they do not reveal *why* the Soviets undertook them or whether they were offensive or defensive moves. A careful reading of Soviet commentary, it is argued, is crucial for understanding what Soviet expectations are from specific situations and why the USSR responds to given cases as it does. As shall be seen below, what one examines in attempting to understand Moscow's intentions and strategy—Soviet actions or Soviet statements—can lead to very different conclusions.

[1]In the micro approach some of the best studies examine what the Soviets both say and do about a particular region or country, but this is much easier to do for a specific country or region than for the Third World as a whole.

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JERRY HOUGH's *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* focuses on Soviet civilian academic writings. According to Hough, the problem with basing an analysis of Soviet intentions in the Third World on Soviet actions is that these actions can be explained in alternative ways. By focusing on the debates about the Third World in the academic literature, he maintains, one can see how the Soviets view their foreign policy options.

This book is one of the more thought-provoking works on the Soviets and the Third World. In it, Hough provides a useful chapter on the difficulties in deciphering the meaning of Soviet writings. In addition, he makes a good counterargument to those who claim that Soviet academic writing has no relationship to Soviet foreign policy-making. Though Hough concedes that the Soviet academics do not make foreign policy decisions, he argues that they can have an indirect influence in shaping the views of the community concerned with international relations.

The scholars of the international institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences often do classified studies and participate in the work of ad hoc interagency committees. Especially in the latter case, they have the opportunity to persuade policymakers (or those who advise policymakers). What these scholars propound in journal articles may reflect what they prescribe in these meetings. Similarly, differences regarding foreign policy issues observed in these journals reflect different policy positions within not just the academic community, but the foreign policy community as a whole. The bulk of Hough's book is taken up with a painstaking review of this literature in an effort to identify what issues regarding the Third World have been debated and what the policy implications have been of the various positions in these debates.

But if Soviet actions in the Third World can be interpreted differently—as Hough points out—the meaning of these debates can also be interpreted differently. And some of Hough's interpretations of these debates are themselves highly debatable.

This is especially the case with Hough's interpretation of the work of Nodari Simoniya—a scholar at the Oriental Institute—who is cited more than anyone else in the book. Hough correctly notes that Simoniya has discussed how young socialist states in the Third World have not been as successful as many young capitalist states in building their economies. Simoniya also has observed that leftwing dictatorships in the Third World cannot be regarded as the most reliable of Soviet allies. But Hough concludes that those statements about the success of capitalism in the Third World are really a call for capitalism in the USSR, and that by criticizing Third World leftwing dictatorships, Simoniya "surely is trying to stimulate thought about the possibility of evolution within the Soviet one-party system" (p. 141).

If Hough is right that certain scholars are actually arguing for change in the USSR when they discuss the Third World, this raises serious questions. If these authors really are calling for capitalism and even some form of democratization in the USSR, why have they been able to express such anti-party views for so long? It is, of course, possible that the party leadership does not really know (or at least did not know before Hough's book was published) that this was what these scholars actually meant. But if this is the case, then these scholars can hardly be said to be influential, especially in the realm of political reform. Nor does what they write have much relevance for our understanding of Soviet policy in the Third World if the actual subject of their discussion is the USSR itself. One might offer a more prosaic—and perhaps more likely—alternative explanation to Hough's: when Simoniya and other Soviet scholars talk about the Third World, they really mean the Third World.

Hough finds that many Soviet academicians are pessimistic about the prospects for socialism in the Third World, and he argues that Moscow will focus its attention more on trying to make friends with non-socialist states. He seems to feel that the Soviets do not wish to undertake the burden of defending socialist regimes faced with armed internal opponents. If Hough had paid more attention to Soviet military literature on the Third World, though, he would have learned that the Soviet military is very much concerned with the question of defending socialism in the Third World.

Since 1983, there have been a number of articles in *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* discussing local wars.[2] All of these ostensibly discuss Western actions in Third World conflicts, but the lesson from almost all of them is that intervention against insurgents can succeed. How Hough may have interpreted this literature I do not know, but since the military is charged with implementing an important aspect of Soviet policy toward the Third World, he should have examined it. If Soviet academicians have a voice in shaping Soviet foreign policy, surely the Soviet military has an even greater one.

Hough emphasizes the many difficult problems that Soviet academi-

[2]See, for example, Col. Gen. G. Dol'nikov, "Development of Air Tactics in Local Wars," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 12, 1983, pp. 34–43; and Col. V. Odintsov, "Rear Servicing of Troops Using Aviation from the Experience of Local Wars," ibid., No. 2, 1985, pp. 81–86.

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cians see in Moscow's effort to promote and maintain Marxist regimes in the Third World. This trend in the Soviet debates suggests to him that "the Soviet leaders would find it in their interest to pull back from their commitment to radical movements" (p. 272). Yet, merely because the Soviets recognize that they face problems with Third World Marxists, both before and after the latter come to power, does not mean that Moscow is going to stop supporting such movements and regimes altogether. After all, the Soviets have learned that the Marxist-Leninists, are Moscow's closest allies in the Third World; no other group has an interest in becoming and remaining so close to the USSR.

In sum, to focus on Soviet academic writing to explain Soviet behavior, as Hough has done, can lead to an underestimation of Soviet interest in the Third World.

BRUCE PORTER focuses on actions rather than writings in trying to explain Soviet behavior. *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945–1980* also demonstrates that the macro and micro approaches to studying the Soviets in the Third World do not have to be mutually exclusive. Porter seeks to answer macro questions about Soviet involvement in local wars by a micro examination of five case studies (the North Yemeni civil war, the Nigerian civil war, the October 1973 Middle East war, the 1975–76 Angolan civil war, and the Ogaden conflict).[3] Unlike Hough, Porter sees the Soviets as becoming more active in the Third World. The postwar years have seen the USSR increase its involvement in the Third World, beginning with arms shipments to Egypt in 1955 and the appearance of Soviets or Soviet allies in combat roles, as with: Soviet pilots in Yemen (in 1967), large numbers of Cuban troops in Angola (1975), Soviet commanders directing combat operations in the Ogaden (1977–78), and Soviet ground troops in combat in Afghanistan (1979–). According to Porter, "a precedent, once set, has tended to become the norm in future conflicts . . . . What the USSR achieved in the Third World between 1973 and 1980 would have been totally unacceptable to the United States only a few years earlier; two decades earlier it might have led to war" (p. 242).

Though the Soviets have certainly increased their military involvement in the Third World over the years, Porter's selection of cases of conflict overemphasizes Soviet successes and underemphasizes Soviet problems. One of the criteria of selection he employs is that the contenders were noncommunist. On this basis, he excludes the war in Afghanistan, but includes the civil war in Angola and the Ogaden conflict, claiming that the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Ethiopia's Dergue were not recognized by the Soviets as communist regimes. However, Soviet writers put these movements in the same category as the Afghan regime—i.e., view them as "states of socialist orientation."[4] In this perspective, the governments in Luanda and Addis Ababa are no less and no more Marxist than the one in Kabul.

Further, while Soviet-backed forces were winning the civil war in Angola in 1975, they were losing the civil war in Oman. Why was the Omani insurgency excluded? Surely Porter would not claim that the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) was more communist than the MPLA.

Porter also uses another criterion for selecting conflicts to study: "Soviet arms played a significant role in determining the course of hostilities" (p. 61). Yet, he chooses not to discuss the PFLO, which despite Soviet arms aid, was defeated; could it be that Porter saw the defeat as evidence that Soviet arms did not play a *significant role* in determining the course of hostilities? Porter also ignores the National Democratic Front insurgents, also aided by Moscow, which were defeated in North Yemen.

Porter's analysis stops with the year 1980. Yet, even by this time

[3]There are dangers in trying to cope with a number of case studies at once: scholars are not always sufficiently knowledgeable of the intricacies of each individual case. In the case discussed by Porter with which I am most familiar—North Yemen—the author makes several errors. On p. 76, he refers to Hassan al-Amri as "the new Republican president" in 1965; al-Amri was the prime minister in 1965 and was *not* president then or at any other time. On p. 77, Porter states that in November 1967, Abdallah as-Sallal was replaced as president of North Yemen by al-Amri; he was actually replaced by Abdul Rahman al-Iryani, and al-Amri became prime minister again shortly after this. On p. 88, Porter states that the British withdrew from South Yemen in August 1967; they withdrew in November 1967. Also, Soviet advisers were not expelled from North Yemen in 1976 as Porter claims on p. 89; the North Yemenis threatened to expel them and the USSR did reduce the number of its advisers there, but they were never removed completely. And finally, the Saudis did not succeed in convincing the North Yemeni leaders to curtail their relations with Moscow after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as Porter claims on p. 89. The Soviet–North Yemeni military relationship has remained strong since the end of 1979. In fact, North Yemen used Soviet weapons to defeat Marxist insurgents supported by South Yemen in a struggle that lasted from 1979 until 1982. The USSR also signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with North Yemen in 1984.

None of these or other such errors may be judged to be particularly serious, but they do not increase the persuasiveness of the author's arguments. For more on the Soviet–North Yemeni relationship, see Mark N. Katz, *Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, Ch. 1; and idem, "Sanaa and the Soviets," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1984, pp. 21–34.

[4]On this point, see Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, February 1986, pp. 83–85.

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there was another type of conflict observable in which the Soviets were heavily involved, but which Porter does not discuss. This is the category of conflicts in which pro-Soviet regimes were on the defensive against guerrilla forces. Such conflicts were taking place before 1980 in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Afghanistan. Porter may exclude the last two because he considers one or more of the parties involved to be communist, but he can hardly exclude Angola and Ethiopia on this basis when he includes the 1975–76 Angolan civil war and the Ogaden war.

It is true that these conflicts are not yet over, but by not considering them, Porter portrays Soviet military involvement in the Third World as being the power that is on the offensive in changing the established order in the Third World for its purposes while the United States and the West are ineffectually defending that order. This may be the situation the Soviets would like, but the truth is that since the late 1970's, Moscow has had to devote a considerable amount of effort to the military defense of the socialist order in the Third World. Thus, Porter's selective examination of Soviet actions tends to overstate the Soviet capability to expand its influence in the Third World.

LIKE Jerry Hough's book, Neil MacFarlane's *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism* concentrates on ideas rather than actions. What is refreshing about MacFarlane's book is that it discusses not only Soviet but also Third World, and to a lesser extent American, writing on national liberation movements. Moreover, the Third World emerges in this study as an actor rather than just the stage on which the superpowers act.

MacFarlane's painstaking study of writings by the leaders and theoreticians of several Third World national liberation movements finds that many of them emphasize several factors: the need for violent revolution, nationalism, and state control of the economy for the benefit of all citizens. He notes that though Soviet writers support the first and third factors, they are not happy with the second: nationalism. Movements that are too nationalist are often not amenable to Soviet influence over the long term.

It is less easy to speak of an "American view" of national liberation in the Third World, but MacFarlane concludes that, in general, American opinion and American foreign policy have been much more comfortable than the USSR with nationalism, but—unlike the Soviets—have not favored violent revolution or state control of the economy. As a result, even when the United States has not opposed the activities of a given revolutionary group, Washington has been much less likely than Moscow to actively assist it.

Conversely, though the Soviet Union might not actually give much economic assistance to such a group once it achieves power, Moscow would, unlike the United States, be supportive of attempts to create a socialist economy. Thus, although there might be differences between a Third World revolutionary group and the USSR both before and after such a group comes to power, these differences are often less significant than those between the revolutionary group and the US.

This view of the triangular relationship involving the United States, the Soviet Union, and revolutionary groups in the Third World is, of course, a generalization that does not apply to all cases. Each revolution has its own peculiar circumstances, which may well outweigh these general considerations. The revolutionaries of North Yemen relied on the USSR, but proved to be politically conservative once their civil war ended. In Zimbabwe, the victorious Robert Mugabe was cool toward the Soviets for several years, partly because Moscow had supported his rival, Joshua Nkomo. And, the Marxist revolutionaries who came to power in Cambodia in 1975 were anti-American, but also anti-Soviet and pro-Chinese because they feared that the Soviet Union supported Vietnamese efforts to dominate them.

It would have been useful if MacFarlane could have extended his study of revolutionary regimes past the period immediately preceding and following their seizure of power, i.e., explored the evolution of a revolutionary regime's perceptions of the superpowers over time. However, that would involve another book-length study.

HOWEVER DIFFICULT the study of Soviet–Third World relations, the strong probability that the Soviet-American competition for influence in the Third World will go on there and that instability will continue to plague many countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America underlines the importance of the endeavor. There are a number of approaches that might be employed to improve and expand our knowledge. One would be an attempt to integrate the macro and micro approaches to study specific aspects of Soviet–Third World relations. For example, an examination of how the Soviets approach inter-state conflicts in the Third World—cases like India vs. Pakistan, the Arabs vs. Israel, Ethiopia vs. Somalia, Vietnam vs. Cambodia, and Iran vs. Iraq—might help us know under what circumstances the Soviets might intervene in, attempt to mediate, or remain aloof from such types of conflict. Similar studies could be made to discern under what conditions the USSR gives substantial, moderate, or only

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token assistance to Marxist revolutionaries in the Third World.

Another useful approach would be to study the relations of a particular Third World country or region with the two superpowers from the perspective of the Third World actors. This could prove useful in understanding just how Third World governments attempt to achieve their goals through their relations with Moscow and Washington, as well as why some rely mainly on one superpower while others attempt to gain something from both. This sort of study would require expertise on American and Soviet foreign policy as well as on the Third World country or region involved—a rare combination. This may, however, be a type of study in which Western and Third World scholars can effectively cooperate.

Yet another approach that ought to be explored is analysis of the relationship between Soviet writings about the Third World and Soviet actions there. In the military field, for example, a study examining whether the Western tactics in local conflicts that Soviet military writers discuss are in fact employed by the Soviets and their allies in Third World conflicts could be extremely important.

Finally, if a study could identify some of the high-level Soviet officers involved in conflicts both in Ethiopia and Afghanistan and track their careers after these combat posts, we could see if this group of officers is being promoted to the top-level military leadership or is being shunted off into career dead-ends. This could tell us something about just how much importance the Soviet military attaches to these Third World conflicts and whether there is evidence that the Soviet military is becoming more interested in them as one of its central missions, or sees involvement in such conflicts as being less important than preparations for a European or nuclear war.

There are undoubtedly other fruitful approaches to studying Soviet–Third World relations. But one thing is certain: the West is going to be confronted for the indefinite future with the problem of how to respond to Soviet involvement in the Third World. The more sophisticated Western understanding of Soviet involvement, the more sophisticated can be the West's response.

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Dissent and Soviet Society

Harvey Fireside

MARSHALL S. SHATZ. *Soviet Dissent in Historical Perspective.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1980.

LUDMILLA ALEXEYEVA. *Soviet Dissent: Contemporary Movements for National, Religious, and Human Rights.* Middletown, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 1985.

JOSHUA RUBENSTEIN. *Soviet Dissidents: Their Struggle for Human Rights.* 2nd ed. Boston, Beacon Press, 1985.

ROY MEDVEDEV, ED. *Samizdat Register 2: Voices of the Socialist Opposition in the Soviet Union.* New York, W. W. Norton, 1981.

DINA SPECHLER. *Permitted Dissent in the USSR: "Novyy Mir" and the Soviet Regime.* New York, Praeger, 1982.

BOOKS on Soviet affairs generally devote scant attention to the subject of dissent, thereby inadvertently mirroring the perspective of Soviet law and institutions, which holds that the dissidents represent a minuscule fraction of the population out of step with the orderly march of the masses to the tunes piped from the Kremlin. Certainly, in the logic of elementary Marxism-Leninism last enunciated by Khrushchev, those individuals—featured in Western media as protesters—do not indicate any basic contradiction in the harmonious evolution of Soviet society. Hence, they, like other criminals, might be certified as insane.[1] The psychiatric establishment, taking its cue from the erratic Premier, multiplied the number of "special psychiatric hospitals," in which unrepentant critics of the regime could be "cured" of their delusions.

With the advent of the Brezhnev era, the KGB moved even more decisively to chill the atmosphere of relative tolerance for dissenting views that had followed Stalin's death in 1953. The first of several increasingly severe waves of repression began in 1965, with the arrests of Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel, as much for having their works published abroad as for putting anti-Soviet dialogue into the mouths of their fictional characters. A spirit of xenophobia marked these renewed freezes, with government prosecutors contending that dissidents, in their writings and interviews, were allowing their words to become weapons in the hands of the capitalist enemy.

The current crop of books focusing on Soviet dissidents mostly reflects a feeling on the part of their authors that this subject is somewhat of an anomaly in a controlled society. Given the rituals of public conformity that nearly 70 years of Soviet rule have etched, it does come as a shock to learn that hundreds, perhaps thousands, of free spirits in the Soviet Union continue to march to the music of a different drummer. Their actions, however, have typically been more symbolic than effective. For example, a gallant few gather each December 5—Constitution Day on the Soviet calendar—in Pushkin Square before their unauthorized assembly is broken up by the police as an "anti-Soviet demonstration."[2]

The message conveyed by such quixotic gestures is that of guerrilla theater. They furnish living proof that the right of free speech, as of all other means of public expression, is granted only to those who sing the praises of the system in authorized fashion. These actions can also be seen as the feeble shoots of a counterculture, celebrating its own ideals with a fervor absent from the forced rites of the conformists.

IN THE FIRST of the books reviewed here, Marshall Shatz attempts to place Soviet dissent within a histori-

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[1] *Pravda* (Moscow), May 24, 1959.
[2] Hedrick Smith, *The Russians,* New York, Quadrangle, 1976, p. 462.

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cal Russian tradition going back to the late 18th century. At that time, a nobility that had been freed of obligatory service to the state gave birth to the peculiar group labeled the intelligentsia. Under West European influence, this coterie of self-styled thinkers established the obligation of improving the lives of the lower classes that is still upheld by their modern epigones.

Professor Shatz skillfully traces the links between the social reflexes of the early *"intelligenty"* and contemporary dissidents. Both groups derived from university-educated youth, with family trauma predisposing them to transmute their personal frustrations into confrontations with authority at large. Like their spiritual ancestors, intellectuals in the USSR agonize over social injustice in a language unintelligible to the masses whom they propose to benefit. Inevitably, they collide with an insensitive bureaucracy and are crushed.

Although such pyschohistorical theories point up remarkable resemblances between activists who, though separated by centuries, respond similarly to family histories, Western political ideas, and a romantic quest for liberation, they underestimate the social gulf dividing old Tsarist realities from today's collectivist system. Newly educated citizens have lost the cliquishness that characterized former thinkers. They perform the myriad special functions of an industrial society instead of the generalized role of social critic played by the old intelligentsia.

Yesterday's aristocrats could toss barbs at unenlightened despots, who in turn dismissed them as irrelevant to the prevailing orthodox order. Contemporary professionals, though still in a minority, are a much more substantial group, more deeply rooted in the society, and more closely yoked to the regime, which regards its writers, in Stalin's phrase, as "engineers of the soul."[3] They may occasionally be tempted to indulge in forbidden thoughts and scribbles after hours, but as creative intellectuals, their output is judged both qualitatively and quantitatively against production plans administered by officials who are their educational equals.

After identifying the present foci of dissent and the reservoirs of religious and ethnic grievances that might feed future protests, Shatz, writing in 1980, was forced to conclude that he had been discussing small circles of urban intellectuals totaling 2,000 at best. If so few restive souls can be said to defy stringent criminal and psychiatric punishments, as well as social sanctions (including denial of education, loss of employment and of other necessities and perquisites) meted out by the authorities, how justified is the author's attempt to accord this embattled band a place in the broad sweep of Russian history?

THE LANDSCAPE of heterodox beliefs is examined in microscopic detail by Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a 15-year veteran of disseminating samizdat (underground literature) in Moscow and reviewing human rights violations as a "Helsinki watcher," before her exile in 1977. In her devotion to detail, Alexeyeva displays the kind of survivor's passion that Solzhenitsyn breathed into his monumental *GULag Archipelago*. Hers is an encyclopedic endeavor likely to daunt some Western readers, but it is a labor of love, the ultimate reference work on the subject, including in its coverage many minor characters omitted from more popular surveys.

Alexeyeva's gallery of dissenters is replete with national and religious protesters, plus a goodly sprinkling of nonintellectual types from among the Tatars and Meskhi, the Pentacostals, and the Evangelical Baptists. The latter part of the book is devoted to the constituent streams of what she terms the "movement for human rights," whose members she has known first-hand and can, therefore, depict most convincingly.

It is perhaps her spiritual ambassadorship that causes Alexeyeva to lend this movement greater concreteness than its oscillating fortunes would seem to warrant. The contacts among its components have been, perforce, sporadic, and the movement has had greater moral than political impact. Yet, in justification of her upbeat account one might recall that where old Russian radicals remained generally mired in their ethnocentrism, many of the 1970's breed welcomed on equal terms colleagues from Ukraine, the Baltic states, and Central Asia.

It is regrettable that proper editing did not excise numerous errors from Alexeyeva's tome: a sentence on page 84 essentially repeated on the next page; US Congressman Robert Dornan (the book says "Dornen") has been made a "Senator" (p. 229); Telford Taylor is called a "judge" and former "chief prosecutor" at the Nuremberg Trials (p. 185) instead of law professor and associate trial counsel. The text is also replete with farfetched claims: for example, that there was a "striking" similarity in "conception and spirit" between the movements for civil rights in the United States and for human rights in the Soviet Union (p. 262). In refutation of this last point, one need merely recall the background of the US struggle, its ethical issues and techniques evolving from the preceding century, to understand how it could merge with mainstream politics and leave an enduring stamp on its society, whereas the Soviet dissenters remained marginal figures, unable to

[3]Alec Nove, *Stalinism and After*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1975, p. 64.

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attract a mass following, and thus could be finally repressed by the authorities with relative ease.

To say this is in no way meant to detract from the nobility of aim and spirit of self-sacrifice that characterize many of the figures whom Alexeyeva portrays. It is, rather, to balance her retrospective adulation of the movement, which goes so far that she claims to be unable to find a single case "of a KGB agent successfully infiltrating human rights groups" (p. 283). In fact, Sanya Lipavskiy's role in framing Anatoly Shcharanskiy on "espionage" charges has been fully documented,[4] while other shadowy characters, such as Aleksey Dobrovol'skiy in the Ginzburg-Galanskov trial of 1968, have been tied by circumstantial evidence to the secret police.[5]

Too often, the thrust of Alexeyeva's narrative has the resourceful band of activists outwitting its pursuers, revealing nothing except under torture. As with resistance fighters elsewhere, the Soviet reality falls short of such myths. Alongside an extraordinary number of heroes and heroines, we find a few corruptible self-serving types, the most notorious being Pëtr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, who turned state's witness in 1972 against hundreds of their former comrades.

Alexeyeva also identifies only a couple of members of the "Russian National Movement" as being intolerant. However, as Alexander Yanov points out in *The Russian New Right,*[6] racism and anti-Semitism are scarcely confined to one fringe group. One may also question her conclusion that in view of several phoenix-like rebirths, the "movement" can boast of being "indestructible when under attack" (p.372). Indeed, it is possible to argue that after the KGB's last concerted assault on dissidents, in 1979–82, the "movement" was effectively destroyed.

IN THE SECOND edition of his history of Soviet dissent, Joshua Rubenstein focuses on the post-1980 period, when the fortunes of the protesters dropped to their lowest point so far. After tracing the movement's genesis and development in the same seven fast-paced chapters that comprised his first edition, Rubenstein describes the "prolonged crisis" of 1979–82, precipitated by such measures as the "pre-Olympics purges" that scoured the streets of Moscow of potentially discordant voices, to the sadistic treatment inflicted upon Andrey Sakharov in his Gorky exile. One by one, the tiny associations that had circulated petitions and staged "press conferences" (really, receptions for Western correspondents in tiny flats) found themselves shut down: the Working Commission To Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes, the Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group, and others.

A concerted drive by the KGB rounded up scores of dissenters, who must have been under surveillance for years. Most were shunted by a prearranged judicial process to labor camps, some to psychiatric prisons, a few to internal exile or forced emigration. The movement's communications were disrupted, as threats of further arrests silenced such samizdat journals as *Chronicle of Current Events.*[7]

Why did the crackdown come at this juncture? Rubenstein examines the standard reasons, including reduced US leverage in the post-Afghanistan chill in superpower relations, but in his final chapter he fastens on more convincing Soviet domestic factors. In his declining years, Brezhnev had relinquished effective power to colleagues who were determined to reverse both his "relaxed attitude toward official corruption" and "his equivocal policy on dissent" (p. 328). Yuriy Andropov became the leader in this drive, which touched Brezhnev's own family, particularly his daughter Galina and her associates, and drove two close members of the clique, Interior Minister Nikolay Shchëlokov and deputy head of the KGB Semen Tsvigun, to suicide.[8]

The new Andropov appointees to these offices, Vitaliy Fedorchuk (Interior Ministry), and Viktor Chebrikov (KGB), tightened ideological controls, work discipline, and strictures against the "underground economy." Their new approach made itself felt among dissenters through the roundup of not only all remaining activists, but even mere readers of samizdat. In the labor camps, the Ministry of Interior's tough line visited physical brutality upon prisoners, including the courageous psychiatrist Anatoliy Koryagin, in order to break their spirit. If they remained obdurate, they were re-arrested for political crimes instead of being released at the end of their sentences. Others, like the Ukrainian activists Yuriy Lytvyn, Valeriy Marchenko, and Oleksiy Tykhyi, were allowed to die of untreated illnesses and injuries.

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[4]On Lipavskiy's actions, see David Shipler, *Russia: Broken Idols, Solemn Dreams*, New York, Times Books, 1983, pp. 37–38.

[5]On Dobrovol'skiy, see Pavel Litvinov, *Trial of the Four*, New York, Viking, 1972, p. 11.

[6]*The Russian New Right: Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR*, tr. by Stephen Dunn, Berkeley, University of California Press, International Studies, 1978.

[7]The fate of the *Chronicle* is recounted in Mark Hopkins's fine study, *Russia's Underground Press: The Chronicle of Current Events*, New York, Praeger, 1983. This volume was among the books reviewed in Louise I. Shelley, "Soviet Justice," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1985, pp. 69-73.

[8]Zhores A. Medvedev, *Andropov*, New York, Norton, p. 96.

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In Rubenstein's persuasive analysis, the outlook for liberalization under Mikhail Gorbachëv remains rather gloomy. The godfathers of the new leader were Andropov and the hard-line ideologue Mikhail Suslov, and Gorbachëv echoes their call for increased discipline as the panacea for Soviet economic and political malaise. Moreover, the "tough cop" types appear more ubiquitous than ever in the upper reaches of the regime.

ALTHOUGH the regime generally considers the dissidents to be its enemies, in fact many of them continue to volunteer suggestions for change that would make the system run more efficiently. For example, the Moscow historian Roy Medvedev and his twin brother, the biologist Zhores, who lives in exile in England, are known for contending that Soviet mechanisms of repression were neither foreordained by Lenin's theory and practices nor justified in terms of rational socialist development. They argue from an idealized Marxist perspective that the centralization of power by Stalin pushed healthy Soviet evolution into abnormal channels, and that the legacy of despotic controls hangs like a millstone around the neck of the present leadership. This leftwing critique has cost Roy his party membership and Zhores his citizenship, but evidently enough highly placed friends have shielded Roy to safeguard his recent independent literary endeavors.

Since 1977, Roy has edited the samizdat review *XX Century,* a journal that circulates unofficially in the USSR and is designed to serve as a forum for neo-Marxist critics of the Stalin era, to analyze social problems swept under the rug in official journals, and to carry on a debate with moderate and rightwing dissidents whom he finds lacking in historical accuracy and theoretical sophistication. The sampling from this publication presented in *Samizdat Register 2* contains selections by Old Bolsheviks and Mensheviks such as Mikhail Yakubovich, whose reminiscences of Lenin are meant to show how tolerantly that leader had treated opponents like Lev Kamenev and Grigoriy Zinoviev. The twofold moral of such essays is to swipe at party members nostalgic for Stalin by indicting his "unprincipled struggle for power" (p. 62) and to expose Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "distorted version" of revolutionary history glorifying the ancien régime (p. xi).

This anthology also features dissections of contemporary problems, for example, M. B. Davydov's proposal to promote small-scale mechanical equipment for the highly productive, privately farmed "garden plots." Then the late Mikhail Baitalski (Baytalskiy) offers a tongue-in-cheek exposé of "Commodity Number One," vodka production, on which the state has a monopoly and from which it derives major revenues although "drinking has become a national calamity in the USSR" (p. 172), causing crime, disease, accidents, and divorce.

While such iconoclastic commentaries had perhaps the greatest impact of any of the forays by the leftwing dissidents–at least serving to make formerly taboo topics legitimate objects of discussion, and, in the case of alcohol, perhaps helping buttress the regime's own anti-alcohol campaign—the most fascinating to a Western observer are Roy Medvedev's tilts against Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. Although prefacing his comments with a tribute to Sakharov's "courageous and unrelenting struggle for man's freedom," Medvedev attacks the dissenting physicist's "one-sided, tendentious and plainly erroneous statements" (pp. 277–78). He faults Sakharov for having grown increasingly disenchanted with Soviet life, and tending to exaggerate the virtues of Western societies, which, Medvedev argues, are dominated by corporate-military capitalism, and to shortchange such Soviet achievements as a marked expansion in affordable urban housing. Medvedev also finds Sakharov fundamentally lacking in theoretical finesse—e.g., when accusing the party elite of a "virtually inalienable" hold on power, whereas, according to Medvedev, it is "merely a temporary holder of state property" (p. 285). In short, Medvedev deems the current stage of Soviet society to constitute not "state capitalism," as Sakharov claimed, but "state-bureaucratic socialism." It may seem hair-splitting, but for Medvedev it is the difference between a disease that is fatal and one that is curable with a dose of Leninist democracy.

In his review of Solzhenitsyn's *GULag Archipelago,* Medvedev removes any remaining checks on his polemical fury. After a perfunctory bow to the opus as "one of the greatest books in the twentieth century," he goes on to portray it as riddled with distortions and untruths. Where Solzhenitsyn has excused those who collaborated with the Nazis, Medvedev is aghast at "a vicious ideological mishmash" (p. 308) that turns treachery into heroism. An even more bitter disagreement has Solzhenitsyn, in Medvedev's eyes, slandering communists in Stalin's camps as opportunists and apologists, instead of seeing them suffering as painfully as others, occasionally leading uprisings of the desperate inmates. Finally, it seems incredible to Medvedev for Solzhenitsyn to blame the West for not having saved the Tsar and, more recently, for not "starting a new world war against the USSR and China" with atomic weapons after the outbreak of the Korean war (p. 316).

No matter how solidly construct-

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ed his arguments, Medvedev emerges as the most waspish participant in this triangular debate with Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. By the end of the 1970's, Medvedev also seems to have become the most isolated of the three, as he disdained engaging in political confrontations with the authorities, preferring his self-appointed role of armchair strategist among would-be reformers. Indeed, he distanced himself from the mainstream of dissidents, blaming official repression on their provocative actions, scarcely a stance to endear himself to them. Later, his protective mantle slipped, as new, rigid KGB types took command and the Eurocommunism that Medvedev had espoused went into eclipse.

THE ATTEMPT to work within the parameters of socialist legality seen in Medvedev had already been pioneered by another editor, the redoubtable Aleksandr Tvardovskiy, in the years 1958–70, before Brezhnev's ideological guardians drove him and his assistants from the executive offices of the Moscow literary review *Novyy Mir*. The dramatic highpoint of that period occurred in early 1962, when an unknown ex-convict from Stalin's camps named Solzhenitsyn brought the handwritten manuscript of a novella, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, to Tvardovskiy. The editor recognized a work of genius and passed it to Khrushchev's assistant for cultural affairs, Vladimir Lebedev, who read it aloud to the Premier at his dacha. Khrushchev appreciated the explosive force of this work and saw its utility as a tool for blasting his Stalinist opponents within the party leadership. On his second try, he browbeat the Presidium of the party, as the Politburo was then called, into approving publication of the work. By a curious conjunction not likely to have transpired anywhere else in world, the rulers of a major state drew battle lines around this and other works of fiction and poetry that recaptured segments of the nation's past for which no one was willing to take responsibility. Khrushchev, Tvardovskiy, and Solzhenitsyn were briefly joined in some risky ventures, with the party watchdogs at their heels.

This fascinating story has been told by some of the participants: Khrushchev, Solzhenitsyn, and a former senior editor with *Novyy Mir*, Vladimir Lakshin.[9] Now, political scientist Dina Spechler relates the entire saga of *Novyy Mir* during the years that it was the bellwether of reformers. She has combed each issue of the journal for diverse themes of what she terms "permitted dissent" and links them to concomitant political events.

Spechler's enterprise verges on the monumental, yet it does not quite come off. There are too many plot summaries for the reader to absorb, plus an excess of social science jargon to detract from the narrative. Spechler assumes that the authors of these plots spoke through the characters in their fiction, albeit by indirection, in an attempt to effect basic changes in the way the Soviet system works. She even implies that they formed a cohesive counter-elite, leading "an embittered, disillusioned generation" to reject the ethical compromises of its fathers" and to "[refuse] to take its place in the ranks of the builders of communism" (p. 123). Yet one can ask: Were these authors among the activists of the 1960's? Did they, as a literary avant garde, palpably influence behavior, or merely arouse discussion? How did they magically appear just when the editors were about to launch one of the journal's critical campaigns? Finally, are there contemporary cases showing that reading fiction actually motivates people to become dissidents?

By equating the dialogue of characters with the politics of their authors, as Spechler does in a "methodological note," she is doing essentially what the prosecutors of Sinyavskiy and Daniel did when they held those two accountable for their literary creations. Yet, while trying to bridge the gulf between fiction and reality, between intent and interpretation, she confronts some basic problems of proving her case. She may be correct about a deliberate escalation of dissent that the *Novyy Mir* staff assembled and dispensed until the constellation of forces favorable to reform fell apart, with Khrushchev retired in disgrace, Tvardovskiy personally broken, and Solzhenitsyn driven into exile. But she may have overstated the orchestration of these episodes, since the literary scene was only a sideshow of political events that occupied center stage. For example, Tvardovskiy might have fancied himself the adroit impresario depicted here, but as Solzhenitsyn suggested, the editor was hamstrung by alcoholism, as well as by his expressed need to always show that he had "the party's interests at heart" (p. 253).

Despite its topheavy freight of methodology, however, *Permitted Dissent in the USSR* does highlight some central questions of ethics. For example, could these writers and editors set out to change closed institutions from the inside without succumbing to the pressures of self-interest and peer groups to rationalize loyal behavior accompanying verbal resistance? From the regime's perspective, their griping

[9]See *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, tr. by Strobe Talbott, Boston, Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 73–76; Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Oak and the Calf: A Memoir*, tr. by Harry Willetts, New York, Harper & Row, 1980; and Vladimir Lakshin, *Solzhenitsyn, Tvardovsky & Novy Mir*, tr. by Michael Glenny, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1980.

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could be forgiven as long as they did not challenge the basic controls of a one-party state. Spechler even suggests that the party bosses used the storms brewing in the pages of *Novyy Mir* as a test for their trial balloons of economic reform. Can one, then, classify the balloon men among genuine dissidents in the underground? For an unsuccessful contributor to the literary journal the greatest danger was generally a rejection slip or a lesson read by his overseers at the Writers' Union; for samizdat authors, the sanctions were professional oblivion, imprisonment, or exile. No matter how much the audience of *Novyy Mir* might have overshadowed the minuscule readership of underground pamphlets, is the author correct in stressing the clout of the former against the impotence of the latter? One needs to recall in this connection that when the Brezhnev freeze followed upon Khrushchev's cultural thaw, all the journals fell into line, whereas the scattered purveyors of samizdat continued to air their ethnic, religious, and political grievances, at considerable personal risk.

Spechler's most telling point, at least to this reviewer, concerns the fact that even in what she terms an "authoritarian, single-party mobilization regime," one does not find the conformity of the graveyard, but flocks of critics, from "a kind of loyal opposition" (p. 246) to more trenchant dissidents. Periods in which the regime actually "legitimized" dissent, as Khrushchev is said to have done in 1960-63, were quite rare, but their memory continues to inspire and sustain nonconformists. In other words, her analysis echoes Medvedev's observations that while "open societies" are never as unfettered as they claim, neither are "closed societies" entirely lacking in elbow room for critics to take a swing at the system.

IF ONE JOINS these authors in a retrospective of the Soviet scene, from the initial ebullience of the Khrushchev era to the drab decades of Brezhnev, one cannot take Gorbachëv's agenda of reform seriously. The Western media reinforce a negative appraisal. Their reports underscore the power of the old bureaucrats, the self-serving nature of the Kremlin's disarmament proposals, and the moribundity of a system that seems to be beyond a single leader's power to energize. Most scholars, while making finer distinctions than journalists, have also sifted through too much evidence of corruption and stagnation to give credibility to new promises of change and vitality.

Yet, there are reasons why Gorbachëv might ease pressure on dissenting opinion. For one thing, appetites for forbidden goods or thoughts cannot be prohibited; their partial satisfaction serves as a safety valve for popular grievances, letting the system keep creaking along. For another, the bloated system of police agents and informers needs the "criminals" to justify its existence. Soviet ideologists have found it counterproductive in the past to crack down on black markets or to trim the private garden plots, because much initiative goes into the provision of goods and services through these channels that cannot be obtained through official outlets. All-out war on dissenters involves a similar squandering of scarce resources—in the costly apparatus of surveillance and punishment, as well as in the lost skills of intellectuals driven out of professional jobs, not to mention the host of creative individuals who have been lost through emigration.

Indeed, there are recent straws in the wind that might augur a shift in cultural policy: the December 1985 plea of Yevgeniy Yevtushenko for greater freedom from censorship and more honesty in historical writing; CPSU Second Secretary Yegor Ligachëv's echoing of the same themes; and the recent resignation of hard-liner Georgiy Markov as head of the USSR Union of Writers after a stormy session of that organization's Congress. Gorbachëv himself sounded the themes of "glasnost'," and of honest confrontation of problems at the 27th Party Congress, which he concluded on March 6, 1986, with a call for "radical transformation in all spheres of life."[10] He lent credence to this slogan by replacing a dozen old-timers at the top of the party and government with such anti-Stalinist types as Aleksandr Yakovlev, party secretary in charge of propaganda.

The skeptics will point to the remaining fixtures, including Pëtr Demichev, who still is Culture Minister and a candidate member of the Politburo. They can also rightly conclude that little has improved in the world of the dissidents, except for token releases of Yelena Bonner, Aleksandr Shcharanskiy, and most recently, the latter's family. The annual totals of Jewish emigration, widely regarded as a barometer of the regime's openmindedness, hover below 2 percent of their crest in 1979, and the KGB continues to persecute religious and political activists.

However, if one places the subject of dissent in its broader cultural context, it appears that a new cycle of officially sanctioned criticism and change is in full swing. As happened with previous cycles, this one may lead to ferment among the intellectuals. When that happens, a new generation of dissidents may be expected to batter away at the inevitable obstacles to reform in those critical areas highlighted by an earlier generation of dissenters.

[10] *The New York Times*, Mar. 7, 1986.

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Correspondence

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US Information Agency,
301 4th Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20547, USA

CUBA IN CONTEXT

TO THE EDITORS: "Cuba's Charismatic Communism" by Jorge Domínguez (in the Sept.Oct. 1985 issue of this journal) is a model of your "essay-review" genre. It skillfully incorporates cogent discussion of the books under review within the larger framework of a critical and convincing evaluation of the Cuban phenomenon, viewed from a current perspective.

On a few matters of detail, however, some questions may be raised. On p. 102, column 1, Professor Domínguez refers to Cuba as "still economically underdeveloped." For the general reader, the connotation of "underdeveloped" could be misleading. It places Cuba in the same category as, e.g., Bolivia, Zambia, or Burma—and lends credence to Castro's recurrent claim that Cuba's poor economic performance since 1959 is largely due to its "underdevelopment" rather than to socialist bureaucracy compounded by his own mismanagement. Some other term, such as "limited development" or "with limited resources" might avoid Castro's semantic booby trap.

On p. 104, Professor Domínguez writes that Castro "saved the revolution in 1980." The use of the term "revolution" in this context, unfortunately, conforms with Cuban demagogic practice, suggesting a continuing, and perhaps permanent, revolution. All previous revolutions have admittedly come to an end, including the American Revolution, the French Revolution, the Russian Revolution, the Mexican Revolution, etc. In Mexico, a memory of the revolution is suggested in the designation of the permanent ruling party as the Institutional Revolutionary Party, but nobody is deceived. Only in Cuba does the government continue to be known officially as the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.

I would suggest that the Cuban Revolution, properly speaking, was over shortly after the economic debacle of 1970. For more than a decade now, Cuban institutions, closely modeled on those of the Soviet Union, have been stable—no more revolutionary than those of Havana's Soviet patron. What tinkering has taken place is marginal; it has had no revolutionary implications. Nor does Castro's recent, more drastic shifting of personnel indicate that revolutionary changes are in the offing. Castro's dominance of the Cuban state notwithstanding, he is more likely than not locked into the Soviet institutional mold for the foreseeable future.

Professor Domínguez explains Castro's quarter-century control of Cuba by his "mixture of vision, ruthlessness, and practicality" (p. 105). Another, perhaps decisive, element could be added: his charisma. It is almost a magic quality of personal, hypnotic dynamism, which he projects with a masterly rhetoric and a superb sense of theater. In this respect, he has no living peers. Among recent authoritarian leaders, the only other ones with charisma, ironically, would be Mussolini, Hitler, and possibly Perón.

Finally, concerning Professor Domínguez's remark that Cuban foreign policy "is not just an appendix of Soviet policy" (p. 105), it may be noted that ever since Cuba broke diplomatic relations with Israel in September 1973, the record shows a remarkable convergence between Soviet and Cuban foreign policies, particularly conspicuous in their voting behavior in the United Nations.

MAURICE HALPERIN
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MR. DOMÍNGUEZ RESPONDS: Professor Maurice Halperin's letter is characteristically lively and wise. He is correct that Cuba's economic underdevelopment is quite different from that of some much poorer countries. His letter and my essay both make the point that a major, though not the only, reason for Cuba's economic troubles is mismanagement by Castro and his government. Moreover, his letter, and my essay's title, both emphasize Castro's use of charisma to serve his ends.

I believe that the Cuban political system can still be described as "revolutionary," a circumstance that is quite unusual, as Prof. Halperin aptly points out. We agree that much about this regime has become bureaucratized, and both of us have written about these trends elsewhere. One area that continues to show the Cuban government's "revolutionary" zeal is foreign policy. Precisely because the Cuban government is more self-

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consciously revolutionary in foreign policy than is the government of the USSR, it can be argued that Cuba is no mere Soviet appendage.

To say that Cuba has a margin of autonomy within the boundaries of Soviet hegemony (to which both Prof. Halperin and my essay referred) does not mean that Cuba opposes Soviet policy. The point is quite different. Beginning in the mid-1970's, Cuba led the Soviets into heightened engagement in Angola and in Central America. Far from being passive or simply reactive and responsive to Soviet policy—as would be the case with an "appendage," "proxy," or "puppet"—Cuba has used its relative autonomy in the direction of radicalizing Soviet foreign policy.

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SOLZHENITSYN

TO THE EDITORS: In his review of my biography of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in the September-October 1985 issue of *Problems of Communism,* John Dunlop seems to be more concerned with speculating about my motives and assassinating my character than with analyzing my work. I would like to set the record straight concerning some of his more outrageous insinuations and allegations.

1. Dunlop claims that I deceived Solzhenitsyn about the sort of biography I intended to write. "The Solzhenitsyns are emphatic," according to Dunlop, "that a 'life and works' (with the stress on the latter) was always discussed, never an intimate biography." Leaving aside the question of whether what I wrote is an "intimate biography" (I would say that it is not), let us suppose that Dunlop has understood the Solzhenitsyns correctly. Why, then, did Solzhenitsyn invite me to Zurich in September 1974 to discuss in some detail the contents of *Sanya* (the memoirs of his first wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya), to point out its many mistakes and distortions, and to make available to me his own annotated copy of the book? This was before he had agreed to cooperate with me on a biography. Why did Solzhenitsyn later allow his trusted cousin Veronika Stein to give me pages and pages of notes on Natalya Reshetovskaya and his stormy relations with her, including over a dozen pages on the detailed circumstances of Reshetovskaya's attempted suicide? Why did Solzhenitsyn allow his second wife to talk to me on the same subject (albeit at much shorter length)? And why did Solzhenitsyn make available to me a lengthy letter he had written to Reshetovskaya's mother detailing the miseries he had endured at Reshetovskaya's hands? I did not ask for any of this "intimate" material; it was offered to me voluntarily. Odd as it may seem, I had not heard of Reshetovskaya's suicide attempt until Mrs. Stein told me about it. More important, with the exception of the notes on *Sanya,* all of this material came to me well after my December 28, 1974, letter to Solzhenitsyn about my intentions, which Dunlop quotes with such apparent authority. It is disingenuous, to say the least, to cite this letter totally out of context, and absolute nonsense for Solzhenitsyn and other interviewees to claim that they would not have cooperated with me if they had understood my "change of emphasis," for they were the authors of that change.

2. Dunlop states that I "broke the agreement" with Solzhenitsyn not to ask any more questions of him after the 1977 interview in Vermont. As evidence for this assertion Dunlop cites a letter from Irina Alberti to Edward Ericson, Jr., evidently designed to help the latter with the Vermont-inspired attack on my book that appeared in the February 1985 issue of *Catholicism in Crisis* (quoted with such approval by Dunlop). I did not respond to that review, because of its intemperate tone; but the fact is that Alberti knows nothing about the case, since she was not present at my discussions with Solzhenitsyn. If Dunlop is in possession, as he says he is, of my correspondence with the Solzhenitsyns, how could he possibly have overlooked my letter to Natalya Solzhenitsyn of July 1, 1977? In it, I wrote that I still had questions for Solzhenitsyn, asked whether I should save them up, send them, or forget about them, and added: "I will rely on you and do whatever you advise." On October 3, 1977, Natalya Solzhenitsyn replied as follows: "Of course you may send your questions. We will answer them to the best of our abilities. You probably have a 'couple of dozen' already, don't you?" What agreement, *pace* Dunlop, was I supposed to have broken?

3. It is suggested that my resentment of Solzhenitsyn's cessation of cooperation with me in 1979 represents the "hidden agenda" of my book. To back this up, Dunlop relies almost exclusively on my preface. In it I went to great lengths to spell out the exact nature of my relations with Solzhenitsyn—not, as Dunlop seems to imagine, to protect myself, but to protect Solzhenitsyn from suggestions that my book enjoyed his endorsement or approval. Dunlop, following Ericson, twists my neutral account to insinuate that I "obviously believed it was unfair of Solzhenitsyn" to withdraw cooperation from me, and in front of my neutral phrase "one and only visit" places the words "he laments," whereas what I wrote was "In 1977, when I paid my one and only visit . . . " (after which I offered a sympathetic account of Solzhenitsyn's Vermont household). Dunlop also misrepresents me as Solzhenitsyn's "official translator" (an office that has never existed) in order to have me "resent deeply" my abandonment of work on the translation of *The Oak and the Calf,* and he asserts that it was at "about the same time" as the withdrawal of cooperation in 1979. My decision to abandon the translation was taken in 1975, four years earlier, and was inspired by a desire to get on with the biography. Furthermore, it was I who had put Solzhenitsyn in touch with my successor, Harry Willetts, and I was entirely satisfied that he should do the job instead of me.

4. I am accused of relying excessively on Solzhenitsyn's first wife, Natalya Reshetovskaya, as a source of information about him. To support this argument, Dunlop reproduces some extraordinary "Alice in Wonderland" arithmetic from the

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Ericson review. According to Ericson, I have 54 footnotes referring to letters that Reshetovskaya sent me, and 157 referring to her book *Sanya*, making a total of 211, against which Ericson sets 134 footnotes drawn from my interviews with Solzhenitsyn and 8 from Solzhenitsyn's present wife, making a total of 142. Ergo, I am biased against Solzhenitsyn. While not accepting for a moment that this is a legitimate method of proving anything (what if each Solzhenitsyn footnote were to refer to pages of information, as is often the case, and each Reshetovskaya footnote to only a phrase, as is also often the case?), let us agree to play this game according to the Ericson-Dunlop rules. We would then be obliged to place on the Solzhenitsyn side of the scales the hundreds and hundreds of footnotes referring to Solzhenitsyn's autobiographical poem *The Way*, to the autobiographical passages in *The Gulag Archipelago*, to the autobiographical references in the literary works —above all Solzhenitsyn's own autobiography *The Oak and the Calf*. I will leave it to Ericson and Dunlop to pore over my notes and tote up the score, but I can assure them that it will come out at many, many times the number of notes referring to Reshetovskaya. How could Dunlop fail to realize such an elementary fact?

5. Dunlop states that I am "recklessly uncritical" of Reshetovskaya's version of her divorce from Solzhenitsyn. In support of this charge, Dunlop cites the *samizdat* notes of Veronika Stein, instancing my failure to take account of the KGB-manipulated young lawyer Alexeyeva, whose role in the Solzhenitsyns' divorce case is described by Galina Vishnevskaya in her book *Galina*. Dunlop also comments that although "it would seem to have been incumbent on Scammell" to interview the Rostropoviches, their names are "strangely absent" from my list of sources. Curiously enough, although Dunlop claims to have read Norman Podhoretz's review of my book in the February 1985 *Commentary*, as well as Veronika Stein's response to that review and a similar letter of mine in the June 1985 *Commentary*, he has unaccountably "overlooked" my reply to Veronika Stein which appeared in the July 1985 *Commentary* and in which I dealt with this charge. I hope I may be forgiven for simply quoting the relevant passage here: "I was in close touch with Mrs. Stein over a period of many years and interviewed her 'extensively,' as she admits in her letter. On many occasions I questioned her closely on Solzhenitsyn's divorce . . . and never once were 'the stormy events of 1972' or the name of Alexeyeva mentioned to me by Mrs. Stein. Yet now she accuses me of suppressing vital facts. If these particular facts were so vital, why did she never mention them at the time? As for the events described by Vishnevskaya, I would like to point out that over a period of three years, I sought an interview with her husband, Mstislav Rostropovich (I must confess that it never occurred to me to approach Vishnevskaya separately), and his secretary gave me his final answer on May 6, 1982: 'After many vacillations and uncertainties . . . Mr. Rostropovich has decided that he cannot participate in the interview you suggest.' I should add that of the hundreds of individuals I approached with a request to interview them on the subject of Solzhenitsyn, Rostropovich was the only one who refused." Presumably, Mr. Dunlop is aware of the fact that *Galina* appeared after my own book had been published.

6. Finally, I am charged with being unsympathetic to Solzhenitsyn's religious convictions and "unremittingly snide" about them. Since Dunlop is fond of quoting (and misrepresenting) my words to bolster his case, let me offer him another bonbon. I accept that my treatment of Solzhenitsyn's religious faith is sketchy and unsatisfactory. I was aware of it at the time of writing and have freely admitted it elsewhere. However, it is time to put an end to one particular mystery that seems to have provoked Dunlop and his friends beyond endurance, to wit, that of the identity of the "unnamed priest" who knew Solzhenitsyn well and on whose testimony I "rather slavishly" rely. Ericson, indeed, in a paroxysm of righteous indignation, challenges me to name the priest, for he and Mrs. Alberti believe that there was no such person and that my footnote referring to "private information" was a deliberate obfuscation. Very well, then. My source was Father Alexander Schmemann, Solzhenitsyn's one-time spiritual father and the priest whom Mrs. Alberti, Mrs. Stein, and other friends of Solzhenitsyn strenuously recommended that I see. I did not give his name, because at the time I interviewed him (and wrote my final chapters) he was dying of cancer, and I wished to protect him from the sort of self-righteous outbursts of the kind we are seeing now. Of course, it is open to zealous critics to concoct a theory whereby Father Schmemann was already so ill when he saw me that he was raving mad, or that I wrote down his words wrongly. The date of our meeting, however, would show that he was fully compos mentis and still able to conduct the business of St. Vladimir's Seminary, and I am confident I understood him correctly. Indeed, because he knew he was not long for this world, he almost certainly weighed his words more, rather than less, carefully than usual.

I will not bore your readers with a detailed rebuttal of Dunlop's other allegations, but I would like to make one general point. While reading his and Ericson's accusatory articles I had an inexplicable sense of *déja vu*. The jeering tone, the selective quotations, the snide (to use a revealingly favorite word of Dunlop's) insinuations, the heavy reliance on specially chosen negative reviews by other writers, the denying of almost any virtue to the book under attack, and the ad hominem imputations of dishonesty and malice, all combined with an evident disinclination to read the book under attack honestly and to engage with its arguments—where had I seen it all before? In the Soviet press, of course, when it was dealing with just about any book by Solzhenitsyn after *Ivan Denisovich* (and with that work too in later years). The difference is that for Solzhenitsyn, faced with a monolithic, government-controlled press, these attacks were highly dangerous,

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whereas in a free society they are but a flea bite. How ironic, however, that these methods should have migrated from the pages of *Literaturnaya Gazeta* via Solzhenitsyn's coterie to the columns of *Problems of Communism*.

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MR. DUNLOP RESPONDS: In his evident anger at my review of his book, Michael Scammell overlooks the pains I took to emphasize the positive features of his biography even while criticizing its very substantial flaws.

Scammell's letter also reveals, no doubt inadvertently, his real attitude toward Solzhenitsyn. Scammell suggests that Edward Ericson and I represent a shadowy *Literaturnaya Gazeta*–style "Solzhenitsyn coterie" (presumably coordinated from Vermont). The curious thing is that Scammell, who has ridiculed Solzhenitsyn for his alleged paranoid fantasies about the KGB (for example, on p. 825), is here quick to ascribe disagreement with his own views to a conspiracy. What this implies about Scammell's attitude toward Solzhenitsyn is only too clear. I should add for the record that I have never met Mr. Solzhenitsyn. (I did exchange two letters with his wife, Natalya Svetlova, when I was gathering information for my review, which is certainly far fewer than Scammell has exchanged with her.)

Now for Scammell's specific points.

1. A life and works obviously requires a substantial amount of biographical material, and Solzhenitsyn generously cooperated with Scammell in this regard. But he and a number of other interviewees were led by Scammell to believe that he was writing a "life and works" and that the emphasis would be on the *works*. My criticism is that Scammell changed the rules in midstream.

2. Any fair-minded reader of Scammell's preface to *Solzhenitsyn: A Biography* will agree that it portrays Solzhenitsyn as niggardly in regard to his cooperation with Scammell. In fact, Solzhenitsyn was most generous. Scammell simply ducks my point that he made poor use of his time at Cavendish.

3. Whether *Solzhenitsyn: A Biography* is fair or not is, of course, for each reader to determine to his own satisfaction. I would argue that Scammell can hardly claim to be evenhanded, and in my review I adduce several examples of unfairness. Others have made the same criticism.

4. Scammell *did* rely very substantially on the testimony of Solzhenitsyn's estranged first wife. This is clear to anyone who reads the book attentively.

5. It would be best to let Veronika Stein and the Rostropoviches respond to this, if they so desire.

6. Scammell cavalierly admits that his treatment of Solzhenitsyn's religious faith is "sketchy and unsatisfactory." But this issue cannot be so blithely dismissed. After all, Solzhenitsyn is a religious man, one whose views in this regard have profoundly influenced his writing. A serious biographer is surely called upon to come to grips with this aspect of his subject's personality.

Scammell tries to brush off my review as a "flea bite," but this will not deflect careful readers from the defects of his volume.

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ERITREANS AND MOSCOW

TO THE EDITORS: Commenting on differences within the Eritrean nationalist movement in his review essay, "Soviet Designs on Africa" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1986), Barry M. Schutz writes: "Whereas from its inception, the ELF [Eritrean Liberation Front] attracted Arab support, the EPLF [Eritrean People's Liberation Front] turned to the Soviet Union and *eventually obtained support from the Soviet bloc*" (p. 81, emphasis added by this correspondent).

From my understanding of the Eritrean situation, gained from reading Eritrean material (including that of the EPLF) and discussions with Eritrean and Australian students who have visited areas of Eritrea under EPLF control, this is rather simplistic and, in the case of "Soviet-bloc support" for the EPLF, inaccurate. Perhaps Professor Schutz has made the mistake of thinking that merely because the ELF is "nationalist" it received Arab nationalist support and that because the EPLF is led by "Marxist-Leninists" they must have, of necessity, received support from the Soviet bloc.

Before the ELF split into two separate groups in 1970, it received political and military support from both radical Arab Ba'athist and conservative Arab regimes. It also received Cuban support in the form of military training for some of its guerrilla fighters. After the split, which saw the formation of the Marxist-Leninist-led EPLF, both groups continued to receive support from Arab governments, particularly Iraq and Syria. Cuba, however, suspended its aid in an unsuccessful attempt to force the groups to reunify (see Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, *The Ethiopian Revolution*, London, Verso-New Left Books, 1981).

After the early 1970's, no state from the Soviet bloc assisted either the ELF or the EPLF. Certainly, the weapons the Eritreans received from Syria and Iraq included ones manufactured in the Soviet bloc, but it appears that these were given as a result of independent policy decisions on the part of the two Ba'athist regimes, and not at the request of the Soviets.

Other than arguing for Eritrean independence at the United Nations in the 1950's, the Soviets did nothing to directly support the Eritrean national liberation movement. They preferred instead to attempt to utilize the historical and religious links between Russia and Ethiopia to try to gain a foothold in Ethiopia and woo Haile Selassie away from his US benefactors. The last thing the Soviets wanted to do was support Selassie's opponents. "When we were fighting the US-backed Haile Selassie regime, we received no help

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from the Soviets, nor did we ask for it," EPLF spokesman Tsegai Dinish told West European journalists in May 1978 (cited in *Arab Liberation News* [Melbourne], No. 10, May 1978).

Soviet opposition to the EPLF was a fact long before the 1974 Ethiopian revolution that toppled Selassie and brought to power the military regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam. The Soviets characterized the EPLF as "Maoist." Indeed, Ramadan Nur and Isais Afeworki, the two leading figures of the EPLF's clandestine core party organization—the Popular Revolution Party—received political and military training in China in the late 1960's (Halliday and Molyneux). As recently as 1976, the EPLF began work on Eritrean translations of Mao Zedong's major writings (*Liberation* [magazine of Eritreans for Liberation in North America—New York], April 1977). When it became evident that the Soviets supported the new Ethiopian regime and thoroughly opposed Eritrean independence, the EPLF contrasted this "betrayal" with Stalin's "correct" line on Eritrea in the 1950's. None of this endeared the EPLF to the Soviet bloc.

As for Cuba's earlier support for the ELF, this was during Fidel Castro's and Che Guevara's "Tricontinental period," when Cuba was making a pitch for leadership of the "world revolutionary movement." This stance often led to foreign policy differences between Cuba and the Soviet Union. (Whether these differences were genuine contradictions or a clever "dual tactic" is now academic, since the mid-1970's saw Castro willing to put his revolution and its soldiers at the disposal of Soviet foreign policy objectives.)

Once the Soviet Union and its allies intervened militarily on Addis Ababa's behalf against the EPLF, there were even fewer possibilities for an EPLF-Soviet alliance. After 1977, when the EPLF found itself struggling militarily against Ethiopian and Soviet-bloc forces, its policy toward the Soviets followed a complicated, zig-zag course.

One might have thought the Soviet attack would have strengthened the Maoist, "anti-Soviet revisionist" component of the EPLF's ideological leadership. Indeed, in 1978, the group announced: "The war in Eritrea is no longer a war against the Ethiopian fascist junta, but a war between the Eritrean people and the Soviet Union" (statement issued by the Rome office of EPLF on November 30, 1978). However, by this time, China had forsaken the EPLF and many other "Maoist" and Marxist-Leninist-led Third World movements in order to improve its relations with Third World governments. There were reports that "ultra-leftists" in the EPLF were being purged (read "Maoist" for "ultra-leftist").

Although still fulminating publicly against the Soviet-backed military intervention against them, the EPLF sent instructions to its overseas support groups to halt their often strident anti-Soviet polemics, saying, "We have never for any reason considered the Soviet Union as our enemy, as an imperialist force, a counter-revolutionary force" ("EPLF's Message to Italian and North American Eritrean Student Organizations!" cited in *Eritrea: Revolution or Capitulation?* New York, EFLNA, 1978). The EPLF even held discussions with Soviet officials in East Germany concerning a possible peace agreement, although these talks ended in failure (Halliday and Molyneux).

In view of China's non-support, the tendency of radical and leftist regimes in the area to look favorably upon the new pro-Soviet Ethiopian regime, and the EPLF's dogmatic policy of "opposition to US imperialism as the main enemy" (stubbornly clung to, even though the United States had lost any foothold in Ethiopia after 1976, and even though the actual "main enemy" had become the Soviet-backed forces), it appeared that by 1978, the EPLF was preparing for some kind of compromise.

After putting the EPLF forces on the defensive, causing them to withdraw to the Western Sahel region and relinquish control of the main towns and ports in central Eritrea, the Soviets and Ethiopians were no longer interested in any compromises, however. The war bogged down to a positional standoff, with the EPLF (the ELF no longer controls any significant areas of Eritrea) fiercely defending its "liberated territory" against periodic and savage Soviet-Ethiopian offensives.

By 1982, the EPLF was again condemning the Soviet Union in no uncertain terms, resorting to the appellation of "hegemonist" to describe Soviet policies (Halliday and Molyneux). This term, in Chinese and Maoist phraseology, usually indicates a characterization of Soviet policy as expansionist and empire-building, while still differentiating it from the classical Leninist concept of capitalist "imperialism."

Thus, the EPLF has never had a "fraternal" relationship with the Soviet bloc. On a number of occasions, it has sought discussions with the Soviets on peace proposals, but these have failed to produce any results, due to Eritrean insistence on total independence from Ethiopia. While the EPLF has wavered over the question of how to appraise the USSR and the Soviet bloc, it has nevertheless continued to confront Soviet-bloc forces on the battlefield. Far from extending any significant support to the EPLF, Moscow has sought, initially, to discourage that group's struggle, and after 1976 and the conclusion of an alliance with Mengistu's Ethiopian regime, to crush the EPLF militarily, enlisting the support of Soviet allies—Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Cuba. To the best of my knowledge, this remains the situation in 1986.

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MANAGERS AND MOTIVATION IN USSR

TO THE EDITORS: Vladimir Kontorovich's article "Discipline and Growth in the Soviet Economy" (*Problems of Communism*, November-December 1985) mentions the relaxation of discipline attendant to a policy of "trust in cadres." This is described solely in terms of a lessening of pressure from above. However, as all relationships are bidirectional, it can be seen that "trust in cadres" also reduced dependency upward, i.e., it took away carrots as well as sticks.

The purges and the rapid rise of the Brezhnev generation led to a demographic synchronization of elites, so

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CORRECTIONS

In the article "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority" by Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann (*Problems of Communism,* May-June 1986) Nikolay Kruchina was incorrectly identified as head of the CPSU Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department (p. 7, fn. 42). His correct position is Administrator of Affairs in the CPSU CC. Also, in the first line of fn. 48, p. 8, the name should have been Vladimir Brezhnev, not Yuriy Brezhnev.

that retirement and death rates among upper and middle management were relatively low over an extended period of time. This, along with "trust in cadres," meant few openings for promotion. As I argue in an article entitled "The Psychology of Soviet Corruption, Indiscipline, and Resistance to Reform," (*Political Psychology* [New York], Vol. 7, No. 1: "Cut off from the chain of dependency up and control down, office holders are cast adrift." Discipline is centralizing, while lack of it is conducive to local leaders' pursuing of local or private interests.

Studies of Western organizations show certain regularities in the behavior of the "stuck"—those with low opportunities for promotion (See R. M. Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation,* New York, Basic Books, 1977). Low-opportunity personnel characteristically have a low-risk, security-minded orientation toward their jobs. Also, career mobility is directly related to commitment to the organization. Finally, belief in the fairness of the organization is proportional to one's chances for promotion. In the light of these findings, the likely indirect demoralizing effects of a "trust in cadres" policy are readily seen.

Kontorovich points to the gains made in the Soviet railroad industry from a tightening of discipline, and to the importance of several well-publicized firings to this discipline campaign. But for the long haul, carrots are needed, as well as sticks. The removal of a few managers for abuses or incompetence will not produce enough career mobility (i.e., enough job openings) to truly motivate managers at all levels. What is needed is a retirement policy that will provide a continuous flow of job openings, yet Gorbachëv has appointed no one younger than himself to the Politburo.

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